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GREATER ITALY 



GREATER ITALY 



BY 
WILLIAM KAY WALLACE, M.A. 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1917 






COPTEMHT, 1917, BT 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 




%^o 



MAY 15 1917 



vQgI..A460822 



PREFACE 

I WOULD attempt to trace in this volume the rise 
of the Kingdom of Italy among nations, with more 
particular emphasis on the part played by the people 
of Italy in the affairs of the world during the past 
three decades. 

The share which Italy has had in shaping the his- 
tory of Europe during this period is a great one. 
Careful analysis would lead one to conclude that 
the policy which Italy has pursued has been one of 
the chief final determinants in world affairs. Italy's 
open acknowledgment of her partnership in the Triple 
AIHance brought about the re-grouping of the Eu- 
ropean Powers which soon crystallised into the two 
groups of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, 
facing each other across the chessboard of international 
affairs. It was only when Germany, with overweening 
self-confidence, trumpeted loudly her defiant cry of 
Weltmacht oder Niedergang, that the people of Italy, 
perceiving the subservience of the position into which 
they had fallen, with indomitable courage set about to 
free themselves from German control. 

In dealing with Italian affairs, I have sought to 
lay particular stress on the relations of Italy with 
the Central Powers, to trace the course of Italian 
pohcy in its deahngs with Vienna and BerHn, and to 
show how the "manage force '^ of Rome and Vienna, 
brought about by the arbitrariness of BerHn, could 



vi PREFACE 

not fail to end in disaster. However, it would be very- 
short-sighted to disregard the immense material ad^ 
vantages and benefits which Italy received as a result 
of her intimate relations with Germany. It is only by 
a clear understanding of this intimacy, which, for a 
generation, existed between Rome and Berlin that we 
can gauge truthfully the present realist temper of the 
Italian people. 

No history of present-day Italy would be complete 
without a mention of the occupant of the throne of 
St. Peter. I have endeavoured to recount briefly, 
though carefully, the relations between the Vatican 
and the Quirinal. In so doing I have concerned myself 
solely with the political aspect of the Papacy. The 
Papacy, viewed as a poHtical organism, is a problem 
of immediate and vital importance to the Kingdom of 
Italy, which must be the object of concern to every 
student of history. Since the chapter on this subject 
was written news reaches me from Rome that during 
the past month there has been a decided change in 
Papal poUcy; that the Vatican is making serious efforts 
to conciUate the Allies; that the Pope has addressed 
severe remonstrances to the Central Powers regarding 
their policy of deportations and bombardment of open 
towns; that he has rid himself of certain pro-German 
personages of his entourage, and is endeavouring to 
show himself docile and conciliatory towards France. 

Of all the Powers engaged in the European War 
none has more pressing problems, difficult of solu- 
tion, confronting it, than Italy. The people of Italy 
believe that they have pre-eminent interests in the 
Trentino and the Eastern Adriatic, in the ^gean and 
Asia Minor, as well as in certain regions of northern 



PREFACE vii 

and eastern Africa. A stable peace in Europe can- 
not be guaranteed without the just satisfaction of 
the essential legitimate Italian aspirations. To in- 
sure a better understanding of these aspirations I 
have endeavoured to give to contemporary problems 
something of their historical setting. 

I have had the privilege of being at and near the 
front with the Italian armies at different periods 
diu-ing this war. I was present on the field of battle 
during the stirring days when the Austrians launched 
their great invasion of Italy last May. I was there 
able to learn something of the intrepid valour of those 
brave sons of United Italy who marched to their 
death in the highlands with flowers garlanded about 
their dust-covered helmets, a smile on their lips, 
a song in their hearts. The precise efficiency, the calm 
demeanour, the stern restraint of officers and men 
alike, in the face of so grave a danger, gave me an 
insight into the new Italy; the Italy of dynamic, 
resourceful energy, of deep courage, of buoyant, op- 
timistic vitality. It is to this Italy that I would 
direct your attention. 

January, 1917 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB PAGE 

I. The Achievement of Unity ... 1 

Napoleon III and Cavour. The Rise of 
Piedmont. Struggles for Independence. 

II. Formative Forces 20 

Nationalism. Irredentism. Futurism. 

III. The Triple Alliance 39 

The Rule of Crispi. Colonial Expansion. 
The Abyssinian War. 

IV. The Period of Retrenchment ... 68 

1896-1903. Internal Difficulties. The 
House of Savoy. 

V. The Dictatorship of Giolitti ... 92 

Political Corruption, The Erosion of 
Parties. Algeciras and Agadir. 

VI. The Libyan War 114 

Aims and Aspirations. Account of the Con- 
flict. The War and After. 

VII. Economic Development 141 

Social and Vital Statistics. Industrial 
AND Commercial Expansion. Colonial 
Dominions. 

VIII. The Vatican and the Quirinal . . 159 

Rome the Capital of the Kingdom of Italy. 
The Law of Guarantees. The Roman 
Question. 



X CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGB 

IX. Italy and Germany 184 

German Peaceful Penetration. Industrial 
Servitude. The Breaking from Bondage. 

X. The Problem of the Adriatic . . . 207 

Relations with Austria. The Need of 
Hegemony. Italians and Slavs. 

XI. The Days of Neutrality .... 238 

The Trend of Policy. Neutralists and 
Interventionists. The May Revolution. 

XII. Italy at War ........ 268 

Period op Aloofness. Military and Polit- 
ical Crises. Unity. 

Index 303 



MAPS 

I. Italy before Unity .... tofacep,^'^ 
II. The Italian War Zone . . to face p. 272 - 
III. Greater Italy at end 



GREATER ITALY 



GREATER ITALY 

CHAPTER I 
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY 

Napoleon III and Cavoub. The Rise of Piedmont. 
Struggles for Independence 

It was in July, 1858, that Cavour, at the personal 
invitation of Napoleon III, came to Plombieres, where 
the Emperor was at that time taking the baths. Here, 
between other diversions, feehng himself strong and 
vigorous as a result of his stay in the bracing air of 
the Vosges, Napoleon readily entered upon a secret 
understanding with the Itahan Minister to assist the 
Piedmontese in driving out the Austrians from north- 
ern Italy, and agreed to the hegemony of the House of 
Savoy, of this new and much enlarged ItaHan King- 
dom. 

The meetings between Napoleon and Cavour lasted 
two days. Finally, after a long interview, Napoleon 
took Cavour for a drive into the country, he himself 
driving the light, high-wheeled gig. No one was pres- 
ent at this excursion, which lasted over three hours. 
It was while Napoleon was busied driving his horses 
along the mountain roads that Cavour poured forth 
his most astute and incisive arguments. This hour 
was to prove momentous in the history of modern 
Italy, for with foreign aid, of both men and money, 

1 



2 GREATER ITALY 

the plan of Cavour ''for the self-government of all 
Italy by Italians" seemed assured. 

It is impossible to conceive that Napoleon III had 
any idea of bringing about Italian unity in a broad 
sense, or that he took a very lively interest in Italian 
affairs. But circumstances had rendered him the 
arbiter of Europe, and he believed the moment oppor- 
tune to freshen the lustre of the miUtary laurels of 
France. Events proved that he was more interested 
in filling up the empty niches of the Invalides with new 
trophies than he was with Italian national aspira- 
tions. 

However, Cavour returned well content to Italy 
and reported to his sovereign, Victor Emmanuel II, 
at Turin the results of his interview. 

The terms of the agreement were vague. France was 
to furnish 200,000 men; Piedmont was to raise 100,000. 
The joint forces were to drive the Austrians from 
Lombardy and Venetia, which, together with the 
Legations and the Marches of Ancona, were to be an- 
nexed to the States already under the sovereignty of 
Victor Emmanuel 11. France was to receive the 
Duchy of Savoy in return for the cession of Lombardy, 
while Nice was to be given to France in case Venetia 
was acquired. Thus Cavour set to work to pave the 
way for the liberation and unification of Italy. 

In those days the attitude of Austria towards Pied- 
mont was, in many respects, identical with the atti- 
tude of the Dual Monarchy towards Serbia during the 
past decade. In 1859 Austria held the greater part of 
northern Italy in bondage, just as in our own times 
the Hapsburg Empire after annexing Bosnia, in 1908, 
held the great majority of the Jugo-Slavs within its 



THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY 3 

power. As Serbia, seeking to realise the national am- 
bitions of the Southern Slavs, turned to Russia for 
help against the encroachments of Vienna, so Pied- 
mont turned to France. For Cavour's arrangement 
for the co-operation of Napoleon was based solely on 
the contingency of an overt aggression on the part of 
Austria. The analogy is still more striking when it is 
recalled that as in 1914 England made every effort to 
avoid war, so in 1859 she tendered her good offices as 
mediator when the situation became acute in April, 
and Austria had despatched an ultimatum to Pied- 
mont. 

The attitude of France was obscure. Napoleon had 
made a personal agreement with Cavour, without in- 
forming his Ministers, who now flatly declared that 
there was no need of going to war for the aggrandise- 
ment of the House of Savoy. The future of Italy for 
a moment hung by a precarious thread. Cavour had 
made plans, so it is said, to leave for America in case 
Napoleon repudiated his word. 

England called upon Austria and Piedmont to meet 
in conference. Cavour bowed to the inevitable, and 
agreed to the proposal. This was April 17. Two days 
later Austria sent an arrogant reply, stating that she 
could not agree to any mediation. This coup de tete 
on the part of Austria rallied France to the support of 
Italy, while the British Cabinet, incensed at the tone 
of the Austrian reply, was also openly favourable to 
Italy. Ten days later Austria declared war, and the 
Franco-Italian forces entered Lombardy. 

Success accompanied the expedition. Magenta and 
Solferino were facile and brilliant, if not decisive, vic- 
tories for the allied arms. The liberation of Lombardy 






4 GREATER ITALY 

soon followed, and the hopes of all Italy ran high that 
at last the detested Austrian would be driven beyond 
the Brenner and the Quanero. Yet only nine weeks 
after the beginning of the campaign, when Venetia 
was still firmly held by Austria, Napoleon, fearing fiu-- 
ther complications at home, as reports had reached 
him that the Prussians were mobilising along the 
Rhine, agreed to an armistice, and on July 11, in a 
personal interview with the Emperor Francis Joseph 
at Villafranca, concluded the preliminaries of peace, 
which was later signed at Ziirich on November 10, 
1859. By its terms Lombardy was ceded to Napoleon, 
who in turn handed it over to Piedmont. This was 
the only tangible result of a campaign so auspiciously 
begun. Italy remained in as chaotic a state as before, 
and Italian unity seemed as remote as ever. 

The Italians, deceived and disappointed by the 
action of Napoleon at Villafranca, were further in- 
furiated against the French, when, in the next year, 
the Emperor demanded his "pound of flesh," and com- 
pelled Piedmont to cede Nice and Savoy to France, 
and at the same time called a halt to Italian ambitions 
by continuing to occupy Rome with French troops. 
Napoleon's short-sighted and slighting attitude to- 
wards Italy was to prove of grave consequence to 
France, not merely because of the neutral attitude 
adopted by Italy during the Franco-Prussian War of 
1870, but during the next half century the spectre of 
the wrongs inflicted at this time on Italy rose time 
and again to prevent a friendly understanding between 
the two countries. 

Nevertheless, the first seeds of Italian unity had 
been sown in fertile soil. The princes of the House of 



THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY 5 

Savoy felt themselves the chosen leaders of Italian 
unity. Piedmont became the kernel of the new Italy. 
The flame of nationalism had spread throughout the 
peninsula. The national aspirations of a great race 
cannot be quenched by temporary reverses. In March, 
1860, EmiUa and Tuscany, by a plebiscite voted them- 
selves a part of the new Kingdom, while Garibaldi, 
with his famous Thousand, set sail from Quarto, near 
Genoa, for the south. One by one, in rapid succession, 
Umbria, the Marches, Naples, and Sicily all voted 
their adherence to the growing Italian Kingdom. In 
November, 1866, the greater part of Venetia was 
wrested from Austria, while in 1870 the chief event of 
the nationaUsation of the Italian peninsula was 
achieved when the ItaUan forces captured Rome, and 
the city became the capital of the country. Thus, 
briefly, are set forth the outlines of the struggle which 
brought into being modern Italy. 

It is more than a mere coincidence that the year 1870 
should have been marked by the appearance of two 
new states in the firmament of nations. The history 
of the rise of Prussia and of Piedmont is emphatically 
similar. The objects of both were the same: to group 
and weld into one united whole the motley members 
which formed each body poHtic. This was the aim of 
both Prussia and Piedmont. As in Prussia, so in Pied- 
mont a landed aristocracy and an old mihtary caste 
held the reins of government. As in Prussia, so in Pied- 
mont a man was found equal to the task of driving out 
the cumbersome Austrian and of setting the seal of 
national independence on the united nations under 
the hegemony of their respective sovereigns. Cavour 
and Bismarck are the two nation-builders of modern 



6 GREATER ITALY 

times. Under their guidance both Prussia and Pied- 
mont assumed the leadership of their race, and con- 
soUdated their peoples into an organic whole. The 
constructive work of unification received its greatest 
immediate impetus when the two States, Prussia and 
Piedmont, became allies to drive out the Austrians. 
The victorious campaign of 1866, which ended in 
Sadowa, was conducted single-handed by the Prussians, 
for the ItaUans met with reverses during the first days 
of the struggle. But Bismarck, who was looking be- 
yond the immediate present, foresaw the advantages 
to be gained by an unwonted leniency towards the 
humbled Austrian. A truce, followed by peace, was 
speedily arranged for, and Italy received Venetia as 
her share of the spoils; a brave step in advance in the 
programme of national unity. 

But the crowning year of the rise of the two States 
was reached in 1870. Once again Prussia took up the 
cudgels for the cause of German expansion, and Italy, 
profiting by the embarrassment of France, entered 
Rome, which was forthwith proclaimed the capital of 
the new Kingdom of Italy, under the sovereignty of 
Victor Enunanuel 11. When, three months later, 
Bismarck placed the Imperial crown upon the head of 
William I at Versailles, he was merely following the 
Italian example. The task was complete. The first 
cycle of the epic of nationalism had ended. 

During the ensuing years Prussia and Piedmont, 
within their respective spheres, were busy endeavouring 
to make the smaller and weaker States of the union 
forget their particularist past, and to imbue the newly 
united peoples with a sense of national patriotism. 
But here the similarity ends. Prussia brought into 




Longitude 



THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY 



THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY 7 

being the German Empire by ''blood and iron." From 
the very outset the principles of nationality were 
violated; fii'st, in 1864, by the annexation of the 
Danish Duchies; then, in 1870, by the incorporation 
of Alsace-Lorraine. Piedmont, on the contrary, rose 
to leadership in response to the desire of a people of 
one tongue, tradition, and culture, who were ready 
for the great experiment in national unity. 

The German Empire still remained a patchwork of 
unassimilated principaUties, under the leadership of 
Prussia, whereas Piedmont, fused into the new Italy, 
soon lost her hegemony and much of her identity. 

The further shaping of the destiny of the two new 
States was influenced by many internal factors. The 
confederation of German States, under Prussian leader- 
ship, as created by Bismarck, was an elastic organisa- 
tion, capable of indefinite expansion. The ItaUan 
Kingdom, on the other hand, soon set itself in a mould 
of a certain rigidity. From a constructive point of 
view the early death of Cavour in 1861, before the 
work of unification was completed, left Italy without 
a strong and skilful leader, while Bismarck Hved on for 
another thirty years, and was able to shape the des- 
tinies of the Empire he had created. Yet Prussia and 
Piedmont have always had a certain comradeship of 
spirit, which subsists to this day. This is only natural 
when viewed in the light of the many important crises 
which the two States endured in common, and of the 
remarkable similarity of the episodes in their national 
development. 

No sooner had national unity in Italy been firmly 
achieved, no sooner did Italy feel her new national 



8 GREATER ITALY 

strength, than she looked about her and discovered, 
for the first time, the weakness of her geographical 
position. Jutting out into the Mediterranean, the 
long, boot-shaped peninsula is unprotected by any- 
natural coast defenses. Across the narrow Adriatic 
and along her northeastern boundary, holding the 
keys to all the valleys leading into the Venetian plain, 
Austria loomed menacingly. In the west, not thirty 
miles from the ItaUan coast, Corsica, in the hands of 
France, was a thorn in the side of the new Italy. The 
Mediterranean was rapidly becoming an EngUsh 
lake, as by the acquisition of the control of the Suez 
Canal by purchase in 1875, the British had succeeded 
in botthng up the States bordering on its shores. 
Though Italy had no reason to fear England, who had 
always taken a most friendly attitude on all matters 
concerning the new Kingdom, the Italians chafed at 
the patronising tone of British statesmen, who were 
in the habit of treating Italy in a romantic rather 
than in a reaUst spirit. Furthermore, the Itahans 
thought that their national will would be continually 
thwarted by England in any sphere of colonial expan- 
sion. 

To any one looking out on the world through Italian 
eyes, during the years immediately following the unifi- 
cation of Italy, Europe presented a sorry spectacle. 
The Itahans, with their hearts still full of their great 
epic adventure in nation-building, beheld England 
busy rounding out her colonial domain, earmarking the 
few remaining ''uncivihsed" districts for her own uses, 
maintaining an attitude of "splendid isolation" which 
chilled the sensibilities of the Italian patriots. France, 
after the throes of the Commune, set about coura- 



THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY 9 

geously to repair the wastage of recent disasters, in- 
augurating the Tliird RepubHc under inauspicious cir- 
cumstances. She was so busy setting her own house 
in order that she found no time for, what seemed to 
her, the childish enthusiasms of Italy. Furthermore, 
Italy openly mistrusted France, and feared that at 
any time France might take it into her head to set the 
Pope back on his temporal throne, or undertake some 
other quixotic expedition. 

In 1876 the control of the Government at Rome 
passed from the Right; pragmatists in politics, follow- 
ers of the Pied^nontese tradition, they had patterned 
their parhamentary conduct on the English model and 
pursued a policy of exclusiveness and self-interest in 
foreign affairs, initiated and so successfully carried out 
by Cavour, Piedmont now lost its ascendency in na- 
tional affairs, and the reins of power passed to the 
South, where the Left dominated. 

With the accession of the Depretis Ministry to office 
in March, 1876, Italian foreign relations follow a hap- 
hazard course. A spirit of visionary altruism, based 
on high-sounding phrases, seized hold of the Govern- 
ment. At a period when cold, hard-headed reahsm in 
the conduct of affairs was needed, Italian statesmen, 
or rather the politicians in power, were more concerned 
with retaining their parliamentary majority than with 
the real interests of their country. During the first 
years of Italian national existence the new State 
showed no singular aptitude to take advantage of its 
position as a force in European affairs. Timidity, 
combined with lassitude and a desire for peace, 
seemed to express the will of the people. Italy 
continued to maintain an attitude of aloofness as re- 



10 GREATER ITALY 

gards international affairs of peculiar interest to her, 
which betrayed the fact that the strong current which 
had brought about national unity had not as yet been 
sufficiently channelled so as to permit a sane con- 
ception of Italy's international obligations and inter- 
ests. Public men and public opinion were both ner- 
vous lest a foreign state should interfere in Italian 
home affairs. 

In order to sound the Powers regarding their atti- 
tude towards Italy, Crispi, who later was to prove so 
ardent an exponent of the Triple Alliance, set out in 
August, 1877, on a tour of the various capitals to find 
out the temper of European statesmen. In Paris he 
was well, if coolly, received. He soon became con- 
vinced that France would not make any attempt to 
restore the temporal power of the Papacy; one of the 
chief fears which still lingered in Italian minds. Yet 
Crispi fancied that he discovered that France looked 
with no favourable eye on any further expansion of 
Italy, and he left Paris firmly beheving that France 
and Italy could not be friends. Crispi then sought 
out Bismarck at Gastein. The Iron Chancellor told 
Crispi very frankly that though he would not be 
averse to assisting Italy in case of an aggressive at- 
titude on the part of France he would in nowise in- 
tercede in Austria in behalf of a rectification of the 
Italo-Austrian boundary-fine, which, drawn hastily 
in 1866, had left Italy very vulnerable from a strategic 
view-point, while many hundred thousand Italians 
in the Trentino and the Adriatic littoral still remained 
under Austrian rule. London, . not wishing to meddle 
in Continental politics of no immediate concern to 
herself, took little notice of the Italian envoy. Count 



THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY 11 

Andrdssy, in Vienna, very pointedly remarked that 
the question of the eventuahty of a Hapsburg protec- 
torate over Bosnia, which was at that time rumoured, 
was of no concern to Italy, and that compensations 
elsewhere, as suggested by Crispi, in regard to a rear- 
rangement of the frontier would not be pacifically 
entertained. Crispi returned to Italy feeling, though 
without much foundation, that Bismarck, notwith- 
standing his gruff and uncompromising manner, was 
the only friend whom Italy could count on in Europe. 

It was a year later that the Congress of Berhn 
(1878) met to undo the handiwork of the Treaty of 
San Stefano in an attempt to settle more equitably 
the Near Eastern Question, which at that time had 
come to the fore of international affairs as a result of 
the Russo-Turkish War. Italy's envoy, Count Corti, 
having no mandate, or programme of policy, main- 
tained throughout the conference an attitude of lofty 
unconcern, allowing Austria to acquire the Bosnian 
protectorate, while England annexed Cyprus. Empty- 
handed the ItaHan delegate returned to Rome from 
an international gathering, where, by skilful negotia- 
tions and representations, Italy might readily have 
gained some substantial territorial compensation, as 
both Austria and England had succeeded in doing. 

The repercussion in Italy of this diplomatic de- 
bacle was wide-spread. The Italians keenly felt their 
weakness as a nation and the incompetence of their 
leaders to deal with international problems. The 
humihation of the Italians at this juncture increased 
their national sensitiveness and made them reahse 
their isolation in Europe. Their amour-propre had re- 
ceived a decided rebuff, and they fancied that they ap- 



12 GREATER ITALY 

peared before the world in a ridiculous light. Thrown 
back on themselves, they turned towards the south 
and cast their eyes across the Mediterranean. 

The Italians, owing to the central position of their 
country in the Mediterranean, believe that they will 
be naturally called upon to control its destiny. The 
heritage of ancient Rome, with its vast dominions, 
cannot be forgotten by a people who live on the seven 
hills of the Eternal City and to whom the pageantry 
of the past is a living reminder. But turning to more 
practical considerations, only one hundred and twenty 
miles of open sea separates Sicily from northern Africa. 
For centuries the Italians have gone forth and settled 
along the African shores of the Mediterranean, taking 
with them their culture and customs, and retaining 
in a large degree their Italian characteristics. 

As France by the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, ex- 
cluded from the direction of European affairs, focussed 
her attention on northern Africa and in 1830 achieved 
the conquest of Algeria, so Italy, rebuffed by the 
Powers in 1878, fixed her ambitions on the acquisition 
of Tunis. The Italian settlement at Tunis was the 
richest and most prosperous of any of the foreign 
settlements established there. The trade relations 
between Tunis and Italy were close and friendly. 
Italy, though hampered by her lack of resources, set 
to work eagerly to acquire this African domain, which 
was to offset her recent humiliation. Tunis, governed 
by a weak Bey, had already fallen into the hands of 
foreign exploitation. But if Italy was anxious to 
acquire this, her first colony, by the annexation of 
Tunis, she found in France a strong and determined 
rival. For France felt that she also had pre-eminent 



THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY 13 

interests in Tunis, though her settlement there was 
barely one-third as large as the ItaUan. Yet, owing to 
the fact that Tunis adjoins Algeria, France believed 
that she had special rights, and determined not to 
tolerate that another European Power should gain 
possession of this country. 

It has been repeatedly stated that Bismarck, after 
the Berlin Conference, told both the French and 
Italian envoys separately that they might each aspire 
to the possession of Tunis, — Bismarck being desirous 
of further embittering Franco-Italian relations. This 
account, which is of French origin, has never been 
confirmed, though it is true that England, in return 
for France's acquiescence in the acquisition of Cy- 
prus, expressed her willingness to countenance a French 
protectorate over Tunis. These negotiations were un- 
known to the Italians at large, who welcomed the 
prospect of a vast colonial domain as a symbol of 
power. All Italy was united in the project, which was 
widely discussed in the press, before any actual steps 
had been taken. Matters were brought to a head 
when in January, 1881, King Humbert visited Sicily. 
The occasion was used to have a deputation of Italians 
from Tunis wait upon the King. This deputation 
presented an address in which the ancient ties be- 
tween Tunis and Rome were referred to in no veiled 
terms. France thereupon decided that her interests 
were in jeopardy. Profiting by a disturbance along 
the Tunisian border of Algeria, the French sent an 
expedition into Tunis, marched the troops to the 
capital, and on May 12 forced the Bey to sign a 
treaty placing Tunis under the protectorate of France. 
Italy was stunned by the news. She felt herself 



14 GREATER ITALY 

helpless to vindicate what she believed to be her 
rights. The Italian people now realised that there 
was something radically wrong with the conduct of 
their international affairs. Italy must have friends, 
allies. Thwarted by Austria in 1878, now tricked by 
what they believed to be the deceit of France, the 
Italians turned first to England, who had always 
been a friend of the young Kingdom. However, 
England did not welcome the idea of being burdened 
with Italian affairs, so she gave an evasive reply. 
Russia lay too far out of the sphere of ItaUan rela- 
tions. There remained only Germany. 

It depends on the angle at which the arrangement 
which resulted in the Triple Alliance is looked upon 
to determine its value. The majority of foreign ob- 
servers who have hitherto discussed the subject will 
tell you that Italy was blindly forced into an agree- 
ment totally devoid of advantages to herself, while 
conferring great benefits on the other two members of 
the alliance; that Italy was just another available 
army at the disposal of Prussia for the defense of 
Alsace-Lorraine, and, as an ally of the Hapsburgs, 
freed Austria from any worries regarding her south- 
western boundary and gave her a free hand to play an 
active part in Balkan affairs. It is usually assigned 
to the credit of Bismarck, as one of his most masterly 
diplomatic strokes, that he forced Italy to pay for 
Germany's aid, while he in reality was most eager to 
seciu-e thie co-operation of the Italians. Bismarck's 
sudden volte face in his attitude towards the Papacy — 
which hitherto he had treated with much harshness 
— alarmed the Italians. Europe rang with reports, 
emanating from Germany, of the alleged difficulties 



THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY 15 

of the Pope's position at Rome, and Bismarck even 
went so far as to propose that the Papacy should 
move to Germany, where temporal asylum would be 
guaranteed. But Bismarck played his most astute 
role when he intimated to the Italian Government that 
the road to Berlin's friendship lay through Vienna. 
Only five months after the Tunisian catastrophe the 
King and Queen of Italy paid a visit of state to Vienna, 
where they were received with much ceremony. 
Though no political discussions were broached, it 
became evident that the way for an understanding 
was being paved. During the ensuing weeks no oc- 
casion was missed to impress upon Italy the precari- 
ousness of her existence as an independent State. 
This, we are told, was Bismarck's method of making 
Italy realise that she was a "negligible quantity," and 
that Prussia was to be the senior partner in any agree- 
ment entered into. But was this really necessary? 
The weakness of Italy, both from a military and finan- 
cial standpoint, was patent to all. The country had 
great possibilities of development in the future, but 
at the time Italy was in no position to dictate terms. 
She would even have accepted far more onerous con- 
ditions than those of the agreement she entered into. 
Several projects were discussed, until a seemingly 
suitable agreement was drawn up which was signed 
at Vienna on May 20, 1882. 

Though the full text of the treaty of the Triple 
Alliance has never been published,^ whatever its exact 
terms may be, its main object was to create a defen- 

^ In 1915 Articles I, III, IV, VII of the treaty were for the first time 
revealed. Article I was disclosed in a Note transmitted by Baron 
SonniQo, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to ItaUan diplomatic 



16 GREATER ITALY 

sive military alliance between the contracting parties 
against foreign aggression for a period of five years. 
It is known that Italy agreed to relinquish her claims 
to the Italian districts still under Austrian rule, while 
both Germany and Austria refrained from any com- 
ment in regard to the Mediterranean, and left Italy 
a free hand to pursue whatever policy she deemed 
opportune. This was the weakest Hnk of the treaty, 
when looked at from the Italian standpoint, as neither 
of Italy's new allies offered any guarantees in the event 
of an aggression directed against Italy in the Mediter- 
ranean. Though the material advantages gained by 
the Alliance were, for Italy, negligible, the signature 
of this treaty marks the beginning of a new epoch in 

representatives abroad on May 24 for communication to the Powers. 
The remainder were published by the Austro-Hungarian Government 
during the same month in their Diplomatische Aktenstucke (Red Book). 
The clauses read as follows: 

Article I. — The High Contracting Parties mutually promise to re- 
main on terms of peace and friendship, and that they will not enter 
into any alliance or engagement directed against one of their States. 

They pledge themselves to undertake an exchange of views regard- 
ing all general and political questions which may present themselves, 
and promise fm-thermore their mutual assistance, commensurate with 
their individual interests. 

Article III. — In case one or two of the High Contracting Parties, 
without direct provocation on their part, should be attacked by one 
or more Great Powers not signatory of the present Treaty and should 
become involved in a war with them, the casus fcederis would arise 
simultaneously for all the High Contracting Parties. 

Article IV. — In case a Great Power not signatory of the present 
Treaty should threaten the State security of one of the High Contract- 
ing Parties, and in case the threatened party should thereby be com- 
pelled to declare war against that Great Power, the two other Contract- 
ing Parties engage themselves to maintain benevolent neutraHty to- 
wards their ally. Each of them reserves its right, in this case, to take 
part in the war if it thinks fit in order to make common cause with its 
ally. 

Article VII. — Deals with Italo-Austrian agreement respecting the 
Balkans. See p. 125. 



THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY 17 

world politics. Italy, rescued from her position of 
obscure isolation, began to play a part in European 
affairs. The shaping of the whole course of world 
events was altered by Italy's step at this time. The 
''balance of power," that favorite British doctrine 
for the maintenance of world peace, was upset by the 
Triple Alliance. France now was isolated in Europe, 
and Italy entered upon a period of national develop- 
ment and unprecedented prosperity. Germany, under 
Prussian leadership, was rapidly forging to the front 
rank of power. Aside from the natural historical 
affinity of the rise to nationhood of Germany and 
Italy, Germany seemed the only State in Europe which 
did not directly in some manner cross the path of 
ItaHan development. At that time the Drang nach 
Osten had not as yet been evolved, and Bismarck 
still frowned upon colonial adventures as threatening 
the stability of the new Germany. 

Two significant events occurred within a. few months 
of the conclusion of the Triple Alliance which in- 
dicated clearly the advantages and disadvantages of 
Italy's new position. Two months after the signing 
of the treaty, England, whether she regretted her 
aloofness towards ItaUan affairs in the past, and 
the httle regard she had had for the colonial am- 
bitions of Italy, or whether she felt the need of con- 
donation for her plans of territorial expansion in the 
Mediterranean, through the British Minister at Rome 
invited Italy to join in a contemplated expedition for 
the pacification of Egypt, which she proposed to 
undertake at this time. Italy was surprised at this 
offer from England and not a little gratified by the 
new attitude of this great Power. However, whether 



18 GREATER ITALY 

from timidity or diffidence or lack of interest, the 
Italians refused to join the expedition, and England 
set about the Egyptian venture alone. Many Italians 
felt that they had already reaped the first-fruits of 
the Triple Alhance and that England's unwonted 
deference was due mainly to Italy's position as an 
ally of the Central European Powers. Suddenly a 
cloud appeared to darken their roseate dreams. The 
Emperor Francis Joseph visited Trieste in December 
of the same year (1882). A young native of Trieste, 
William Oberdank, who, in spite of his German 
name, was an ardent Italian patriot who had fled 
from Austria to escape mihtary service, returned at 
this juncture and was arrested and found in posses- 
sion of two bombs. Though no actual attempt against 
the life of the Emperor was made, or even a plot un- 
covered, Oberdank was convicted and hanged, in 
spite of official representations made in Vienna by 
the Italian Government. The people of Italy were 
aroused to anger by this event, which was seized 
upon and turned into political capital by certain 
nationalist elements to discredit the alliance. Here, 
within a few months, Italy had tasted the fruits of 
her new alliance. Bitter sweet was to be the fate of 
the relations of Italy with the Central Powers. Where- 
as ItaUan foreign prestige was greatly increased, her 
nationalist ambitions were constantly rubbed raw by 
the exasperating policy of Austria towards the Italians 
within the Hapsburg realm. 

The days of timidity in politics were passing; a 
stern, almost ruthless realism, concerned only with 
immediate advantages to be gained, was becoming 
the guiding principle in public affairs. The ascendant 



THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY 19 

star of the Prussians was sliining forth with an ever 
stronger and more brilhant hght. Germany, through 
the added prestige of her new alliance came to be the 
chief, and at the same time the most menacing, figure 
in European poHtics. Under the Hohenzollern leader- 
ship, during the next thirty years, the German people 
seized upon Europe and proposed to make it a vassal 
to their will. The lust of power at home soon trans- 
formed itself into a lust for world power. The gigantic 
strides of German expansion — commercial, industrial, 
and technical — dragged along in their orbit the new 
Italy. In Germany, Germanism became pan-Ger- 
manism, nationahsm soon became imperialism. Italy 
found herself adopting, almost unwittingly, this trend 
of thought. Plans of colonial expansion in Africa, 
and, above all, of nationalist expansion across the 
Alps and the Adriatic, took definite shape. 

Thus closes the first epoch in the history of modern 
Italy. The same impulse of nationalism which brought 
Germany and Italy into being was still at work when 
the two countries once again linked their fortunes. 
It is certain that both felt that their tasks were still 
unfinished. Italy had at last, after three hundred 
and fifty years, accomplished the aims, so lucidly 
set forth by Machiavelli when he exclaimed: 

"Italy without life waits for him who shall heal 
her wounds, and put an end to the ravaging and 
plundering of Lombardy, the swindling and taxing 
of Tuscany, and cleanse those sores which have long 
festered." 



CHAPTER II 
FORMATIVE FORCES 

Nationalism. Irredentism. Futurism 

The unijication of Italy had been brought about 
by putting into practice a long-cherished theory that 
all men of the same language, customs, and tradi- 
tions have the right to form a separate political entity. 
The Italians were the first to bring to a successful con- 
clusion, on a large scale, this great experiment in state- 
craft, which was to become so impelling a force in 
nation-building during the ensuing years. In France 
and England national liberty and unity were, in the 
early days of their accomplishment, so inextricably 
confused with the idea of the King as State, that racial 
unity played but an unimportant part in their na- 
tional development. In America, individual liberty 
was the sole aim of the signers of the Declaration of 
Independence. The Italians are the people who 
blazed the trail of national, racial unity, and set the 
world thinking along lines of nationality. This con- 
tribution to the historical evolution of Europe is 
one of the most important single factors of political 
progress during the nineteenth century. Nationalism 
had received at the hands of the Italians the sanc- 
tion of authority which inspired the Rumanes, Bul- 
gars, and Serbs to assert their right to nationhood. 
The growth of nationalism throughout the world can 
be traced to the same source. As France, a century 

20 



FORMATIVE FORCES , 21 

before, had lit the torch of individual libeHy, so Italy- 
first championed successfully the belief that national 
liberty, which is merely an extension of the idea of 
individual liberty to include all individuals of a kin- 
dred race, is the most valuable asset of mankind. The 
European War is a struggle for the preservation of 
this principle. The AlUes are maintaining the right of 
national independence of smaller States against the en- 
croachments of the Germanic idea of a State composed 
of a motley of races, marshalled in battalion formation 
under the hegemony of the strongest. 

With so firm a faith in the creed of nationality, the 
Italians could not rest content as long as all the prov- 
inces bearing the imprint of Italian culture were not 
united to the mother country. For, under the stress 
of necessity, the boundary delimitations' of the new 
Kingdom had been drawn in a manner which left 
outside the realm more than a million ItaUans. Thus 
arose the problem of ^'Italia irredenta,''^ or "unre- 
deemed Italy," as the districts inhabited by these 
ItaUans came to be called. 

Beyond the boundary of present-dky northern 
Italy are isolated groups of Italians who had gone 
forth as early as the time of the Roman Republic and 
settled along the western limits of Liguria and in cer- 
tain favourable and warm Alpine valleys. Through- 
out the centuries which have elapsed they retained 
their civilisation. However, Nice and the surround- 
ing territory, ceded to France as recently as 1859, 
has already lost much of its ItaUan character. The 
Ticino, to-day a Swiss canton and loyally Swiss, has 
nevertheless retained many typical Italian character- 
istics. These two districts are not usually held to be 



22 GREATER ITALY 

a part of "unredeemed Italy" except by a few ex- 
tremists, as their inhabitants are overwhelmingly in 
favom* of their present allegiance. Moving farther 
eastward we come to a system of mild, fertile, Alpine 
valleys which compose the so-called Trentino. This 
province has an area of 3,950 square miles, and sup- 
ports a population of 375,000 Italian inhabitants. 
An enclave between Lombardy and Venetia, stretch- 
ing on both sides of the Adige from beyond Riva to 
Cortina d'Ampezzo, the Trentino was for centuries 
an independent Italian prince-bishopric, and was ar- 
bitrarily annexed to Austria on the fall of Napoleon. 
Notwithstanding the fact that for the past thirty 
years every effort has been made to denationalise 
the Italians of this district, and often by the most 
unscrupulous methods to force the inhabitants to 
abandon their racial allegiance, the Trentino remains 
an Italian province, and its people have striven val- 
iantly and patiently to knit ever more closely the 
ties which bind them to Italy until such a time as 
the district may become an integral part of the King- 
dom of Italy. 

The other great settlement of Italians who live 
beyond the pale, and are eager to be joined with their 
mother country, live in "Venezia Guilia," with the 
great seaport of Trieste as its chief centre. As the 
name implies, this region, with the exception of 
Trieste,^ was formerly under the dominion of Venice, 
whose colonial domain in the Eastern Adriatic in- 



1 In 1382 the city placed itself under the protection of Leopold III, 
of Austria, and except for a brief period during the Napoleonic regime 
Trieste has for over five centuries been continuously under Austrian 
rule. 



FORMATIVE FORCES 23 

eluded also Istria and Dalmatia. The irredentist 
problem in these regions is far more difficult of solu- 
tion, for, though the coast towns of the Adriatic have 
retained their Italian character to a large extent, the 
districts inland, even up to the doors of the cities, 
are predominantly Slav; Slovene in the northern 
Adriatic, Serbo-Croat farther south. 

To formulate a plan for the redemption of the 
Italians living outside the realm has preoccupied 
all Italy from the first day of national independence. 
Extremists went so far as to include the islands of 
Malta, Corsica, and even Corfu, besides the Eastern 
Adriatic mainland as far south as Avlona, in their 
scheme of Italia irredenta, while the more conservative 
lay claim only to such districts as, like the Trentino 
and Trieste, are patently Italian. 

Even before national unity had been achieved, 
Garibaldi, in 1866, entered the Trentino with his 
army, and stood on the heights overlooking the city 
of Trent. But the fruits of his victorious campaign 
were snatched from the Italians by the timidity of 
their Government, who recalled the Garibaldian legions 
before the task had been completed, and renounced, 
for the time being, the acquisition of the Italian 
province. 

As the years passed, the irredentist movement 
seemed to be lulled into quiescence. Exchanges of 
visits between the King of Italy and the Emperor 
of Austria took place. Victor Emmanuel II journeyed 
to Vienna in September, 1873, while Francis Joseph, 
though refusing to go to Rome in order not to give 
offense to the Pope, came to Venice in April, 1875. 
The relations between the two States seemed to be 



24 GKEATER ITALY 

improving. But at the most unexpected moments 
the passions of the Italian people, demanding the 
liberation of the irredente provinces, burst forth. 
Every important occasion, whether the anniversary 
of a battle, the opening of an exposition, at which the 
orator never failed to recall the ancient Italian cul- 
ture of Trieste and of the Trentino, and the Hke, was 
seized upon to make a demonstration in favour of the 
coveted provinces. These in turn sent deputations to 
Italy and raessages of loyalty to the Italian cause, 
and even went so far as to hail the King of Italy as 
their rightful sovereign. Such popular outbursts, 
which enkindled the imagination of the people, found 
an echo among the ruling classes, more especially in 
the north of Italy, not merely because of the mem- 
ories of their own hardships under Austrian rule, but 
for the more practical reason that the unredeemed 
provinces are of strategic as well as sentimental value. 

The Trentino valleys have, from the earliest times, 
been the pathway of the numerous invasions of 
Italy from the north. Held by Austria, these valleys 
constituted a continual menace to Italy, as Austria 
could at any time launch an attack into the Vene- 
tian plain. In the east the valley of the Isonzo in 
the hands of a foreign Power leaves the Friulian plain 
open to incursion. Thus along nearly all her northern 
boundary Italy was in a position of marked strategic 
inferiority. 

While the Council of Ministers was busy endeavour- 
ing to solve the question of the irredente provinces 
by pacific measures, popular demonstrations in favour 
of armed intervention grew apace. In every public 
procession the flags of the Trentino and of Trieste 



FORMATIVE FORCES 25 

now occupied the chief position. Even in the Chamber 
of Deputies inflammatory speeches were made, de- 
manding the annexation of the provinces. Crispi, 
during his European tour in 1877, it will be recalled, 
broached the subject of the Trentino and Trieste, 
but both in BerUn and Vienna he met with a cate- 
gorical refusal even to discuss any change in the 
status quo. The agitation of the irredentists reached 
a fever pitch. The death of King Victor Emmanuel 
II, the liberator of Italy, in 1878, gave an opportunity 
for wide-spread agitation. Garibaldi, whose spiritual 
authority among the people of Italy was supreme, 
issued a manifesto in which he exclaimed: 

"The call of the patriots of Trieste and Trent must 
find an echo in the hearts of all Italians, and the yoke 
of Austria, no better than that of the Turk, must once 
for all be broken from off the necks of our brethren." 

Popular enthusiasm for the war of redemption 
reached a white heat when, six months later, it was 
announced that Austria had received, at the hands 
of the Congress of Berlin, the permission to occupy 
Bosnia, while no compensations were offered to Italy. 
A mob gathered in front of the Austrian Consulate in 
Venice and could only be dispersed with difficulty. The 
movement began to take on alarming proportions. 
The Government fell as a result of its inabifity to cope 
with the situation. The position of the dynasty was 
imperilled, as there was still a large Republican party 
in Italy. A new Ministry formed under Depretis ( 1 878) , 
who had already occupied the post of Premier, was by 
skilful manipulation and great tact able to steer the 
ship of state safely through the crisis, but not with- 



26 GREATER ITALY 

out arousing the animosity of Austria, who answered 
the threats of the irredentists by making formidable 
military preparations in the Trentino. 

During the next two years the irredentist question 
was the chief topic in ItaUan public affairs, and the 
discussion was repeatedly aggravated by the irrec- 
oncilable attitude of Austria. In Italy bodies of 
volunteers were being enrolled. Garibaldi's son, who 
had now succeeded his father in his position of au- 
thority, formulated a plan to raise one hundred bat- 
talions to liberate the irredente provinces by force of 
arms. The whole of Italy was in a state of ferment, 
and it was feared that the slightest incident might 
precipitate a conflict, which, owing to the military 
unpreparedness of Italy, would almost certainly have 
resulted disastrously. To check the movement half 
measures] would not avail. Italy, isolated in Europe, 
with France still a potential enemy, was passing 
through the most difficult crisis of her history since 
unity had been achieved. Heroic measures alone could 
save the country. "Italy and Austria can only be 
enemies or allies," was an acute and peculiarly clear- 
sighted summing up of the situation by Count Nigra, 
Italy's Ambassador at the Court of Austria. Italy 
was too weak to fight Austria single-handed; there re- 
mained only the alliance. Events in Germany seemed 
to pave the way for this understanding. The men- 
acing attitude of France in the Tunisian crisis further 
contributed to drive Italy into the arms of Germany 
and Austria, and thus only a year after the most vio- 
lent "irredentist" campaign, Italy had entered into a 
closely united alliance with her hated enemy, Austria. 

Within a few years the anti-Austrian agitation 



FORMATIVE FORCES 27 

died down, and many of those who had played a 
leading part in the irredentist movement became 
convinced that the Triple Alliance was of greater 
benefit to Italy than the acquisition of the unre- 
deemed provinces would be. It seems reasonable to 
suppose that had Austria adopted a liberal and en- 
lightened policy towards her Italian subjects, had 
they been permitted to manifest openly their desire 
to retain their Italian culture, the irredentist move- 
ment would have finally died out, and the Italians 
under Austrian rule would have become reconciled 
to their fate. But Austria, instead of adopting this 
com'se, from the earliest days of the new regime showed 
her animosity towards her Italian peoples. With dia- 
bolical cunning she incited the Slav populations of the 
Adriatic, and the Germans of Tyrol, to penetrate the 
Italian regions, and by the force of numbers, by coer- 
cion and persecution, to crush out the Italianism of 
these districts. 

As a result of the arbitrary privileges conferred on 
the Germans the relation of the Italian Trentino to 
German Tyrol became that of a vassal State. The 
Germans governed the Trentino, not merely without 
any regard for the Italian inhabitants, but ruthlessly 
repressed all attempts on their part towards economic 
development, so that, notwithstanding its abundant 
water-supply, suitable for the generation of valuable 
industrial motive power, and a dense population, 
providing a good and adequate labour market, the 
Trentino remained in a state of primitive agricul- 
tural development, while just south of the boundary, 
in Italy, wealthy and prosperous industrial centres 
everywhere sprang up. 



28 GREATER ITALY 

As time passed the zeal and activity with which 
the Germans of Tyrol worked to crush the Italian 
population of the Trentino grew more bold. Every 
possible agency was mobilised throughout the Tren- 
tino to spread German influence, education, and cul- 
ture. Such seemingly harmless organisations as the 
German- Austrian Alpine Club, the Hotel Keepers' As- 
sociations, and Tourist Bureaus were subventioned to 
assist in the Germanising programme. The task of 
the Germans of Tyrol soon became identified with 
the Pan-Germanic movement, and their campaign 
was organised with all the care, patience, and skill 
with which the Pan-Germans enter upon any under- 
taking. While Italy was busy protesting her friend- 
ship for Germany, and the relations of the two coun- 
tries had for long been intimate, the Italians beyond 
the boundary, in the Trentino, were being subjected 
to all manner of persecution to compel them to re- 
nounce their Italian fealty. The Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Schulverein, the most virulently active and impor- 
tant protagonist of Germanic civilisation, including a 
membership of more than 200,000, had for its pro- 
gramme the establishment of German schools, hbraries, 
orphan asylums, and other mediums of German prop- 
aganda, throughout the Trentino. This and other 
similar organisations, such as the Sildmark and the 
Tiroler Volkshund strove to offer educational facilities 
of such distinct advantage that every ambitious Ital- 
ian parent of the Trentino, wishing to improve the 
condition of his children, would send them to these 
German-speaking schools, where, by insidious teach- 
ing, the child would soon be influenced to abjure his 
Italian heritage. Economic advantages and favours 



FORMATIVE FORCES 29 

were lavished on the Itahan peasantry of the Trentino, 
while by bribes and boycott, and other coercive 
measures, many of them were won over to the Ger- 
mans. From year to year German influence extended 
more widely over the Trentino. The Germans already 
felicitated themselves on the success of their prop- 
aganda. * 

In the region of the Adriatic conditions were some- 
what different. The race hatred of the Slavs for the 
ItaHans, who had always treated the Slavs rather in- 
differently, chiefly because the Jugo-Slavic peoples 
were peasants who had hitherto achieved only a very 
low stage of cultural development, had long been 
latent. Under the auspices of the Vienna Govern- 
ment, the Slovenes of the Northern Adriatic willingly 
lent themselves to the plans of Vienna to combat 
the growing irredentist movement of the Italians of 
the Httoral. With enthusiasm the Slovenes entered 
upon their new role. This was the first time in their 
history that their expansion had been tolerated, and 
the opportunity was avidly seized upon by the more 
intelhgent among them. Trieste became the goal of 
their ambitions, and the city was seemingly dehvered 
up to them as their prey by the Austrians. The move- 
ment developed rapidly and soon embraced all the 
ItaUan cities of the Adriatic Httoral. '^The Itahan- 
ism of Trieste is purely artificial," ''Trieste must be 
Slav," and other similar watchwords became current, 
and found their way into the Slavic newspapers. The 
demands of the Slavs for educational and representa- 
tive equahty, and even control of cities predominantly 
Itahan, to which the Slavs had but recently emigrated 
under Austrian subvention, embittered the struggle. 



30 GREATER ITALY 

Clashes between the Slavs and the Italians in Trieste 
became every-day occurrences, instigated by the 
Slavs, whose agitators felt secure in the knowledge 
that they would not only not be prosecuted, but would 
even be recompensed by the Vienna authorities. This 
showering of benefits and privileges on the Slav ele- 
ments of the population of the Adriatic and on the 
Germans in the Trentino drove the Italian inhabitants 
to call more desperately than ever for the help of their 
kinsmen of Italy. 

The irredentist movement now took on a new 
aspect. It became a struggle for Italian cultural 
survival. Armed intervention from Italy was no 
longer hoped for. On the other hand, intellectual 
help was asked, to keep aHve the Italian spirit of the 
irredente provinces, which were rapidly succumbing 
to the Slav and German encroachments. In the 
Trentino the Pan-Germans had become the dominat- 
ing factor in local affairs, and their efforts to implant 
German culture by coercion and cajolery had met 
with no little success. Along the Adriatic, the Slavs, 
goaded by Vienna, grew more imperious. In Trieste 
and the other cities of the littoral, they increased so 
rapidly in numbers that even though they remained 
a foreign and unassimilated element, the Italians had 
good reason to fear that in time the Slavs would 
control the cities of the Eastern Adriatic. 

The Italians no longer remained idle. They formed 
societies for the maintenance of the Italian culture 
of the irredente provinces. The Lega Nazionale, in 
the .Trentino and Trieste, and the Dante Aligheri 
Society, in Italy, were organised, and with funds con- 
tributed largely from Italy they made it their pro- 



FORMATIVE FORCES 31 

gramme to support schools, libraries, and other social 
centres of Italian character in the unredeemed dis- 
tricts, while by official representations Italy en- 
deavoured to obtain an amelioration of the condition 
of her nationals under Austrian rule. With the aid 
of these societies the Italians of the Trentino and 
Trieste, supported and encouraged by their brethren 
of Italy, organised a stubborn resistance to further 
propaganda. 

Frequent outbursts which followed the harsh, re- 
pressive measm'es of Vienna, more especially in the 
Adriatic, such as the appointment of Slovene bishops 
to sees whose congregations were overwhelmingly 
ItaHan, showed that the temper of the irredenti Italians 
was "still strongly separatist. As time passed, and 
the ItaKan predominance of the provinces became 
more menaced, the irredentist inhabitants came to 
disregard Vienna, and looked only to Rome. The 
municipal councils of the cities still predominantly 
Itahan, such as Trent, Gorizia, and Trieste, busied 
themselves erecting monuments to Dante, Petrarch, 
and other great Italians of the past to remind the 
people of their Itahan allegiance, and thus keep alive 
the Italianism of the province^. 

It is throughout this period, when materiahsm was 
making continually deeper inroads in Italy, that the 
great flame of nationaUsm was kept alive by the 
needs of the irredente provinces. The spiritual strength 
of Italy was forged on the anvil of irredentism. Car- 
ducci, the illustrious Italian poet-patriot, became the 
champion of Italian nationalism. His was not a 
romantic attachment for the provinces beyond an 
arbitrary boundary-Une, but a stern conviction that 



32 GREATER ITALY 

all Italians must some day be united with their mother 
country if Italy would but remain true to the pure 
flame of nationalism which had brought about her 
unity and independence. The irredentist movement 
thus became a literary, patriotic creed rather than 
a political design. It passed deep into the hearts of 
the Italian people. While Italian statesmen were 
engaged in protesting their sentiments of friendship 
to the Vienna Government, suppressing all outward 
signs of enmity towards Austria on the part of the 
Italian people, the zeal of the poets of Italy never 
flagged in keeping alive the picture of their oppressed 
brethren beyond the Alps. It was not "land greed" 
or a hunger for territorial expansion so much as a 
spirit like that of the Christian crusader, who set out 
to redeem the shrines of the Holy Land, which inspired 
the Itahan people to look forward to the liberation 
of their nationals still under the Austrian yoke. For 
to the Italians racial independence had received the 
sanctification of a religious creed. This must be 
borne in mind in considering the attitude which 
Italy was to assume during the coming years. 

If nationalism, as conceived by the Italians, brought 
forth '4rredentism," ''irredentism" in turn, by a 
circuitous path, brought into being what has been 
termed "futurism." Though of very recent growth, 
and at the present writing still a new and only half- 
revealed force, in the national life of the Italian people 
"futurism" must be taken into account in order to 
gain a clear conception of the formative forces of 
present-day Italy. 

For twenty centuries Italy has been the cultural 



FORMATIVE FORCES 33 

focus of Western Europe. No other race of men can 
show so long a hne of pre-eminent geniuses as can the 
inhabitants of the Itahan peninsula. The civiHsation 
of the West owes its present direction to the impulse 
received from Italy. In all fields of human endeavour 
Italy has stood forth the master; the Western world 
has listened obediently, learned, and then followed 
the current of the mighty stream of civiHsation which 
rose beyond the Alps, among the hills of Rome, in 
Umbria, Tuscany, Lombardy, and Venetia, to spread 
over Europe and the world. Letters, arts, and science, 
rehgion, jurisprudence — all owe to Italy the tribute 
of their most luminous flowering. Caesar the con- 
queror, Cicero the orator, Virgil the poet, and the 
long galaxy of Romans who were the first Italians, 
belong to the first era of Western history. Then, 
after a period of darkness, out of the night, in letters 
of indehble purity and beauty, shine the names of 
Dante and Petrarch, precursors of a new epoch. The 
art of painting is revived, and finds a Giotto, whose 
art is carried to a cHmax by a Leonardo and a Titian. 
Gahleo revolutionises the accepted concepts of cos- 
mography, and a Christopher Columbus discovers a 
new world. And this same race brought forth a 
Lucrezia Borgia, and a St. Catherine of Sienna, a 
Benvenuto Cellini, a Machiavelii, and a St. Francis 
of Assisi. Each as he passed across the stage of life 
left a work wrought with the highest perfection in 
its particular sphere. 

There followed a period of relative decay, until 
from the North came a Winckleman and a Goethe, 
followed soon by a Shelley and a Browning. Italy 
still remained the teacher; the past became sanctified. 



34 GREATER ITALY 

glorified by these new disciples. Then came the sub- 
sequent invasions of a Ruskin and his phalanx, who 
made of Italy a shrine. The new votaries from all 
parts of the world sang paeans of praise of the Italy 
of the past, and gave to the Italy of the present no 
thought. Like a race of servile pygmies, modern 
Italians trod among the Titan figures of the past. 
Men refused to consider Italy in any other Hght than 
as a treasure-house of ancient glory; the holders of 
a sacred trust, Itahans must aspire to no other role. 
The dank romanticism of the early nineteenth 
century, though swept aside by a ruthless realism in 
other countries, still lingered in association with the 
name of Italy. National independence in Italy had 
been achieved; by her new strength Italy had as- 
serted her position as a World Power, but to the world 
at large Italy remained a museum. "We have made 
Italy, we must now make Itahans," was the spon- 
taneous outcry, after the great ordeal of unification 
had been achieved. Italy, so eager to redeem her 
irredente provinces, suddenly felt the need of self- 
redemption. Oppressed by the grandeur of the past, 
by their long and illustrious heritage, vexed at the 
condescension of foreigners towards their aspiration 
for modern development, already during the first 
days of national existence a few Itahans reahsed that 
Italy, in order to develop nationally, must trample 
underfoot the ever-present past. Italy must become 
something more than a haven for dilettante art critics 
and artists, the birthplace of tenors, the refuge of 
idyllic lovers. The Italians were sick unto death of 
hearing the glories of the Renaissance discussed and 
commented upon by foreign observers; sated by the 



FORMATIVE FORCES 35 

universal and eternal repetition of the ''Cinque- 
Cento," as though Italy had ceased to exist since the 
days of Michelangelo. While the world prattled on 
about Italian art, and thought of modern Italy in 
the same old romantic strain, the Italians by a dynamic 
realism, by closing their eyes to the past, by concern- 
ing themselves with the present, and by looking only 
to the future, rung by rung were winning their way 
up to recognition as a World Power. Though many 
refused to consider the Italians other than as an old, 
worn-out race, the people of Italy were daily more 
vigorously and lustily asserting their rejuvenescence. 
Germany, the most kindred in recent development 
of all the States of Europe, alone seemed to reaUse 
the potential strength of the new Italy, and it is per- 
haps from Germany that the inspiration of futurism 
was drawn. 

Until the present decade, futurism remained in the 
background of men's minds — an ideal rather than 
a creed. With the opening years of the present cen- 
tury there arose in Italy a group of young men, ar- 
dent men, sincere men, who believed that if Italy 
was to take her place among nations, if she was to 
play a part in keeping with her real power, this dotage 
of the past must cease; this disregard of the present- 
day Italy must be stamped out. How could Italy 
subsist and grow with a world of men, both within 
and without her boundaries, engrossed only with 
the period of efflorescence of a golden age of genius 
already covered with the dust of four elapsed cen- 
turies? The Renaissance and its heritage must be 
relegated to a secondary position; the Risorgimento 
and its epic achievement must command the atten- 



36 GREATER ITALY 

tion of the world. The futurists as their name im- 
plies, believed that Italy's destiny lay in the future; 
that looking backward is a sign of senility; that 
looking to the future is the privilege of youth. Italy 
felt herself young and vigorous now that she had 
been admitted to the comity of nations. But more 
than this, Italy felt the need of keeping for herself 
the fruits of her present genius. Hitherto she had 
lived for the world; an international forum, in the 
past she had given the free gift of her soul to the 
world, with the result that foreign armies — French, 
Spanish, Austrian — ^had despoiled her lands and borne 
off her treasures, the trophies of victory. Alien poets 
and philosophers, artists and historians, had stripped 
bare the tree of Italian culture, leaving but the empty 
symbols to inspire coming generations. Thus arose 
the demand for independence, hberty of action and 
self-rehance; that ''sacred egoism" which, in the 
grave crisis of 1914 became a political watchword, an 
outgrowth of the older and more cogent Vltalia 
fara da se. These are a few of the manifestations of 
this same spirit of trusting to Italy's future, which 
this new group sought to formulate. 

In order to gain a hearing for their programme the 
futurists very evidently overstepped the mark of 
moderation. Marinetti, the leader of a phase of this 
new movement for the glorification of the new and 
contempt for the old, gained an unpleasant notoriety 
rather than a serious consideration. But his work 
has not been without importance in that it expresses 
boisterously and exaggeratedly sentiments for a long 
time widely diffused, though latent, in Italy. His 
praise of the forge and the workshop, his exaltation 



FORMATIVE FORCES 37 

of the machine, his reiterated insistence on the banal- 
ity of admiring only the works of the past, whether 
'they be the canvases and marbles of the Renaissance 
or the ruins of a Roman aqueduct, have had a potent 
effect, even beyond the boundaries of Italy. Nor 
can we dismiss as the lucubrations of a maniac his 
proposal to fill in the canals at Venice, or at least 
abolish the use of gondolas, as unsuited to our epoch. 
For Venice is no longer, to the Italians, a golden- 
domed bauble, a background for honeymoons, as many 
foreigners are still wont to consider it, but an im- 
portant commercial port, the only good harbour 
which Italy possesses along the whole length of the 
Italian shore-line of the Adriatic, a fortress and a 
naval base, besides being a chief city in Italy. Or, 
again, the more recent plan of selling to America the 
art treasures of the past, and with the great sums 
secured by this transaction providing for the main- 
tenance, for many years to come, of a great navy and 
a powerful army, besides paying for the cost of her 
war, without undue burden to the Italian people, 
and at the same time getting rid of a cumbersome 
heritage and giving to America, which is without a 
past, a semblance of continuity in history, found 
throughout Italy many willing listeners. 

But futurism has to it another side, which dis- 
tinguishes it as a phenomenon singularly suggestive. 
While futurism preaches a cult of progress, it is a 
progress based on the strength to maintain itself, 
if need be, by the force of arms. Arbitration, paci- 
fism, internationahsm, the Utopian dreams of a world 
freed from racial conflicts and wars, programmes 
to provide for perpetually friendly relations between 



38 GREATER ITALY 

the various States, based on treaties, so common in 
all other progressive platforms, find no place in 
Italian futurism. For it is essentially a belligerent 
doctrine. ''War is the only hygiene of the world," 
was a main tenet enunciated by Italian futurists 
over a decade ago, when liberal pacifism was daily 
gaining more consideration from parliaments and 
the proletariat. "War is the culminating synthesis 
of progress, the school of ambition and heroism," 
was to be the cry of the futurists during the painful 
days of Italian neutrality. For present-day ItaHans 
dared not forget their struggles up from slavery; 
they still felt the lacerations of the fetters which 
bound them during their long period of captivity, 
when their genius was engrossed in the embellish- 
ments and the pleasures of life. Modern Italians 
must know how to handle a rifle as well as a paint- 
brush; the lathe and the motor as well as the sculp- 
tor's chisel. Nationalism, irredentism, futurism, were 
to be the leaven of modern Italy. They embody the 
doctrines of vigour, of aggressive strength, kindred 
to the German "might is right," yet tempered by a 
Latin geniality of twenty centuries of cultural tradi- 
tion. 



CHAPTER III 

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 

The Rule of Grispi. Colonial Expansion. The Abyssinian 

War 

During the first lustrum of the Triple Alliance 
Italy derived httle tangible profit from her new posi- 
tion. The Italians soon realised that they could only 
reap a benefit from the alliance commensurate with 
their own strength. They at once set about, to the 
limit of their resources, to imitate the Prussian mili- 
tary system by introducing sweeping reforms through- 
out their armies and bringing their cadres up to full 
strength. 

The old dream of a colonial domain in Africa was 
again revived, and a motion was passed in the Cham- 
ber sanctioning the project of establishing an Itahan 
colony along the shores of the Red Sea. Partly to 
wipe out the memory of the humiliations endured as a 
result of her thwarted ambitions in Tunis, partly be- 
cause the Itahans realised that miless they took imme- 
diate action all available territory suitable for colonial 
expansion would be occupied by other States, the 
Itahan Government fitted out a small expedition to 
take possession of Massua, the centre of the district 
later known as Eritrea, on the southwestern shores of 
the Red Sea, previously opened up by Italian explorers 
and in a measure exploited by Italian merchants. 
The region selected for this enterprise was not propi- 

39 



40 GREATER ITALY 

tious. The coastland along this section of the Red 
Sea is a sun-scorched waste of sand, inhabited by wild 
nomad tribes and of value as a colony only in so far 
as it gives access to the rich and fertile high plateau 
of Abyssinia. This latter region, well suited for Euro- 
pean colonisation, formed part of the Christian King- 
dom of Abyssinia, the only strong independent State 
of Africa possessing an army worthy of the name, 
marshalled along European hnes and armed with mod- 
ern weapons. Whether the Italians expected the Ne- 
gus of Abyssinia to submit meekly to the loss of this 
territory is not clear, no project for the conquest of 
the hinterland having been openly mentioned. How- 
ever, the Italians deemed their enterprise easy. The 
landing of the expeditionary force was effected in 
February, 1885. The Italians met with little or no 
resistance as long as they remained along the coast. 
But soon Italian ambitions looked farther afield. The 
broad, sandy desert land was crossed, and the hopes 
of Italy ran high that at last a great colonial empire 
would be carved out of the heart of one of the most 
fertile regions of the African continent. But these 
hopes were soon to be doomed to disappointment. 
No sooner had the Italian troops entered the highlands 
than they met with strong resistance, and one section 
of the invading forces was later attacked by the Abys- 
sinians and cut to pieces near Dogah in January, 1887. 
Thus the Italians had set forth on their adventurous 
colonial enterprise, and, though the shores of the Red 
Sea remained in Itahan hands and Eritrea was pro- 
claimed an Itahan colony, the fruits of the undertak- 
ing were negligible. 

As the time approached for the renewal of the 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 41 

Triple Alliance a current of opinion made itself heard 
which announced in no uncertain terms that Italy 
could profit but little by her alliance with Austria and 
Germany, and pointed to the sterility of the first 
epoch of the alhance. The menace of France had 
been removed. The Italians no longer feared that 
any foreign Power would attempt to restore the Pope 
to his temporal throne, and the raison d'etre of the 
Triple Alliance had thus vanished. On the other hand, 
the alhance kept Italy in an attitude of tension vis-a- 
vis the other Powers, while Germany and Austria 
seemed to have a free hand to promote their own 
particular interests. Bismarck had, by his famous 
"Re-Insurance Treaty"^ with Russia (1884), entered 
into a separate and secret agreement with that Power 
for the pm"pose of protecting Germany from an attack 
in the East. Italy was not advised of this arrange- 
ment, though from the course of events the Itahan 
Government could soon discern that the alhance with 
the Central Empires had lost much of its significance. 
This shghting conduct of Germany towards her Itahan 
aUy could not fail to awaken the doubts of the Itahans 
as to any benefits which might accrue to them from a 
treaty so loosely interpreted by the other contracting 
parties. On the other hand, those in favour of the 

^ The existence of this secret agreement was not made known imtil 
on October 24, 1896, it was divulged in the Hamburger Nachrichten, 
Prince Bismarck's own organ, which stated: "Very soon after the 
change of thi'one (in Russia by the assassination of Alexander III) and 
the retirement of Gortchakoff, a good understanding was established 
between German and Russian policy and remained in force until 1890. 
Until then both Empu'es were completely in agreement that should either 
one of them be attacked the other would remain benevolently neutral, 
so that if, for example, Germany were attacked by France the friendly 
neutraUty of Russia was expected, and the friendly neutrality of Ger- 
many if Russia were attacked without provocation.". 



42 GREATER ITALY 

renewal of the Triple Alliance were anxious to secure 
an addition to its clauses in order to be assured of the 
co-operation of Germany and Austria for the adequate 
protection of Italy's interests in the Mediterranean, 
of which no mention was made in the original treaty. 
Count di Robilant, the Italian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, was firmly opposed to any renewal of the 
treaty without definite additions. He beheved that 
the subservient poHcy followed by Italy at the signa- 
ture of the treaty in 1882 had been detrimental to 
Itahan interests. He refused to take the initiative in 
the negotiations for the renewal of the alliance. Writ- 
ing in July, 1886, to di Launay, Itahan Ambassador 
at Berlin, he remarks: 

''Decidedly Italy is tired of this sterile alliance, and 
I do not feel desirous of forcing her to renew it, be- 
cause I feel too deeply that it will always be unpro- 
ductive for us. It is probable that M. de Bismarck 
has made a mistake as regards myself, not knowing 
me at all, and imagines that I will feel the need of 
following his lead always, in spite of everything. If 
he thought that he is strangely mistaken. It is there- 
fore more than probable that I shall not renew the 
alHance."^ 

Some months later di Robilant let it be known that 
Italy required definite guarantees against French ex- 
pansion eastward in northern Africa, which might ulti- 
mately involve Tripoli, and that a plain discussion 
with Austria regarding the maintenance of the status 
quo in the Balkans was desirable. Negotiations re- 
garding these points were no doubt entered into. 
However, no understanding, definitely incorporated in 

^Chiala: "Pagine di Storia Contemporanea, La Triplice e la Du- 
plice," p. 471. rf 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 43 

the text of the treaty, was reached. A semiofficial 
writer/ in April, 1887, declared, ''that no innovation 
in the Mediterranean, and especially in Africa, will be 
possible without our consent. We are therefore in- 
sured against a possibihty of events such as occurred 
at Tunis being repeated in Tripoli or elsewhere. This 
would be a casus belli which would involve our alUes." 
At the same time, though the principle of the mainte- 
nance of the status quo in the Balkans may have been 
conceded by Austria, and the way opened for the in- 
clusion of Article VII in the treaty of alliance between 
Austria and Italy, it was not definitely agreed to until 
fifteen years later (1902). Referring to this question, 
the same writer states:^ ''Austria-Hungary will not take 
a step in this direction (Salonika or Albania) without 
previous agreement with us; whatever may happen, if 
Austria wishes to advance in the Near East she will 
do it with our consent, and as a result our interests 
find the broadest guarantee in the treaty." 

The cause for the change of heart on the part of 
Italy can in part be explained by the defeat of the 
Italian colonial expedition at the hands of the natives 
at Dogah a few months before the alliance was to be 
renewed, which left Italy materially weakened. Afraid 
to find herself once again isolated in Europe, and un- 
able to force Berlin or Vicama to consider any revision 
of, or addition to, the treaty clauses in a definite form, 

1 "Ex-Diplomat," in the Nuova Antologia, April 16, 1887, p. 733. 
This extract is quoted by Professor Salvemini in his series of interesting 
studies on the Triple Alliance, pubHshed in the Revue des Nations 
Latines (July, 1916), who adds: "The articles deaHng with foreign 
poUtics published by 'Ex-Diplomat' in the Nuova Antologia during 
these years were written under the iaspiration of the Premier, M. 
Depretis." 

' Ibidem. 



44 GREATER ITALY 

Italy placed her signature to the renewal of the alli- 
ance in its original form for a period of five years. 

Though Italy was unable to secure the desired 
modifications embodied in the treaty of the Triple 
Alhance, she was able, probably through the good 
offices of Bismarck, to enter upon an understanding 
with England regarding the recognition of Italy's vital 
interests in the Mediterranean. No formal treaty was 
concluded between Great Britain and Italy; there was 
merely an exchange of Notes, yet it became known 
that Great Britain would defend Italy if the latter 
were attacked by sea, and that an alliance had been 
entered into between the two States to safeguard the 
status quo in the Mediterranean and the adjacent wa- 
ters. Thus Italy found herself allied on the Conti- 
nent with the Central Empires, the greatest mihtary 
Powers; on the sea with Great Britain, the greatest naval 
Power, and her position and prestige greatly enhanced. 

The ensuing decade was to witness the high-water 
mark of the Triple Alliance. Hitherto, Italy, while 
outwardly faithful to her treaty engagements with 
Germany and Austria, nevertheless had endeavoured 
to remain on friendliest terms with the other Powers. 
This difficult task was only partially successful, and 
Italy's relations, particularly with France, were marred 
by continual chicanery, followed by retaliatory mea- 
sures of a commercial nature, which materially injured 
the interests of both countries. 

The renewal of the Triple Alliance in May, 1887, 
was followed in a few months by the accession to the 
Premiership of Crispi, who for the next nine years was 
to hold this office almost uninterruptedly. He was to 
leave no stone unturned to cement the bonds of the 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 45 

a/Kance which bound Italy to the Central Empires, 
more particularly to Germany. An ardent advocate 
of the Triplist agreement, as well as an avowed Ger- 
manophil, during his term of office he modelled Italian 
poUcy along Bismarckian lines, and became a zealous 
exponent of Germanic aims and ideals, content with 
the material benefits which accrued to Italy by this 
arrangement. 

Next to Cavour the name of Crispi shines forth as 
that of the most important figure in Itahan pubhc 
affairs since the formation of the IQngdom of Italy. 
Cavom' brought Italy into being as a united nation; 
Crispi raised Italy to the rank of a great Power. 
The contrast between the temper and character of the 
two men vividly illustrates how contradictory may be 
the quahties and quahfications of great statesmen. 
Cavour came from the most northern province of 
Italy, Piedmont. An aristocrat by birth, cold, shrewd, 
methodical, sincere, silent, a realist in politics, he hved 
and acted by the old maxim, '^a bird in the hand is 
worth two in the bush." Crispi was a Sicilian of 
humble extraction, a former Repubhcan conspirator, a 
follower of Mazzini, an exile who had rallied to the 
House of Savoy. Hot-headed, self-confident, a florid 
and facile orator, suspicious by nature, always looking 
for some hidden, underhand motives in the actions of 
others, yet endowed with an astonishing flair which 
enabled him to discoimt the future, though he very 
often was unable to gauge rightly a problem in hand, 
he possessed withal a remarkable capacity for govern- 
ment. Notwithstanding the faults imputed to him, 
he was inspired by a deep patriotism and a firm behef 
in the potential greatness of Italy. 



46 GREATER ITALY 

Crispi was eager to see Italy enjoy her rights aD,d 
privileges as a World Power. He believed that it was 
due chiefly to the timidity and vacillation of former 
Cabinets that Italy had not hitherto played an impor- 
tant part in world affairs. His admiration for the 
Prussian, or rather the Bismarckian regime, was very 
great, and he hoped, by following in the footsteps of 
the Iron Chancellor, to bring forth a greater Italy. 
That he paved the way for Pan-German expansion 
towards the Mediterranean would seem incontestable; 
that he dehvered Italy up to Germany to be exploited 
commercially is also true; but it cannot be denied that 
his motives were high-minded, and that he sought to 
benefit his country by increasing her economic strength 
and industrial resources. He brought Italy from a 
position of inferiority and obscurity to a fuller enjoy- 
ment of her just privileges as an independent State, 
and in no small measm-e he made it possible for her 
to rely on her own strength in periods of crises which 
were to confront her later on. 

Hitherto Italy's position had been equivocal. Al- 
though the Triple AlUance was known to exist, ItaHan 
Ministers had carefully refrained from making any 
public references thereto, and had endeavoured to 
remain on equally friendly terms with all the Powers. 
Crispi had not been in office two months when, in 
July, 1887, he paid a visit to, Bismarck at Friedrichs- 
ruhe, which was in the nature of a profession of faith. 
Ten years before Crispi had visited the Imperial 
Chancellor; then his journey had seemed a pilgrim- 
age, he had come as a suppliant, now he was received 
as an equal, the spokesman of the Kingdom of Italy. 

Though this visit was of no immediate poHtical im- 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 47 

portance, and was merely intended by Crispi to pro- 
claim boldly Italy's open adhesion to the Triple Alli- 
ance, its effects abroad were not long in making them- 
selves felt. Italy now stood forth, a j5rm advocate 
of the alliance. Her intentions could no longer be 
doubted. The defensive policy of the alUance which 
had hitherto governed the relations between the allied 
States seemed to be drifting towards a more aggressive 
attitude. This impression was confirmed when Crispi, 
on his retm-n from Germany, in his pubhc utterances 
proclaimed that the Triple Alliance was the firmest 
safeguard of the peace of Europe. 

Six months later two Emperors passed from the 
scene of German affairs. The non^jgenarian Wilham I 
was followed to his grave by his son, the Emperor 
Frederick, who had hastened from the health-giving 
shores of Liguria in March to the death-bed of his 
father, only himself to die three months later, in June, 
1888. The sceptre of Imperial Germany passed into 
new and untried hands. The men who had created 
the German Empire and implanted in the character of 
its institutions and constitution the harsh rigour of 
the ordeal by fire, now made way for a young man of 
twenty-nine years of age, endowed with a boundless 
and restless energy, a strenuous desire to see all and 
do all by himself; an odd mixture of an intellect curious 
and alert to the new advantages of his time and age, 
yet blended though unassimilated with a temperament 
feudal, arbitrary, and arrogant. Such was the man 
called upon to occupy the throne of the HohenzoUerns, 
as he appeared to the Italians when, four months after 
his accession, WilUam II visited Rome. 

As the new ruler of Germany rode down the Corso 



48 GREATER ITALY k 

in an open landau the multitudes who lined the streets 
looked in vain, in the cortege of gala carriages, for the 
stern, shaggy-browed face of Bismarck. The Iron 
Chancellor had not been invited to accompany the 
new Emperor to Rome, and the Italians were quick to 
discover that a new era had opened in Germany, arid 
they at once set about to reap the advantages of the 
situation. The ovation which Wilham II received at 
Rome was the most sincere of any which he has since 
received during his numerous peregrinations through 
the capitals of Europe. He won the hearts of all 
Italy spontaneously by the mere fact that he was the 
first sovereign of a great State to come to Rome since 
the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy. 

The Emperor's courteous and frank manner, the 
intense interest which he bestowed on all who ap- 
proached him, and the success with which he played 
the part of Prince Charming delighted Italians of all 
classes, while Wilham II himself found no little plea- 
sure in playing the dramatic role of Emperor in the 
city of the Csesars. The alliance with Italy seemed 
to offer more advantages in the eyes of the new sov- 
ereign than any one in Germany had hitherto realised. 
With keen perception the Emperor grasped the fact 
that here lay a vast domain needed by Germany for 
her growing commerce, and a fair field for industrial 
conquest. Italy, bound by alliance to Germany, 
would welcome Germans more warmly than any other 
foreigners; Italy would be an excellent market for 
German products, and no doubt German influence 
could shape the policy of this Mediterranean Power 
to its will. It was during this visit to Rome that the 
first seeds of the Emperor's Weltpolitik were sown. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 49 

William II, duiing his week's sojourn in Italy, was 
taken to Naples. There, amid the enchanting scenery 
of the blue waters and high-rising hills of Parthenope, 
with the bleak Vesuvius, vapour-crowned, cut clear 
against the morning sky, the German Emperor was 
present at the launching of a battleship. Here again the 
young sovereign seemed to find new food for thought, 
and the impression which this launching made on his 
mind at this time opened new vistas of world dominion. 

Returning to Rome, the Emperor took it upon him- 
self to pay his respects' to the Pope, as the head of 
the church of his Catholic subjects. As a Protestant 
prince, he besought an interview, which was readily 
granted. A curious ceremonial was followed, by which 
the Emperor set out for his visit to the Vatican from 
the Prussian Legation — the fiction being that this was 
German soil — to the Papal Court. The Pope received 
the HohenzoUern Emperor alone, in audience. In the 
adjoining apartment Prince Henry of Prussia and 
Count Herbert Bismarck, who accompanied the Em- 
peror, waited the return of their sovereign. Growing 
impatient and nervous as a result of the prolonged 
interview. Count Bismarck, notwithstanding the pro- 
tests of the Papal Chamberlain, burst into the audience- 
chamber, and the colloquy of the Pope and William II 
was brought to an abrupt close. This incident, vari- 
ously exploited as portraying the gruff manners of 
the Prussians and their slight regard for the Pope, 
nevertheless did not displease many Italians in official 
circles, who were not loath to applaud any event 
which might diminish the temporal prestige of the 
Papacy. 

The voyage of the German Emperor to Italy had 



50 GREATER ITALY 

proved a triumphant sanction of Crispi's programme. 
In order to convince Germany of the sincerity of 
Italy's desire to co-operate actively in the alliance, 
and to be worthy of the consideration of her allies, 
Crispi m'ged the vote of imposing credits for arma- 
ments, amounting, for the current year of 1888-9 
to 553,000,000 Ure (£22,120,000), an increase of 140,- 
000,000 lire (£5,600,000) over the preceding year. 
At the same time Italy's attitude towards France 
became uncompromising. Already, before Crispi's ac- 
cession to power, owing to the abrogation of commercial 
treaties with France, in 1886, the commerce between 
the two nations was slowly dwindling, and in 1888 a 
sharp decline in the imports from France was noticed. 
At the same time rumours were spread abroad in 
Italy of the hostile demeanour of France. The fact 
that Italy had openly joined hands with Austria, 
from whose yoke France had, thirty years before, 
spent her blood and treasure to liberate her, rankled 
in the minds of many Frenchmen when they realised 
that Italy was ranging herself on the side of France's 
enemies. The wound to the national pride and honour 
of France caused by the War of 1870 still bled. Al- 
sace-Lorraine was first and foremost in the thoughts 
and plans of France. Italy was now, by her alliance, 
pledging her increased armed forces to Prussia for 
the defense of these ravished provinces. Is it to be 
wondered that France showed her ill humour at Italian 
conduct ? 

But Crispi was looking out only for Italian in- 
terests; he had little natural sympathy for France. 
Whether there was any foundation for his fear of an 
aggression on the part of France, or whether he be- 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 61 

lieved himself to be playing a Bismarckian role, Crispi 
with much zeal and vigour feverishly pushed ahead 
the fortifications of the Piedmont frontier, while he 
invited a British squadron to visit Genoa in order to 
intimidate the'French. The Italian Premier's Franco- 
phobia took on alarming dimensions. First, a rumour 
spread rapidly throughout Italy of a plan on the part 
of France to attack and destroy the ItaHan naval 
base at Spezia; then of a French project to land 
troops in Sicily. No sooner had this proved unfounded 
than it was replaced by the alleged plan of the occu- 
pation by the French of Tripoli, which had already 
been marked out as a field for future Italian colonial 
conquest. While these "events" were disturbing 
the ItaUan Government, minor incidents, such as 
race riots in Modane and other French towns, in 
which Italians were maltreated — their cause was to 
be sought solely in the fact that Italian workmen 
were willing to accept a lower scale of wages than 
the French — and a violation of the French Consulate 
at Florence by a local judge, aggravated the already 
strained relations between Rome and Paris. 

In the meantime Italy had thrown in her lot even 
more whole-heartedly with the Triple AUiance. In 
May 1889, King Humbert, accompanied by Crispi, 
returned the visit of his German guest. He was 
entertained at BerKn by his Imperial host in the 
accustomed manner, with military pageants and 
reviews, gala performances at the Imperial Opera 
House, and all the trappings of a State visit. Crispi 
renewed his protestations of friendship for Germany, 
while his sovereign. King Humbert, convinced of the 
sincerity of German good-will, went so far as to de- 



52 GREATER ITALY 

clare "Italians and Germans members of one and 
the same family." 

In the early spring of the next year (March, 1890) 
Bismarck retired from the office of Chancellor. Crispi 
was eager to prove to the world that the Triple 
Alliance was in no manner weakened by this event. 
The newly appointed Imperial Chancellor, Count 
Caprivi, willingly lent himself to this idea, and shortly 
afterwards he visited Italy, where he was met by 
Crispi at Milan, and the two statesmen came to a 
complete understanding; while Caprivi, continuing 
his journey, was received by the King of Italy at 
Monza with every mark of esteem and consideration. 

Nor did Crispi omit to endeavour to ameliorate 
existing relations with Austria. After having made 
several fruitless attempts to secure German aid for 
the settlement of the vexed question of the Trentino 
and Trieste, Crispi suddenly decided that all dis- 
cussion of the matter must cease. In a well-worded 
speech in the Chamber, he set forth the fact that 
irredentist agitation was detrimental to the best in- 
terests of Italy, and that in order to strengthen the 
position of Italy abroad the question of the unre- 
deemed provinces must be put out of mind. With an 
exemplary rigour he suppressed all irredentist prop- 
aganda, dissolved the societies which had supported 
the movement, and even went so far as to dismiss 
the Minister of Finance in his own Cabinet for having 
listened without protest to an irredentist harangue. 
He let Austria see plainly that he was in earnest in 
his endeavour to wipe the slate clean and begin anew 
the intercourse between the two countries. But 
Austria, unmindful of ItaHan advances, continued 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 63 

her policy of repression and annoyance of her Italian 
subjects. 

Under Crispins guidance Italy's foreign relations 
had grown more complex. No longer isolated in 
Europe, insured of German assistance and Austrian 
acquiescence on the Continent, as well as of the help 
of England at sea, Italy found herself in a position 
of hberty of movement which she had not hitherto 
enjoyed. Crispi in the brief space of three years had 
raised Italy to a position of relative dominance in 
Eiu'ope, while he now assumed for himself the role 
of the spokesman of the Triple Alliance, which he 
proclaimed the chief factor of peace and stability in 
world affairs. 

Leaving the gates of Italy open to German peace- 
ful penetration, Crispi now turned his attention to 
Italy's colonial problem and entered upon a course 
of colonial adventure, which, brilliantly initiated, 
was to end in a disaster that dragged Crispi down 
in its partial collapse. Notwithstanding the inauspi- 
cious inauguration of the Italian colonial enterprise 
in Eritrea, and the successive defeats which the native 
forces had inflicted on the Itahans, Crispi was de- 
termined to push forward vigorously the project of 
African colonisation. Here he hoped to reap the tan- 
gible reward and proclaim to the world the proof of 
the new greatness of Italy. 

By m.eans of negotiations with the native chiefs, 
and of a private understanding with Great Britain, 
Somaliland, an extensive tract of rocky and infertile 
coastland bordering the Indian Ocean and adjoining 
British East Africa, passed peacefully under Italian 
protectorate. Though the district itself is of little 



54 GREATER ITALY 

value, yet its vast area of 139,430 square miles satis- 
fied the growing megalomania of Crispi, and the new 
colony was annexed amid the loud applause of all 
Italy. 

Not satisfied with this first success, Crispi took 
advantage of the death of the Negus of Abyssinia, 
and the disorders which had arisen, to push Itahan 
conquest inland and wipe out the memory of recent 
reverses. These efforts were crowned with a vic- 
torious advance and the occupation of several im- 
portant centres in the hinterland. Then Crispi, em- 
boldened by his good fortune, successfully championed 
the cause of Menelek, one of the pretenders to the 
vacant throne of the Negus. When Menelek had 
been established firmly on his Abyssinian throne, by 
a treaty between himself and the Italian Government 
signed at Uccialli in May, 1889, a portion of the high 
plateau including Asmara was granted to Italy, and 
Italy further assumed what amounted to a quasi- 
protectorate over the empire of the Negus in the form 
of an alliance in perpetuity between Italy and Abys- 
sinia, by which Italy reserved for herself the exclusive 
right to furnish arms and financial aid which the 
Negus might need. This treaty also contained a 
clause,^ somewhat loosely drawn, which conferred 
upon Italy according to the Italian contention, the 
right to represent Abyssinian interests in Europe. 
The Negus contested the Italian interpretation of 
this article of the treaty, which, according to Roman 

^ This clause on which Italy based her claims to a protectorate over 
Abyssinia, reads: "His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia con- 
sents to make use of the Government of His Majesty the King of 
Italy for treatment of all questions concerning other Powers and Gov- 
ernments." 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 55 

opinion, was a definite obligation on the part of Abys- 
sinia to be represented abroad by Italy, while the 
Negus contended that it merely conferred a privilege 
on Abyssinia to have recourse to Italian aid when 
she so desired, but in no way could be interpreted 
as a fixed obhgation. Thus the question remained 
unsettled, and from the very outset the relations 
between Italy and her new Abyssinian ''ally" were 
not as friendly as might be desired, and portended a 
conflict in a no distant future. 

Meanwhile, not content with the astonishing suc- 
cess which he had achieved in the brief space of two 
years in affirming Italy's colonial conquests, Crispi 
turned his attention towards Tripoli, and began by 
gaining the friendship of the native chiefs, among 
them Hassuna Pasha Karamanli, whose loyalty and 
friendship was to prove valuable to Italy later on. 
This is as far as this undertaking developed at this 
time. For though Crispi earmarked Tripoli for future 
occupation by Italy, and blocked French advance 
into this territory, nothing further was done, as before 
Crispi could push the negotiations with his accus- 
tomed vigour an important event at home prevented 
him from carrying out his plan for the acquisition of 
TripoU. To Crispi must be given the credit of having 
launched Italy on the TripoUtan campaign which 
twenty years later she was to bring to a successful 
conclusion. 

Crispi's achievement had been briUiant. He had 
brought Italy from a position of subservient ob- 
scurity into the enjoyment of a sense of national self- 
reliance and strength. He had endowed his country 
with her much-desired colonial domain, and had af- 



56 GREATER ITALY 

firmed the position of Italy as a great Power. Though 
his attitude towards France was taunting and ag- 
gressive, it is explained by his desire to proclaim the 
new power of Italy, in that Italy dared tenir tete with 
France, before whose menace all Italy had hitherto 
trembled. Crispi stood at the height of his fortunes. 
Never had his position, both at home and abroad, 
seemed stronger. Suddenly by one of those inex- 
plicable caprices which have always prevailed in 
Italian politics, and are a chief disadvantage of the 
system of the responsibility of Ministers to Parliament, 
by an adverse vote of the Chamber on a matter of 
secondary importance, chiefly as the result of a violent 
speech on the part of Crispi, in which he accused 
"the Right" of having acted servilely in the interests 
of foreign Powers before 1876, he was compelled to 
retire from office in January, 1891. 

Had Crispi ended his pubhc career at this time, 
all his fellow countrymen would have retained an 
enthusiastic admiration for his ability and a sense 
of indebtedness for his accomplishment on behalf of 
a greater Italy. But fate deemed otherwise. 

It would seem a strange conjunction of fortune 
that Crispi, the most sincere advocate of the Triple 
Alhance, should never have been called upon to con- 
sider the question of the terms of its renewal. Called 
to office after the treaty had been somewhat reluc- 
tantly renewed in 1887, Crispi was compelled to re- 
linquish his post a few months before the question 
of its renewal again came up. However, the stamp 
given to ItaUan affairs during Crispi's long tenure 
of office, proved that, though he himself was no 
longer in power, the change of Ministers could not 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 57 

mean a change of policy. His successor in office, 
the Marchese di Rudini, although he belonged to the 
Right and was known to be only a lukewarm Trip- 
list, did not dare to take it upon himself to weaken 
the bonds of the Triple Alliance. Crispi, it is true, 
had hoped for and laboured to secure the formation 
of a more closely knit coalition, which would include 
the three alhes in an economic as well as military 
alHance. He had planned the foundation of a cus- 
toms union along the lines of the German Zollverein, 
to include Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy, 
which would have rendered the strength of the Triple 
AUiance far more effective. However, these projects 
were not carried out, though in order to assert more 
patently the firm foundation of the alhance, the 
treaty was now drawn so as to bind the contracting 
parties for a period of six years, and it was under- 
stood that the treaty was to continue automatically 
in force for another six-year period unless specifically 
repudiated by one of the parties thereto one year 
before the expiration of the first period. At the same 
time Italy entered into private trade agreements with 
Germany and Austria which were to offset the dam- 
ages to Italy resulting from the commercial war with 
France. 

Crispi's action in avowedly placing Italy within 
the orbit of the Triple Alliance, and adhering to and 
even fostering its new aggressive pohcy, could not 
fail to find a repercussion in Europe. The same year 
which marked the renewal of the Triple Alliance by 
Crispi's successor, and thus proclaimed that the al- 
liance had become Italy's national policy, and could 
no longer be considered the personal policy of Crispi, 



58 GREATER ITALY 

is marked by the first signs of a rapprochement 
between France and Russia, which can be dated from 
the visit of the French fleet to Cronstadt in the summer 
of 1891. WiUiam II had seen fit not to continue the 
tradition of Bismarck, and had not renewed the "Re- 
Insurance Treaty" with Russia. The inoonediate 
result of this pohcy was the Franco-Russian under- 
standing, which was soon to ripen into a formal al- 
liance. 

The Cabinet of the Marchese di Rudini, which had 
been hastily patched up on the fall of Crispi, was not 
destined to survive. Finding himself in a minority, 
di Rudini relinquished his office, and a new figure 
now for the first time appears on the horizon of Italian 
public affairs, who through later years was destined 
to play so important a part in Italian pubhc life. It 
is Giovanni Giohtti. A Piedmontese, brought up in 
the Triplist tradition, who looked on foreign affairs 
merely as they might be reflected in the mirror of 
domestic requirements, an astute manipulator of 
parliamentary majorities, to whom a compromise 
was more dear than a fight, his debut in the office of 
Premier in May, 1892, was fraught with difficulties 
which would have dismayed many a stronger man. 

During the preceding years Crispi, engaged chiefly 
in affirming the growing power of Italy abroad, had 
left home affairs to drift. The ever-increasing ex- 
penditures for armaments and colonial enterprises 
had burdened Italian finances to the breaking-point. 
The day of reckoning, long-postponed, came during 
the first weeks of Giolitti's Ministry, accompanied 
by the uncovering of unsavoury scandals in the finan- 
cial dealings of public men in high position, as well 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 59 

as by agrarian difficulties in the south of Italy. 
Giolitti found himself faced by a series of seemingly 
insurmountable problems. Amid these trying cir- 
cumstances, by devoting his entire energies to home 
affairs, by a shrewd policy of whitewashing and tem- 
porising, rather than by making any attempt to 
eradicate the evils of the situation root and branch, 
Giolitti was able to extricate himself, for the time 
being, from the quagmire, and at the same time gain 
a large personal following among public men in all 
parts of Italy by a judicious use of political patronage. 

During Giolitti's first Ministry Italian foreign rela- 
tions were allowed once again to follow a random course. 
There seemed to be a return to the old Depretis tradi- 
tion of endeavouring to be on friendly terms both with 
the alhes and with the other Powers, which well suited 
the character of GioHtti. The German Emperor, to 
prove his esteem for Italy and the House of Savoy, 
came to Rome on the occasion of the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the wedding of King Humbert, in 
April, 1893, accompanied this time by the Empress, 
and was welcomed with warmth, though with less 
enthusiasm than on his previous visit. Then a French 
squadron, bearing an autograph letter from the Pres- 
ident of the French Repubhc to the King of Italy, 
was f^ted at Genoa with much cordiahty, and a few 
weeks later a French mihtary mission fraternised with 
Italian officers on the occasion of the inauguration of 
a monument at Palestro, commemorating the battles 
in which the French had fought for ItaHan hberty. 

But this policy of endeavouring to be on friendly 
terms with both sides was not destined to continue. 
In France the animosity towards Italy was steadily 



60 GREATER ITALY 

growing. The French refused to accept one hand 
proffered in friendship while the other was a men- 
acing mailed fist. A natural race jealousy between 
these two main branches of the Latin family sub- 
sisted. Misunderstandings, exaggerated and ag- 
gravated by wilful distortion, made amicable inter- 
course difficult. ItaHan-baiting and race riots were 
frequent in France, which aroused the hostility of 
the Itafians, who moreover accused France of bad 
faith in not wishing to accept the advances of Italian 
friendliness, while France accused Italy of double- 
dealing. The situation became unbearable to the 
French when, at the personal invitation of the Ger- 
man Emperor, the heir to the throne of Italy was 
present at German Grand Manoeuvres in the autumn 
of 1893, which were held in the neighbourhood of 
Metz. France felt herself personally insulted by 
this act of the House of Savoy in openly parading its 
name and fame through the conquered province under 
the aegis of the Prussians. Many Italians, it is said, 
deplored this thoughtless act on the part of their 
future sovereign, which had aroused the French un- 
duly, and though the fact itself was of Httle signif- 
icance, it well illustrates the lax Giolittian concep- 
tion of foreign obhgations. 

The result of this act was immediately seen. The 
French beheving it to be an overt affront which might 
lead to grave consequences, and even presaged war, 
Hquidated their holdings of Itafian securities to the 
extent of 1,000,000,000 lire (£40,000,000), which 
created a panic in Italy. Italy's position had be- 
come increasingly critical. The situation had been 
aggravated by Giofitti's temporising poHcy. He was 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 61 

no longer able to cope with the situation. Though 
he maintained liis majority at the elections, he re- 
signed his office, and Crispi was called to the rescue 
as the one strong man capable of putting Italy's 
house in order. 

The task was one requiring not merely strenuous 
energy and political insight, but deep courage. Italy 
had sunk to a lower level of economic depression and 
internal disorder than she had found herself in since 
the foundation of the united Kingdom. Crispi ac- 
cepted the task thrust upon him, and in December, 
1893, again forming a Cabinet, assumed the office 
of Premier. In Sicily disturbances which Giohtti 
had failed to combat had now assumed alarming 
proportions. The peasants in the country districts, 
as well as the workmen in the towns, had been organ- 
ised by Socialist agitators into fasci or labour unions, 
which had multiplied throughout the island. They 
soon gained the upper hand in their contests with 
the local authorities, and a serious insiurection was 
now threatened. Crispi at once despatched a large 
body of troops to Sicily. Martial law was proclaimed; 
the fasci were suppressed, their leaders sentenced to 
imprisonment, and within a few weeks, by a firm 
poUcy order was restored. 

Crispi was unable or unwilling to ameliorate re- 
lations with France, which had, if possible, become 
more embroiled than ever. As a result on the one 
hand of the assassination of the President of the 
French Republic, Carnot, at the hands of an Italian 
anarchist, and on the other of the arrest of a French 
officer in uniform on Itahan territory near frontier 
fortifications, which caused him to be condemned 



62 GREATER ITALY 

for espionage, the period of mutual suspicion and 
antagonism reached its culmination. 

Having by the presence of William II at Venice 
again proven that the Triple Alliance held firm, not- 
withstanding the manifold internal difficulties, Crispi 
determined to seek in Africa fresh triumphs and re- 
awaken in the hearts of the Italian people confidence 
in their greatness as a nation. 

The Negus Menelek had formally denounced the 
Uccialli treaty of alliance with Italy, and was known to 
be endeavouring to form a league of all the Ethiopian 
chieftains under his leadership to resist the fm-ther 
advance of the Italian forces. At the instigation of 
Crispi, General Baratieri, the Italian Governor of 
Eritrea, sent a column of Italian troops eastward into 
the Sudan, and reached Kassala, nearly three hundred 
miles inland, after a brilliantly conducted campaign. 
The news of this achievement was greeted with en- 
thusiasm in Italy, and spurred Crispi on to demand 
still greater efforts. 

Relations with the Ethiopian rulers meanwhile had 
become more and more strained, and, fearing an 
attack. General Baratieri then led his forces against 
the Ras Mangasha, the chief vassal of the Negus, and 
in January, 1895, in two separate encounters, at Coatit 
on the 13th and at Senafe two days later, he defeated 
the Abyssinians and occupied Adua, the capital of the 
district. The first phase of the African campaign had 
been brought to a successful conclusion. General 
Baratieri returned to Rome and was received with 
adulation. 

While Crispi was sharing with the successful general 
the applause of the people of Italy, Menelek was pre- 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 63 

paring to avenge the defeat of his vassal. General 
Baratieri returned to Eritrea. The first serious en- 
counter occurred December 7, 1895, when the Abys- 
sinian forces fell upon the Italians at Amba Alagi. 
The Italians, though they fought obstinately, were 
outnumbered and badly beaten, only a handful of 
their men being able to escape. The Negus, following 
up this first success, now attacked the Italians at the 
fort of Makalle. After a first bloody encounter in 
which they were repulsed, the Abyssinian commanders 
decided to besiege the fort in the conventional style. 
The lack of water compelled the Italians to surrender, 
and they filed out of their stronghold with the due 
honours of war. 

Crispi now realised that the Italians were confronted 
by a military force of considerable magnitude. Re- 
inforcements were at once ordered to be despatched 
to Africa, while the Premier did not refrain from ex- 
pressing his disgust at the recent disasters, which he 
now attributed to the inefficiency of General Bara- 
tieri. Menelek, learning of the extensive preparations 
which the ItaHans were making to push their African 
campaign to a successful issue, was, now that his 
vassal had been avenged, ready to treat with the 
ItaHans regarding terms of peace. Crispi, however, 
confident in the ultimate success of the enterprise, 
insisted that if peace were to be made the treaty of 
alHance between Italy and Abyssinia, in its original 
form, which amounted to a virtual Italian protectorate 
over the Ethiopian domain, must be renewed, and that 
the Italians should occupy again all territory that 
they had conquered during the campaign of the pre- 
ceding year. Menelek refused to consider these terms, 



64 GREATER ITALY 

and both sides continued their preparations for war. 
Though in Italy there was a strong party opposed to 
the African campaign, volunteers in great numbers 
had enKsted for service in Africa. Early in February, 
1896, the Itahan forces, both native and white, in 
Eritrea, under the command of General Baratieri, 
numbered nearly 20,000 men, with twenty batteries of 
field artillery. The expedition had been hastily assem- 
bled and suffered from lack of organisation. The 
troops, arriving in Africa, found it difficult to become 
acclimatised; their equipment was defective, and, 
above all, the system of transport of supplies wholly 
inadequate, while the discipline of the native troops 
was bad and several detachments deserted and went 
over to the enemy in a body. The Abyssinian army 
numbered over 90,000 men, the largest force ever 
marshalled in one single army by an African ruler. 
The troops were of excellent fighting material, armed 
with automatic rifles, supplied with abundant ammu- 
nition, and with an artillery more modern than, and 
superior to, the Itahan. There was, besides this, a 
reserve force of 20,000 men armed with shields and 
lances. 

General Baratieri believed that to attack so large a 
force would be imprudent, and he telegraphed to 
Crispi, in answer to repeated inquiries, as to the cause 
of his delays: ''If we are attacked we will conquer; if 
we attack we will lose." Crispi was impatient to wipe 
out the memory of the recent defeats of Itahan arms. 
He had led the country into this African adventure, 
and he felt that he must push it through speedily, as 
both Parliament and the nation had grown restive. 
It was thereupon decided to supersede General Bara- 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 65 

tieri. This step had been contemplated for some time 
past, and was at length secretly carried out, and Gen- 
eral Baldissera set out to take command of the Italian 
forces in Africa. 

General Baratieri, learning from private sources of 
the proposed change, decided to risk an action before 
the arrival of his successor. On February 29, he divided 
his forces into three columns and set out to attack the 
Abyssinian armies, which were encamped beyond Adua. 
The country is hilly, with abrupt rocks rising stark 
out of the soil, which is covered with rich tropical 
vegetation. There were no roads, and the columns 
had to advance through the gulHes and along the 
stony beds of dry torrents, with no means of keeping 
in close communication. At dawn on March 1, the 
advance column on the left of the Italian forces came 
into contact with the main body of the enemy. A 
pitched battle was fought in which the Italians were 
driven from the field with heavy losses. The right 
wing of the Italian forces lost its way, and was unable 
to co-operate in the action, while the centre engaged 
the enemy near Abba Garima. After a brief encounter 
here it was evident that the enemy was in vastly 
superior numbers and was gaining ground. The na- 
tive contingents of the Itahan forces now rebelled, and 
amid scenes of indescribable cruelty and slaughter the 
Itahans were literally hacked to pieces. An hour later 
the rout of the Italians was complete. General Bara- 
tieri became separated from his staff and only escaped 
with great difficulty. The victorious Abyssinians 
swarmed from all sides, and pursued the small rem- 
nant of the defeated Italians through the broken coun- 
try, and captured or killed all who came within their 



66 GREATER ITALY 

path. The Italians lost 5,000 white troops killed in 
action, with 250 officers and 2 generals, as well as 
their whole artillery. Never before had Europeans 
suffered such a defeat at the hands of native troops. 

The news of the disaster at Adua reached Rome 
late in the evening of the same day, but was not 
known to the pubhc until the next day. Many Ital- 
ians, who had been opposed to Crispi's colonial plans, 
debased themselves so far as to express their unmixed 
dehght at the failure of the African campaign, and 
cried "Long live Menelek," but the majority vented 
their rage against Crispi and loudly demanded retribu- 
tion. 

Three days later, on March 5, Parliament opened. 
The Chamber was in an uproar. Crispi entered; a 
tense silence fell upon the assembled deputies. "I 
have the honour to announce that the Cabinet has 
placed its resignation in the hands of the King." 
Crispi spoke slowly. "His Majesty has accepted the 
resignation," he added. Immediately, from all sides 
of the House loud cheering broke forth: "Long live 
the King ! Long live the King !" 

The aged Minister — Crispi at that time was nearly 
eighty — who had done so much for Italy, who had 
played so active a role in Itahan public affairs from 
the earUest days of ItaUan unity, who had borne his 
part on the battlefield as well as in the political 
arena, who first raised Italy to a position of impor- 
tance in world affairs, left his seat in the Chamber 
amid the hoots and jeers of his compatriots. Outside 
the Chamber the fury of the mob was even more vio- 
lent. A hostile demonstration was made in front of 
Crispi's residence. "Abhasso Crispi!" "Death to 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 67 

Crispi !" were the cries which rang through the streets 
of Rome during the ensuing days. 

The crisis became more serious when it seemed that 
no one could be found who was wilhng to take upon 
himself the task of forming a Ministry. Finally, after 
several days of uncertainty, during which it is reported 
that King Humbert, despairing of the situation, had 
even thought of abdicating, the Marchese di Rudini 
undertook the task and succeeded in forming a Min- 
istry. 

Crispi thus disappeared from public life. He con- 
tinued to frequent the Chamber, and never shirked his 
responsibility as a deputy, and though numbers of his 
friends and admirers, drawn from the most vigorous 
and healthy elements of Italian public life, rallied 
around the great Imperialist, he never regained his 
prestige, and his last days were clouded by many diffi- 
culties and by the infamous accusations heaped upon 
him by his political opponents. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 

1896-1903. Intebnal Difficulties. The House of Savoy 

The overthrow of Crispi had severely shaken Italy. 
The difficulty in finding a successor further discouraged 
the Italian people. Finally the Marchese di Rudini 
was able to constitute his Ministry. His first act, in 
order to win popular favour, was to declare a general 
amnesty on March 14, the birthday of the King. 
The prison doors were opened, and political and civil 
offenders, chiefly the victims of the repressive measiures 
of the former Cabinet, were released. 

On March 17, di Rudini presented his Ministry to 
the Chamber. He announced that General Baldis- 
sera, now commanding in Eritrea, had been given full 
powers to take such measures as he deemed expedient, 
and that the instructions sent on March 8, by the 
former Cabinet to treat for peace, had been con- 
firmed. Di Rudini let it be plainly understood that 
he proposed to follow a colonial policy diametrically 
opposed to that pursued by Crispi. Though he was 
prepared to continue the war against Abyssinia if 
necessity compelled, and demanded a credit of 150,- 
000,000 lire (£6,000,000) for this purpose, he declared 
that the period of colonial expansion had come to an 
end, that even if Italian arms should be victorious, 
he would not seek any increase in territory in Africa, 
and that he was going to pursue a poUcy of retrench- 
es 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 69 

ment as best suited to the interests of Italy. An 
order of the day, presented at this time, though not 
acted upon, gives a clear insight into the temper of 
the Chamber and the country: 

''The Chamber, esteeming that the responsibihty 
for the recent disaster in Africa rests solely with the 
Government, which, violating the constitution, and 
deceiving the country regarding its character and 
importance, has given to the plan of military enter- 
prise an expansion not desired by Parliament, and 
has sacrificed to its policy the Hves and vital interests 
of the nation, believing that the African expedition 
favoiu*s only militarists, speculators, and political 
adventm^ers, is contrary to humanity, and incom- 
patible with the economic status of Italy, concludes 
to recall immediately the troops from Africa, and in 
accordance with Article 47 of the Statutes, to im- 
peach the Ministry." 1 

Yet the defeat at Adua was not so disastrous to 
the ItaHans in Eritrea as was believed at home. Gen- 
eral Baldissera showed himself to be an energetic 
and efficient officer. He opened up peace negotia- 
tions with Menelek, and despatched Major Salsa to 
discuss terms with the Negus. But the conditions 
imposed were deemed unacceptable, and General 
Baldissera continued his preparations for a renewal 
of the conflict. Three times Major Salsa returned 
with Itahan counter-proposals and during the last 
interview, the terms still being deemed unsatisfactory, 
Menelek detained the Italian envoy. Impressed by 
the losses sustained by his troops in the battle of 
Adua, and learning of the arrival of Itahan reinforce- 

ip. Vigo: "Trent' Ultimi Anni del Secolo, XIX," vol. VII, Treves, 
MHan, 1915, p. 127. 



70 GREATER ITALY 

ments, he broke camp, and marched southward towards 
Shoa. 

The peace negotiations had failed, but General 
Baldissera did not remain inactive. His army was 
now reorganised. He thereupon detached a force to 
relieve Kassala, which was seriously threatened by 
the Dervishes. This difficult mission was success- 
fully carried out, and on April 1, Kassala was safe, 
and the enemy put to flight. At the same time, Baldis- 
sera, with his main force, 16,000 strong, marched to 
the assistance of the Italian garrison, closely besieged 
at Adigrat, and here Italian arms were again vic- 
torious, and the garrison was relieved on May 4. 
It is not improbable that, owing to the skill of Baldis- 
sera, the Italians would have been able to defeat the 
main forces of the Negus, which had now become 
demorahsed, but di Rudini was intent upon following 
his policy of retrenchment, and he did all in his power 
to hasten peace negotiations. Acting on instruction 
from his Government, Baldissera now tin-ned over 
to the Ras Mangasha the fort of Adigrat, which had 
been so valiantly defended and so skilfully relieved. 
On May 19, the remaining stores and munitions were 
destroyed, and the Italian force withdrew from this 
hard-won post. 

Crispi, though fallen from power, addressed a ring- 
ing appeal to the King to protest against the supine 
policy of the Government, and urged that the war 
against Menelek be prosecuted with vigour. But 
his voice was not heeded, and on June 5, the Italian 
plenipotentiary. Doctor Nerazzini, set sail from Na- 
ples for Adis Ababa, the Abyssinian capital. After 
many delays peace was finally concluded there on 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 71 

October 2G. By its terms, the Treaty of Uccialli was 
annulled; the absolute independence of Abyssinia 
was recognised ; the final delineation of the boundary- 
line between Eritrea and Abyssinia was postponed 
(in the meantime the Itahans held the line Nareb- 
Belesa-Muna), and the sum of £400,000 was paid as 
an indemnity by the Italians for the return of prisoners 
held by the Negus. After an attempt made by di 
Rudini to abandon the greater part of Eritrea, this 
frontier Hne was finally confirmed to Italy during the 
Ministry of his successor. Kassala was turned over 
to the Anglo-Egyptian forces on Christmas Day, 1897, 
and two other slight changes were made in the bound- 
ary between Eritrea and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. 
Eritrea now passes from active discussion in Itahan 
affairs. The cabal against Crispi had greatly exag- 
gerated the magnitude of the Italian disaster in Africa. 
The majority of the Italians appeared satisfied with 
the treaty of Adis Ababa, and were loath to enter 
upon any f mother colonial undertakings. While the 
temporary reverse at Adua for the time being in- 
jured Itahan prestige abroad, it in nowise prevented 
Italy from taking a leading part in important inter- 
national events. 

Only a few months after peace with Abyssinia was 
proclaimed, a fleet of the Powers, composed of Itahan, 
French, British, Russian, and Austrian ships, under 
the command of an Italian admiral. Count Canevaro, 
appeared off the Island of Crete (February 16, 1897). 
Since the month of May of the preceding year, the 
island had been in a state of upheaval. Conflicts 
between the Christians and the Turkish troops had 
been frequent. To put an end to an intolerable situa- 



72 GREATER ITALY 

tion the Greek Government had despatched a small 
squadron under the command of Prince George of 
Greece to the island in January, 1897, and a few weeks 
later (February 14) landed an expeditionary force 
to assist the insurgents. The day after the arrival 
of the international fleet a landing party under the 
command of an Italian officer occupied Canea. 
Though the policy of the Powers in ordering a bom- 
bardment of the encampment of the Greeks, when 
the latter refused to obey the summons given them 
to evacuate the island, was openly inveighed against 
throughout Italy, the fact that an Italian Admiral 
was in command of a fleet of all the Powers did much 
to restore public confidence. 

Throughout di Rudini's administration his guiding 
passion was that of rancour against Crispi. To dis- 
credit the "Imperialist," to heap shame upon him, 
seemed to di Rudini to be of great political importance. 
In pursuing this vindictive personal policy he brought 
about a period of tension between Italy and Great 
Britain, by the publication (April, 1896) of a "Green 
Book" on the Abyssinian war, wherein he included, 
without the authorisation of the British Govern- 
ment, certain confidential documents concerning An- 
glo-Italian negotiations regarding Abyssinia. The 
incident was soon dismissed by Great Britain, but it 
weakened the Italian Premier's position in his at- 
tempt to initiate a new orientation in Italy's foreign 
intercourse. Di Rudini outlined this new policy 
when he declared in the Chamber on May 25: 

"I intend to uphold the Triple Alliance, but I ex- 
pect to interpret it in such a manner that it will not 
alter our friendly relations with France and Russia; 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 73 

relations which I hope to render more cordially, sin- 
cerely, I would almost say affectionately, friendly."^ 

Italy was now once again drifting into a policy of 
compromise in her foreign relations. The Crispian 
poUcy of militant "Triplism" was, as was to be ex- 
pected, abandoned, and had it not been for the fact 
that, in the room of the Duke Caetani di Sermoneta, 
the Marchese Visconti Venosta, the most distin- 
guished ItaHan diplomatist, after twenty years of 
retirement consented to take charge of the Italian 
Foreign Office (July, 1896), and by his astuteness and 
skill was able to direct and modify di Rudini's rather 
incoherent poHcy, Italy would, in all Hkelihood have 
soon found herself in a difficult position. 

If Italy was intent upon seeking new friends, Ger- 
many was more anxious than ever to retain her hold 
over Italy. German penetration was at this time 
only seriously beginning, and William II felt the need 
of consolidating the bonds which bound the people 
of Italy to Germany, even if the Italian Government 
should choose to follow a more eclectic poficy. There- 
fore, on March 24, less than three weeks after Adua, 
the German Emperor arrived at Genoa, accompanied 
by the Empress, the Crown Prince, and his second 
son. Prince Eitel Frederick. Amid the cheers of 
the populace, he went on board the Imperial yacht 
Hohenzollern, cruised slowly down the coast to Naples, 
where the party landed, and remained for some days. 
Then after visiting Sicily, the voyage was continued 
up the Adriatic shore-line to Venice, where, in the 
company of his Ministers, William II had repeated 

1 Chiala: " Pagine di Storia Contemporanea: La Triplice e la Duplice," 
Turin, 1898, p. 626. 



74 GREATER ITALY 

interviews with King Humbert and his advisers. 
The ItaUan people were visibly impressed by this 
exuberant demonstration on the part of Germany 
that she was not merely a fair-weather friend. But 
di Rudini looked upon the matter in another Hght. 
A half-hearted supporter of the Triple Alliance, he 
had made it his chief aim to establish cordial rela- 
tions with France and Russia, though he seemed to 
have no constructive programme of the course of ac- 
tion to be pursued in order to carry out his desire. 
The object of the Triple Alliance was to maintain the 
balance of power in Europe and the peace of the 
world. Italy, bound to Great Britain by her naval 
agreements, had in a measure attached Great Britain 
to the Triple Alliance. Yet Italy now sought to enter 
upon not merely 'pacific relations with France, which 
Berlin had always encouraged, but cordial relations, 
which Germany had hitherto studiously sought to pre- 
vent. The time was now approaching when the Triple 
AUiance again came up for discussion, regarding its 
prolongation or abrogation. The procedure adopted 
was peculiar. The month of May (1896), the normal 
date for the final discussion of the terms of the treaty, 
or for its renewal, passed by with no announcements 
regarding the decision taken. It was not until June 
that it was casually made known by a remark of the 
Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Golu- 
chowski, that the treaty had not been "renewed," but 
merely '^ continued," and thus remained in force until 
1903. Though there was no modification in the text 
of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, it soon became 
evident that full privilege was now conceded to Italy 
to cultivate cordial relations with Russia and France. 



/ 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 75 

On June 20 the Italian Foreign Minister, the Duke 
Caetani di Sermoneta, speaking in the Chamber, de- 
clared : 

"The Triple Alliance, a pact of mutual fidelity, in 
no way excludes, and on the contrary implies, that 
each of the allied states should remain on good and 
cordial terms with all the other Powers. Therefore, in 
so far as we are concerned, our friendly relations with 
Russia and our efforts to bring it about that our rela- 
tions with France shall be imbued with that mutual 
sympathy and com^tesy which are in accordance with 
our racial affinity, and the memory of unforgettable 
events, do not prevent that there should persist towards 
us the unlimited intimacy and confidence of the two 
alfied Powers, Austria-Hungary and Germany."^ 

Henceforth the bonds of the Triple Alliance were 
being imperceptibly loosened. Italy seemed by de- 
grees to be regaining her independence of action abroad, 
though to maintain a nice balance in her relations 
towards both groups of Powers, and not to find her- 
self suddenly isolated in Europe, required quick per- 
ception and sound judgment. 

The results of this new trend of events soon made 
themselves felt. In September Italy concluded a 
treaty with France, concerning Tunis, and amicably 
settled this question, which had hitherto created much 
bitterness between the contracting parties. A month 
later the marriage of the Italian Heir Apparent, the 
future King Emmanuel III, to Princess Helen of Mon- 
tenegro, took place on October 24. This alliance was, 
in the near future, to open a new sphere of Italian 

^ Camera dei Deputati: "Discussione XIX, Legislatura," p. 6867. 



76 GREATER ITALY 

influence, in that it again directed Italian attention to 
the Eastern Adriatic. At the time it was interpreted 
as cementing the growing friendship with Russia. 

While di Rudini was courting Franco-Russian friend- 
ship, the Marchese Visconti Venosta prudently saw to 
it that the pact of the Triple Alliance was firmly main- 
tained. He accompanied King Humbert and Queen 
Margherita on their visit to Germany in the autumn 
of 1897, where his sovereign again demonstrated his 
loyalty towards his German ally. 

During this year Italy played an important part in 
co-operating with Great Britain in protecting the 
Greeks from the disastrous consequences of their un- 
fortunate war against Turkey, and took an active part 
in the establishment of the autonomous government 
of Crete. The Italians were gratified at the increasing 
consideration in which Italy had come to be held by 
British statesmen. The words of Lord Salisbury, who, 
speaking in the House of Lords, declared that the 
"great and sincere sympathy" of England towards 
Italy "was dictated not by sentiment but by con- 
siderations of interest"^ confirmed the fact that the 
Anglo-Italian Entente was a living factor in maintain- 
ing the stabiUty of the peace of Europe. 

While Italy was thus successfully conducting her 
foreign policy, at home affairs had lapsed into a la- 
mentable state of chaos. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the finances of the country, owing to careful hus- 
banding, were soon placed on a relatively sound foot- 
ing, nothing was done to ameliorate the condition of 
the poor, Di Rudini's weakness was soon patent. 
Though a member of the Right he had attained office 
1 " Parliamentary Debates," LI, 935. 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 77 

only by means of a secret coalition with the Radicals. 
Unable to maintain himself alone, he was compelled to 
bow to the demands of the Radical leader, Cavallotti, 
an unscrupulous, though brilliant, political agitator. 
Pursuing liis policy of persecution towards Crispi, 
di Rudini lent the support of the Government in the 
prosecution of the former Premier on the charge of 
embezzlement, which dragged on for nearly two years, 
and finally ended in virtually clearing Crispi of the 
charge, though the Chamber voted to censure him for 
irregular procedure. Not content with hounding 
Crispi, di Rudini used the influence of the Govern- 
ment to crush Crispi's parliamentary partisans at the 
General Election, which was held in March, 1897. 
The result was that the number of Radicals and 
RepubHcans in the Chamber was greatly increased, 
and the country soon found itself at the mercy of 
the revolutionary elements. Di Rudini had promised 
much in the way of social reforms, and that he would 
cleanse the political Hfe of the country. When fresh 
bank scandals were revealed and the guilty were still 
allowed to go unpunished, it became evident that not 
merely had the Premier repudiated his word, but that 
the Government was daily losing its control of the 
situation. 

The economic condition of the country, more par- 
ticularly in the South, was deplorable. To please 
the agrarians, di Rudini increased the duty on the 
cheaper grades of cereals, at a time when thousands 
were faced with starvation. Towards the end of 1897 
food riots broke out in the south of Italy, as the result 
of the increase in the price of bread. These continued 
intermittently throughout the autumn and early win- 



78 GREATER ITALY 

ter. By January they had spread all over the south 
of Italy and Sicily. The disturbances were readily 
suppressed by armed force, not without some loss of 
life. Though the movement was not revolutionary in 
its origin, it gathered strength from the fact that the 
Socialists and Republicans made use of the general 
dissatisfaction to further their interests. Di Rudini 
became alarmed; he ordered the temporary reduction 
of the corn duties, and even suspended them in the 
South, but otherwise no steps were taken to alleviate 
the sufferings of the people, which were very real. 
The Premier's feeble poHcy and his apparent indiffer- 
ence in the face of grave events, hastened the growth 
of the vast army of malcontents. Slowly the move- 
ment spread northward. In April there was a general 
strike near Bologna, then at Ravenna and Parma; in 
each case accompanied by serious disturbances and 
clashes between the civilians and the police. The un- 
rest throughout the country had grown to vast pro- 
portions. The subversive elements had already gained 
the upper hand in the northern districts, centring 
around Milan. It seems improbable that there was 
any carefully framed revolutionary plot. A Milanese 
Radical Deputy had spoken of ''the vote and the 
carbine" as the weapons of the people; but no steps 
were taken to organise or arm them. The Socialists 
were in the vanguard, and actively spread the dis- 
content. At Milan there was much real distress and 
poverty, though no active outbreak would have re- 
sulted had the authorities acted with firmness and 
moderation. On May 7 a great crowd gathered to 
protest against the killing, on the previous day, of 
two workmen in a scuffle with the police. The crowd 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 79 

was in an ugly mood. It was soon joined by groups 
of workmen and factory girls. Some employers closed 
their factories. The demonstrators now paraded the 
streets. Suddenly in the Corso Venezia a platoon of 
cavalry charged the crowd at a gallop. Though it was 
evident that the outbreak had not been planned, the 
pent-up fury of the mob burst forth. Barricades were 
thrown up; some of the demonstrators climbed to the 
roof tops and threw tiles and other missiles down on 
the poUce. The troops, having received no further 
instructions, looked on idly while the crowd continued 
its labours of barricade building. The mob was, for 
the most part, unarmed and without leadership, yet 
the Government, hearing of the outbreak, hastily des- 
patched considerable reinforcements to Milan, and 
proceeded to suppress the "revolution" with ruthless 
violence. For two days the mob was hunted down 
by the soldiery and the police. Over one hundred per- 
sons were killed and several hundred wounded. 

The Government tried in vain to fix the responsi- 
bility and find a scapegoat. Socialist, Repubfican, and 
Clerical leaders were brought into court, but the evi- 
dence against them collapsed. It would appear that 
the real responsibihty lay with the di Rudini Govern- 
ment, which by its laxity and weakness had allowed 
the movement to get under way, and then repressed it 
with undue brutality. The Government did not long 
survive the eventful Milanese outbreak. On June 
18, in order to appease popular indignation, di Rudini 
attempted to make over his Cabinet. During the 
two years that he had been in office he had already 
modified his Ministry three times, according to the 
exigencies of the moment. But this last attempt 



80 GREATER ITALY 

failed, and ten days later the Ministry fell, and di 
Rudini retired from public affairs. 

Though the authorities were unable to attach any 
blame for the riots at Milan to the SociaUsts, the more 
conservative elements of the population, the rich and 
the well-to-do, who had paid Uttle heed to the out- 
breaks in the south of Italy, aroused by the outburst 
at Milan, loudly clamoured for repressive measures. 
Under di Rudini's successor. General Pelloux, martial 
law was proclaimed at Naples, where there had been 
no disturbance whatever, as well as at Florence, where 
there had been very little, and at Milan. Railway 
servants and all public employees were mobilised on a 
military basis. Two-thirds of the Catholic societies, 
many of them purely philanthropic, were dissolved on 
the ground of their being anti-dynastic. Republican 
associations were outlawed, newspapers were suspended, 
schoolmasters dismissed for discussing socialism out of 
school hours. The miUtary court at Milan passed out- 
rageous sentences on trumped-up charges. "Two well- 
known journalists were sentenced to six and four 
years' imprisonment respectively, 'for continually at- 
tacking the institutions and authorities,' 'exaggerating 
the sufferings of the people, and thus embittering the 
hatred of classes,' and 'creating the environment from 
which the disorders sprang.' A Cathohc journahst was 
sentenced to three years for 'attacking the monarchy 
and institutions with subtle irony,' 'sowing class hatred 
between peasants and landlords,' and 'turning many 
of the clergy from their natural work of pacification.' 
There was hardly a pretense of decent legal procedure. 
The president of the court, General Bava-Beccaris, was 
as indifferent to equity as he was ignorant of law.".^ 

iKing and Okey: "Italy To-day," London, 1909, p. 98. 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 81 

Nor were the condemnations confined to Milan. 
Throughout Italy, on one charge or another, wholesale 
arrests were made. But a reaction soon set in against 
the arbitrary procedure of these courts. Petitions 
were widely circulated throughout Italy demanding the 
release of the prisoners. Before the end of the year 
over 2,700 prisoners were released, and within three 
years all those condemned at this time in connection 
with the events of those fateful May days were re- 
leased by royal amnesty. 

General Pelloux, supported by a majority of the 
Chamber which was strongly reactionary, now pre- 
sented a bill concerning public safety which would, 
if passed, confer even more autocratic powers on the 
Government than it already possessed, regarding the 
right to prohibit pubHc meetings and suppress asso- 
ciations, etc. Presented before the Chamber in No- 
vember, 1898, the measure met with violent opposi- 
tion on the part of the Republicans, Radicals, and 
Sociahsts. To prevent its passage every means of ob- 
struction was made use of, until in June, 1899, de- 
spairing of securing the passage of the bill by the 
usual parHamentary procedure, in view of the violence 
of the obstruction — fist-fights and other disturbances 
had become every-day scenes in the Chamber — the 
Government announced that the measure was by royal 
decree declared a law. The following year (February, 
1900) the Court of Cassation at Rome declared that 
the Public Safety Bill did not have the validity of a 
law. The whole matter was again brought before 
Parliament; again the Radicals resorted to their meth- 
ods of obstruction. An attempt was made to alter the 
standing orders; scenes of unruly conduct were again 



82 GREATER ITALY 

witnessed in the Chamber. New orders were finally- 
drafted which were intended to empower the President 
to suspend disorderly members, etc. But the Presi- 
dent of the Chamber found himself unable to cope with 
the concerted disturbance of the group of extreme 
members. The sitting broke up in confusion. The 
President of the Chamber resigned, and General Pel- 
loux now determined to appeal to the country. The 
result of the election was an increase in the strength of 
the radical groups. General Pelloux thereupon resigned. 
During Pelloux's administration Italy's foreign pol- 
icy was largely opportunist. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs was Admiral Canevaro, the former commander 
of the international fleet off Crete. His methods were 
those of the quarter deck rather than those of di- 
plomacy. He despatched an Italian cruiser to South 
America to secure redress from Colombia for injuries 
done, thirteen years before, to an Italian subject. He 
joined Great Britain in preventing the Vatican from 
being invited to be represented at the Peace Confer- 
ence convoked at The Hague by the Tsar of Russia. 
He endeavoured to secure for Italy the control of 
the San-Mun Bay in China, but his demand was 
rejected, and as a result of this diplomatic fiasco his 
resignation soon followed. He was succeeded by 
Visconti Venosta, who once again was willing to 
straighten out the tangles of Italy's foreign poHcy. 
Instead of abandoning altogether the project of secur- 
ing a sphere of influence for Italy in China, he seized 
the opportunity to despatch an Italian contingent 
to join the Powers in suppressing the Boxer uprising 
(1900), and as a result Italy secured a foothold in 
China in the form of a concession at Tienstin. 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 83 

On the fall of the Pelloux Cabinet, M. Saracco was 
called upon to form a Ministry of pacification (June, 
1900), and he succeeded in a measure in reconciling 
the conservatives with the more moderate radicals. 
A little over a month later, on July 29, King Humbert, 
while leaving an outdoor festival at Monza, was as- 
sassinated by an anarchist. 

/ The reign of the late King, though relatively quiet, 
•had not been uneventful. Though he was unable to 
retain for the monarchy that loyalty and popularity 
which it had enjoyed under his father, he had con- 
solidated the Kingdom into a coherent unit. He had 
adhered strictly to the constitution, and chose his 
Ministers in accordance with the will of the Chamber. 
However, he surrounded himself with a small coterie 
of persons who had Httle sympathy with popular 
reforms, and thus failed to remain in close touch 
with the country. Of distinct Germanophil ten- 
dencies, he was a stanch supporter of the Triple Alli- 
ance, and did much to bring about close and friendly 
relations between Italy and Germany. He exerted 
his energies to strengthen the army and navy, and 
approved of the programme of colonial expansion. 
A man of fearless courage and great good-will, he had 
won popular esteem by his personal assistance ren- 
dered freely at the time of any national disaster, such 
as the earthquake at Ischia, where with his own hands 
he rescued several persons from beneath the ruins. 
His presence at Naples and Busca, during the cholera 
epidemic in 1884, did much to restore confidence in 
the community. He was furthermore extremely 
generous, and distributed over £100,000 annually 
in reheving the wants of the poor. It is not 



84 GREATER ITALY 

surprising that he was surnamed " Humbert the 
Good." 

In 1868 King Humbert married his first cousin, 
Princess Margherita of Savoy, the daughter of the 
Duke of Genoa. The niece of the first King of Italy, 
the wife of the second, she had lived through the 
heroic days when the men of her House fought for and 
won Italian liberty. A woman of great personal 
beauty, high accomplishments, and intense patriotism, 
she was to exert a considerable influence in Italy, 
though without actively interfering in public affairs. 
It is reported that in later years she remarked: ''In 
the House of Savoy only one person rules at a time." 
On her only child, Victor Emmanuel, Prince of Naples, 
the Queen lavished her affection and care. Though 
deKcate in his youth, Victor Emmanuel outgrew his 
weakness, and while still young entered the army. 
He early showed great capacity for mihtary admin- 
istration. Devoted to outdoor living, he has com- 
bined his love for hunting and yachting with studious 
habits. He is a recognised authority on numis- 
matics, and has gathered together one of the most 
important collections of Italian coins now extant. 
Liberal in his politics, progressive in his opinions, 
he soon became an ardent advocate of economic 
improvements and social reforms. Thoroughly alive 
to the needs and interests of commercial develop- 
ment, a believer in the need of industrial expansion 
to foster the power of the State, he has sought to 
place the greatness of Italy before his own. He has 
effaced himself to allow the Italy, which he loves with 
flaming patriotism, to grow greater, richer, more 
powerful. He looks upon Italy as on a great corpora- 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 85 

tion, over which he has been appointed Managing 
Director. The prerogative of sovereignty is, to him, 
that of directing and increasing the efficiency and 
output of this '' Corporation-State." Yet he was 
never to forget that he is descended from a long Hne 
of soldier-kings, and that the honom* and greatness 
of Italy must, if occasion demanded, be asserted by 
the force of arms. Such was the man who, as Victor 
Emmanuel III, adapting himself to the needs and 
conditions of his time, assumed the sceptre of the 
House of Savoy, and undertook conscientiously the 
difficult metier de roi. 

One of the most singular phenomena of the crea- 
tion of United Italy is the part played therein by the 
House of Savoy. The Italian patriots, who during 
the early years of the Risorgimento struggled for the 
freedom and unity of Italy, sought to estabhsh a 
repubhc. Mazzini at Rome, Manin at Venice, Gari- 
baldi were stalwart Republicans. The thought of a 
monarchy was distasteful to all ItaHans. In seeking 
to create United Italy their chief incentive was the 
overthrowing of the seven despotic princes who ruled 
over Italy, not least among them the Princes of 
Savoy. For after their re-establishment at Turin 
in 1814, they had made a clean sweep of all reforms 
instituted by the French and re-established a reac- 
tionary government. Yet there was a young prince 
of the House, Charles Albert by name, who had in- 
herited in a measure the capacity for sagaciously 
gauging the significance of the events that were taking 
place. Though not in direct line of succession, he 
was soon to be called to the throne, and though a 



86 GREATER ITALY 

weak and vacillating ruler whose qualms of con- 
science forbade him to take a firm stand, he made 
possible the reconciliation between reaction and rev- 
olution, between democracy and aristocracy, which 
took place during the reign of his son, Victor Em- 
manuel II, the first King of United Italy. Thus at 
a crucial moment in their history the Princes of Savoy 
once again accommodated themselves to the temper 
of their times, and followed the oldest tradition of 
the House. 

This in a measure explains the present-day vigour 
of the most ancient ruling dynasty in Europe, which 
traces its Hneage clearly in the male line to Humbert 
the Whitehanded, whose domains in the first years 
of the eleventh century were situated on the Lake 
of Geneva, and later included all of Savoy and the 
chief passes over the Alps — the Mont Cenis and the 
Greater and Lesser St. Bernard. His son Oddone 
added Piedmont. 

During the centuries which elapsed the counts, 
and later the dukes of the House conformed their 
policy to the needs of their day. Defending them- 
selves, sword in hand, they were Guelphs and Ghibel- 
Hnes in turn. They took a prominent part in the 
Crusades, and were ever ready to fight in a just cause, 
more particularly if the occasion offered an oppor- 
tunity to extend their domain and sway. 

It was not until towards the end of the fourteenth 
century that the princes of the House of Savoy in- 
augurated the policy of paying more attention to 
their Italian than to their Savoyard possessions, and 
thus became identified with Italian affairs. They 
succeeded in extending their power and estates by 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 87 

co-ordinating policy with opportunity. Their vigor- 
ous reaUsm is well shown by the conduct of Duke 
Amadeus VIH, who though not a priest, was elected 
Pope by the Council of Basel in 1439. Wliile never 
travelhng to Rome, he assumed the Papal tiara, and 
as FeUx V reigned for nine years, recognised by half 
Chi'istendom. Through fortune and misfortune the 
Savoyard princes understood the secret of adapting 
themselves to the conditions and circumstances of 
their times, so that though repeatedly driven out of 
their estates by more powerful foes, they were in- 
variably reinstated in their ancient domains. 

During the eighteenth century they continued their 
poHcy of accommodation. It is not surprising there- 
fore, that when in the ensuing century the revolu- 
tionary societies, which had sprung up throughout 
Italy, gained in strength and importance, and enlisted 
the support of the most energetic and intelhgent men 
of the epoch who were eager to bring about the unity 
of the ItaUan people, the House of Savoy, realising 
that a progressive policy was the one best suited to 
their own interests, as well as those of Italy, should 
have taken an active part in the movement. Victor 
Emmanuel, ably advised by Count Cavour, who was 
himself of old aristocratic lineage, understood that 
the destiny of his House depended upon the policy 
to be pursued. It so came about that the world wit- 
nessed the extraordinary sight of a King taking into 
his service red-shirted Garibaldians, and placing him- 
self at the head of armed revolutionaries, in order to 
compass the overthrow of the other sovereign princes 
of Italy, including the Pope. United Italy, long the 
dream of Italian RepubUcan patriots, owed its ac- 



88 GREATER ITALY 

complishment to the strong hand and the daring enter- 
prise of the royal House of Savoy. It was the princes 
of this ruhng House who were able to bring the ques- 
tion of Itahan unity to the attention of Europe. It 
is owing to their initiative that foreign aid was secured, 
without which the undertaking would have failed. 
It was the forces of Piedmont, pledged by Victor 
Emmanuel to co-operate with the French, which 
secured Napoleon's assistance. Step by step as the 
task of union was being carried out, Victor Emmanuel 
undertook to reconcile the peoples of Italy with the 
idea of accepting a new sovereign, rather than a repub- 
lican form of government. It is unquestionable that 
had it not been for the fact that national sentiment 
and the desire for unity were more profound than 
the movement towards democratic government, the 
task would have been impossible. But Italian revolu- 
tionary leaders, whose unselfish patriotism was so 
strikingly set forth by Garibaldi himself when he 
declared, "I have never been a partisan of Kings, 
but, inasmuch as Charles Albert has made himself 
the defender of the cause of the people, it is my duty 
to offer him my sword," soon recognised that the 
aims of the House of Savoy were as legitimate as they 
were useful to the cause of United Italy. Without 
a strong leadership, without a closely welded, unified 
State, Italy as a nation could not have survived. Not 
even federaUsm would have been practical, had it 
been possible. The future prosperity of Italy de- 
pended on the successful accomplishment of the task 
of union. The same laws and regulations, even down 
to the minutest detail; the same flag and uniform 
in Piedmont as in Sicily, in Venetia as in Romagna 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 89 

or Calabria, could alone bring it about that the Italian 
people would feel themselves racially as well as na- 
tionally one. 

The star of Piedmont rose high on the horizon as 
the task of unification was methodically proceeding. 
It reached its zenith when, shortly after the occupa- 
tion of Rome, Victor Emmanuel, in opening the first 
Italian Parhament at Florence, on December 5, 1870, 
exclaimed: ''With Rome, the capital of Italy, I have 
carried out my promise, and crowned the enterprise 
begun by my illustrious father twenty-three years 
ago. My heart of a sovereign and of a son feels a 
solemn joy in welcoming, here assembled for the 
first time, the representatives of our beloved coun- 
try, and in pronouncing these words: Italy is free 
and united, it is for us to make her great and happy." 
Henceforth the Kingdom of Italy was the sole thought 
and preoccupation of this prince of the House of Savoy. 
Piedmont and the narrower needs of his native king- 
dom were forgotten. Instead of ruHng Italy from 
Piedmont as the HohenzoUerns proceeded to rule 
Germany through Prussia, Victor Emmanuel with 
the subtle flexibihty which has always characterised 
the princes of this House, adapted himseK to the new 
conditions which had arisen, and in the brief eight 
years which remained until his death, succeeded in 
proving to the people of Italy that he was worthy 
to be their King, and at the same time rendered the 
Monarchy popular throughout the peninsula. 

The House of Savoy owes to Italian unity its pres- 
ent greatness, but it is not an exaggeration to say that 
without the leadership of its princes the unification 
of Italy would have been long postponed. Yet there 



90 GREATER ITALY 

remained among a not inconsiderable section of the 
community the regret that Italy, when united, had 
not cast off the yoke of Kings. 

/ During the reign of King Humbert the popularity 
of the monarchy waned, though the old RepubHcan 
spirit cannot be said to have grown stronger. Italy 
was passing through a period of transition; social 
and economic questions came to the fore. The coer- 
cive measures adopted to quell parliamentary distur- 
bances, as well as popular uprisings which marked the 
closing years of his reign, showed that King Humbert 
had failed to appreciate the true significance of the 
prevailing unrest. The situation had become in- 
creasingly difficult when the King was removed by 
the bullet of an anarchist. In view of this event, it 
would have been reasonable to expect that a period 
of reaction would be initiated by his successor. But 
Victor Emmanuel III refused to consent to such a 
policy. With his reign an era of liberalism opened, 
and within a very brief space of years Sociahsts and 
Radicals no longer considered any change in the 
Government as a necessary part of their progranmie; 
even Clericals, who were for so long active anti-dynastic 
agents, appeared to have become reconciled to the 
Monarchy. Victor Emmanuel had taken the lead in the 
new trend of events. He removed the Monarchy from 
the sphere of controversy and originated the democ- 
racy of kingship. In pursuing this policy of hberal- 
ism he left the task of governing too much in the 
hands of parliamentary leaders, and allowed the 
country to be ruled by a parUamentary dictator, 
while he bent his energies on improving the social 
and economic conditions of his subjects. Yet, when 



THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 91 

in later years the Italian people rose to vindicate 
their independence as a World Power, Victor Em- 
manuel III was ready to lead them. Then the soldiers 
of Italy, Socialists, Republicans, Royalists, Clericals, 
peasants, bourgeois, and aristocracy, from Sicily and 
Naples, from Rome, Tuscany and the Marches, from 
Venetia, Lombardy as well as Piedmont, were to go 
into battle with the cry ''Avanti Savoia^' on their 
lips, proclaiming the unity of the Kingdom of Italy 
under the sceptre of the House of Savoy, y 



CHAPTER V 

THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 

Political Cokruption. The Erosion of Parties. Algeciras 
AND Agadir 

The year 1903 marks a turning-point in the his- 
tory of Italy. Up to this time the benefits of national 
existence had been but vaguely sensed by the major- 
ity of the Italian people. National unity, achieved 
by foreign aid, had failed to arouse the Italians to a 
realisation of their obligations in the realm of world 
politics. Concerned with domestic dissensions, the 
despised, silent, subservient partner of the Triple 
Alliance, Italy, during recent years had wallowed in 
a slough of political despondency. 

The history of the ensuing decade of Italian public 
affairs is largely that of one man, Giovanni Giolitti, 
."the dictator." To estimate fairly the capacity and 
character of a man who, by the use or rather abuse 
of power, was able to control the destiny of a great 
people through a long period of years, requires patient 
analysis. Few men have experienced such marked 
tokens of loyalty and public favour; few have been 
accused of such baseness, corruption, and crime. 

Born at Mondovi in Piedmont on October 27, 1842, 
the son of a minor government official, Giolitti, after 
having completed his university training, entered 
the civil service, first in the Ministry of Justice, later 
in that of Finance. During the stormy days of 1860- 

92 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 93 

70, when Italy was struggling to be free, when the 
youth of the land loyally gave their lives for the cause 
of national unity and independence, Giolitti was 
never moved to enlist in any such enterprise. The 
intliralling drama of nation-building failed to awaken 
any enthusiasm in the mind of the plodding bureau- 
crat. Giolitti remained quietly at his fireside. He 
read the news of the victories of Solferino and Magenta, 
of the expeditions of Garibaldi and the Thousand to 
Sicily, of the Hberation of Venetia, and the conquest 
of Rome with seeming unconcern. A zealous and 
devoted civil servant, he remained at his desk, and 
his careful, methodically prepared reports won for 
him the commendation of his chiefs and rapid promo- 
tion. 

"When in 1882 Italy, on her entry into the Triple 
Alliance, had firmly established her position among 
nations, GioUtti, abandoning his career, succeeded in 
securing a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. He 
brought with him an intimate acquaintance with the 
bureaucratic machine, a skilled perception of how 
this machine might be used to control an electorate 
and even a Government, as well as a profound knowl- 
edge of matters of finance. Supple, pliant, unham- 
pered by any political or ethical principles, totally 
devoid of any lofty ideals of patriotism, moved to 
action only by the expediency of the moment, giving 
what was wanted rather than what was needed, Giolitti 
found himself after ten years of active politics, called to 
the Premiership in 1892. His first Ministry, as will be 
recalled, ended disastrously ^ His name was covered 
with opprobrium. For several years he dared not rise 

^ See p. 58 et seq. 



94 GREATER ITALY 

to speak in Parliament. Then, by degrees, the past 
was] forgotten. In 1900 we find Giolitti accepting the 
portfoUo of Minister of the Interior in the Zanardelli 
Cabinet. 

His poHtical resurrection did not pass unnoticed, 
though few voices were raised against him. From 
this time onward GioHtti's influence in the Chamber 
grew rapidly. His bold programme of social reform, 
which in reality amounted to little more than a policy 
of non-interference on the part of the Government, 
in the struggle between capital and labour, won for 
him wide support. In comparison with the repressive 
policy towards labour resorted to by his predecessors, 
the new Giolittian regime must be looked upon as a 
step forward. The right to strike, the right to hold 
pubUc meetings, the freedom of the Press, were now 
conceded to the deHght of the Sociahsts, while other 
less extreme liberal members of the Chamber, eagerly 
courting the favour of the new leader, flocked to his 
standard. It was only natural, therefore, that when 
ZanardelU resigned Giohtti should have been called 
upon to form a Ministry. He accepted the offer, and 
on November 3, 1903, constituted his Cabinet, caUing 
M. Tittoni, a Prefect of Naples, to the Foreign Office. 

GioHtti, as long as it served his purpose, was in 
the vanguard of all fiberal movements. But though 
he apparently concerned himself with problems of 
public poHcy, his real and unquestioned abihty as 
a ruler of men was consumed in affirming his par- 
liamentary dominance and in subjecting the members 
of the Chamber to his will. Owing to the pecufiarities 
of the Italian parhamentary system, the Government 
in power at the time of a General Election is able to 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 95 

exert such pressure that the governmental candidate 
is ahnost invariably elected. As the Minister of the 
Interior appoints the Prefects and other local officials 
who are in a position to exercise absolute control 
over all elections, he is able to create for himself a 
personal following of Deputies who owe their election 
to the support given to them by the Government 
"machine." During the three General Elections which 
took place in 1904, 1909, 1913, GioUtti was each time 
in power. He saw to it that only docile candidates 
were elected. Bribery, corruption, and coercion, 
were resorted to when needed to secure the desired 
results. The Giolittian system of exercising par- 
liamentary control is without precedent in contem- 
porary Europe. As soon as the Chamber was elected, 
and had entered upon its legislative duties, Giohtti, 
after a brief delay, was in the habit of resigning from 
office with the majority still loyal to him. He would 
retire from pubhc affairs content to allow some faith- 
ful follower or weak opponent to assume the burden 
of office. Then when the situation became involved, 
owing to the lack of cohesion in the Chamber, when 
the Deputies turned once again their thoughts to 
their re-election, Giolitti would upset the Ministry, 
return to office and, assured of the personal support 
of the majority of the Deputies, lead the Chamber 
and the country through the toils of a fresh General 
Election. Within a few years he succeeded in breaking 
down completely the already feeble barriers of poht- 
ical parties ; and thus freed from the trammels of party 
allegiance or political programmes, Giohtti was in a 
position to rule Italy as befitted his fancy. His des- 
potism was, however, enhghtened. His methods were 



96 GREATER ITALY 

simple. He endeavoured to satisfy, in so far as pos- 
sible, every one. On the one hand, he redressed labour 
grievances, on the other he satisfied the capitalists 
in their demands for privileges and protection. He 
held his sway over the landowners and large farmers 
by maintaining the customs duties on wheat. He raised 
the salaries of the clergy and encouraged the efforts 
of the Church to extend its influence in the schools, 
while appointing notorious Freemasons to posts in 
the Ministry of Education. To satisfy the masses he 
reduced the length of the period of service of con- 
scripts, and at the same time increased the effectives 
of the army and navy to satisfy the upper classes. 
His maxim of government was to grant immediately 
every demand which was made upon him by insistent 
public clamour; to give way to all active currents of 
pubUc opinion.^ 

After a protracted period of economic crises, the 
country was now entering upon an era of prosperity 
and expansion. Politics no longer engrossed the at- 
tention of the multitude, and it became evident that 
Giolitti, while not brooking any interference with his 
methods of government, was eager to keep the ship 

1 Cf. G. Ferrero: "La Guerre Europe^nne," Payot &'Cie., Paris, 1916. 
Writing on the Giolittian regime, page 207, he remarks: 

"This Government will seem strange to many. . It is, in fact, a sys- 
tem of government which has almost entirely disappeared in Europe. 
Csesar and Augustus used two such governments: the one to conquer 
Gaul, the other to reorganise the Empire. Interesting analogies could 
be found in the history of Florence and in the repubhcs of South 
America. It is the kind of government which is found everywhere, 
where the electoral system is not dominated by strongly organised 
parties. Sooner or later a man or a family or a family group gains 
control of the electoral machine, and uses it to his own advantage. 
This system, moreover, put into practice for ten years in Italy by an 
intelligent, dexterous, adroit man, a clear-thinking, strong-willed man, 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 97 

of state riding on an even keel. As a result of agrarian 
and industrial difficulties, in September, 1904, Italy 
was confronted with a general strike of unprecedented 
magnitude, promoted by the extreme Socialists with 
the avowed object of upsetting the Giolittian Ministry. 
For two days the normal life of northern Italy was 
paralysed. Serious disorders broke out in Rome and 
Naples. Giolitti, while maintaining order, determined 
not to interfere except in the event of flagrant violence. 
The disorders soon died down, and at the General 
Elections, held two months later, the entire country, 
indignant at the attempts made to wreck the Govern- 
ment by resorting to force, swept the Socialist Deputies 
who had fomented the strike from oj05ce. Even the 
Vatican suspended the non expedit so that Catholics 
might vote. The Giolittians were everywhere re- 
turned by large majorities. 

Soon afterwards (March, 1905) Giolitti, in accord 
with his policy, retired from ofl&ce. A vain attempt 
was made to form a stable Ministry under Giolitti's 
faithful lieutenant, Tittoni. Finally M. Fortis, an 
old Garibaldian legionary, patched up a short-lived 



did not fail to produce remarkable results. It allowed Italy to profit 
by the period of prosperity which the world has enjoyed since 1900. 
. . . Whatever may have been its merits, this personal Government 
exercised its functions under the cloak of being a parUamentary institu- 
tion. This contradiction between the substance and the form could 
not fail to produce grave consequences: debates, voting, parties, the 
formation and overthrow of Ministries, the interplay of majorities and 
minorities, elections; everything which goes to make up the essence of 
a parhamentary system could be nothing more than fictions, more or 
less concealed. . . . One phenomenon above aU irritated many — the 
decadence of Parliament. It is impossible to deny that the Chamber 
and the Senate stand for much less than they did twenty years ago 
. . . and it must not be forgotten that governments which endeavour 
to satisfy everybody often satisfy no one." 



98 GREATER ITALY 

Ministry. The new Premier, forbidden to carry out 
any measure which might offend GioHtti, above all 
to tamper with the dictator's political machine, found 
his position burdensome, and it was a surprise to no 
one when he resigned in February of the following 
year. Giolitti, not yet ready to take up the reins of 
power, deemed it expedient to intrust the leadership 
of the Cabinet to the leader of a small group, the 
feeble remnant of the Opposition, Baron Sidney 
Sonnino.^ Sonnino's Ministry was a Cabinet such as 
had been rarely constituted in Italy, made up of men 
drawn from all ranks and all parties, imbued with a 
deep patriotism, and united in their desire to serve 
their country. This Ministry at once set about to 
grapple with urgent reforms. The reorganisation 
of the railways which had recently been nationahsed, 
the conversion of the national debt, and measures to 
improve the deplorable economic conditions in the 
South of Italy were the chief items of their pro- 
gramme. 

Baron Sonnino was temperamentally unfit to con- 
trol an Italian Chamber. His bad parhamentary 
tactics, his total lack of political adroitness created 
the impasse which Giolitti had no doubt foreseen. On 
a simple technicaUty the Sonnino Ministry was over- 

^ Sonnino was born at Florence in 1847, of Anglo-Jewish extraction. 
He served for some years in the Italian diplomatic service, but resigned 
to devote himself to the study of Italian social conditions. On enter- 
ing Parliament his abiUty attracted attention. A recluse, cold, shy, 
diffident, he has ever remained a lonesome figure in Itahan politics. 
Totally devoid of an understanding of parliamentary intrigue, and an 
indifferent speaker, he has been unable to hold together a following. 
A man of great moral rectitude and sincere patriotism, he was in later 
years to be called upon to guide Italy through the most difficult crisis 
of her history. 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 99 

thrown, little more than two months after its crea- 
tion, and Giolitti, now ready to re-enter the field, 
again took up the reins of government. He at once 
adopted the most popular features of Sonnino's pro- 
posed reforms, and with a docile House ready to 
execute his commands, the dictator, for the ensuing 
thi'ee years, ruled Italy, while the country enjoyed 
an era of ever-increasing prosperity and material well- 
being. 

In the realm of foreign affairs Giolitti endeavoured 
to apply those principles which had so well succeeded 
at home. A faithful adherent of the Triple Alliance, 
he, nevertheless, made friendly advances to the other 
Powers. Giolitti cared little for Italy's international 
relations and remained blind to her position as a 
World Power. Yet by the force of circumstances 
Italy was called upon to play a considerable role in 
world affairs. The ever-increasing expansion of the 
Pan-Germanic movement, the pretensions of Prussia 
to European hegemony, the reawakening of irredent- 
ism, and, above all, the growth of nationalism were 
essential contributing factors. 

Italy had already entered into a more friendly 
understanding with France, and after the visit of 
President Loubet in the autumn of 1904,^ steps were 
taken to put an end to the commercial warfare which 
had been waged between the two countries for many 
years past. The Italian Rente was once again hsted 
on the Paris Bourse, much to the benefit of ItaHan 
credit abroad. 

Itahan official apathy in the domain of foreign 
relations was rudely aroused when, on March 31, 

1 See p. 170. 



100 GREATER ITALY 

1905, the German Emperor visited Tangier. This 
coup de theatre was to have far-reaching effects. Wil- 
liam II, so it was alleged, asserted that he had come 
to protect Moroccan independence from further French 
aggression, as well as to safeguard German commercial 
interests in Morocco. This active interference on the 
part of Germany in the affairs of the Mediterranean 
would, if permitted to continue, have upset the nicely 
balanced equihbrium which had at last been arrived 
at in these waters. 

Nine months later, on January 16, 1906, an inter- 
national conference met at Algeciras to settle the 
questions raised by this Imperial visit. The shadow 
of war which, for a brief period had overspread Eu- 
rope during the preceding summer, had not alto- 
gether been dissipated. When the delegates assembled 
it was found that Great Britain firmly supported the 
French thesis which asserted the exclusive priority of 
French interests in Morocco. Austria in her zealous 
advocacy of German claims earned the title of "a> 
brilHant second," which William II grandiloquently 
bestowed on the Foreign Minister of the Dual Mon- 
archy. The course which Italy was to pursue at 
the conference was of necessity complex. Bound 
to the Central Empires in all matters concerning 
Continental policy, Italy had entered into agree- 
ments with Great Britain regarding the Mediter- 
ranean. Furthermore, Italy was bound by a recent 
understanding^ with France not to oppose French 
expansion in Morocco, in return for the recognition 
of Italian pre-eminence in Tripoli. Italy chose to 
regard her agreements with France and Great Britain 

iSeep. 116. 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 101 

as more important than her alHance with Germany, 
so that in principle the Itahan delegates supported 
the French thesis at the conference, and Italy was 
thus instrumental in bringing about the triumph of 
France and the exclusion of Germany from Mediter- 
ranean affairs. The anger of Germany on learning 
of the independent attitude which Italy had dared 
to assume in opposing her all-powerful German ally 
was very great, and for the year following the con- 
ference in both Berlin and Rome there was an ex- 
change of official visits, and an endeavour on the part 
of prominent Triphsts to efface the unpleasant mem- 
ory of the Algeciras Conference. It was no surprise, 
therefore, that the Triple Alliance, notwithstanding 
the fact that it had lost all but formal significance, 
was not denounced in the summer of 1907, and 
thus automatically remained in force until 1914. 

Relations with Austria were far from friendly. In 
Vienna the conviction was gaining ground that the 
Itahans could not be relied upon in a crisis, while it 
was evident to many Italians that the yoke of the 
alliance with the Dual Monarchy had become un- 
bearable. Austria, as early as 1904, took steps which 
could only be interpreted as overtly hostile acts by 
Italy. Along the Italo-Austrian boundary the Aus- 
trian General Staff initiated at great cost an elaborate 
system of fortifications, manned with heavy-cahbre 
guns. Fresh troops from remote confines of the Haps- 
burg Empire were now garrisoned here. The Emperor 
Francis Joseph attended in person the Grand Manoeu- 
vres held in Tyrol in 1905. In November of the 
same year the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Heir 
Apparent to the throne, the recognised leader of the 



102 GREATER ITALY 

anti-Italian party, approved the vote of a Catholic 
congress, held under his presidency, in favour of the 
re-establishment of the temporal power of the Papacy. 
The advent of a "strong man," Baron von Aehrenthal, 
in October, 1906, at the Foreign Office, in Vienna, 
was to put to severe test the cohesive strength of the 
Triple Affiance. Reverting at first to a more friendly 
poUcy towards Italy in order to allay Itahan sus- 
picions, the new Austrian Foreign Minister after a 
reasonable delay in January, 1908, announced that 
he had obtained from the Ottoman Government a 
concession to build a railway across the Sanjak of 
Novi Bazar, uniting the Bosnian hues with the Vardar 
road running from Mitrovitza to Salonika. This 
project aroused the apprehensions of the Italians. 
The Roman Cabinet was accused of weakness in 
permitting Austria to upset the status quo in the Bal- 
kans as stipulated by Article VII of their treaty of 
affiance. Giolitti, to escape further recriminations, 
through his Foreign Minister declared that Italy had 
not given her consent to the Austrian project, but on 
the contrary favoured the counter-proposal presented 
by Russia, wffich was to hnk Serbia with the Adriatic. 
Tffis announcement, as was to be expected, brought 
about a period of tension between the Austro-Itahan 
affies, which was only relieved by the energetic in- 
tervention on the part of Berlin. Yet this episode 
has a wider significance in that it marks the first 
active co-operation on the part of Italy and Russia. 
The friendly relations between the two countries 
were further strengthened by the visit of M. Isvolsky 
the Russian Foreign Minister, to the King of Italy at 
Racconigi, on September 29. Thus a new orientation 
in Italian foreign policy was inaugurated. 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 103 

A week later, on October 5, 1908, Austria pro- 
claimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Giolittian laisser-aller policy in foreign affairs 
had exposed Italy to so many humiliations, both 
within and without the Triple Alliance, and guaran- 
teed so little the security of the Kingdom that the 
more enlightened elements of the nation were loudly 
indignant at this fresh affront, by so flagrant a dis- 
turbance of the status quo in the Balkans, the corner- 
stone of the alHance with Austria. Popular exaspera- 
tion reached its culmination in Italy when it was 
learned that, in spite of the declaration made at Carate 
the next day, October 6, by M. Tittoni, that "Italy 
might await events with serenity" — ^words inter- 
preted to mean that Italy was to receive adequate 
compensation — instead of the rectification of the 
Austro-Italian frontier, which was confidently ex- 
pected, Austria merely agreed to evacuate the San- 
jak of Novi Bazar which she had formerly policed. 
In Pome, when the news became generally known, 
disorders broke out. The Austrian Embassy was as- 
saulted, the windows smashed, and popular disap- 
proval was loudly voiced in the Chamber. The in- 
ternational situation was acute. War, again con- 
jured up by the Central Empires was menacingly 
near. For a moment it seemed as though Russia 
would come to the support of Serbia and protect 
the interests of the Jugo-Slavs. But the bellicose 
attitude of Germany, who made Austria's quarrel 
her own, prevented armed intervention, as neither 
France nor Great Britain were in a position to act 
in concert. Once again Italy found herself on the 
brink of a great European war, in an ambiguous 
position in which her unnatural alliance with the 



104 GREATER ITALY 

Central Empires placed her. In the midst of the 
crisis a terrible national calamity overwhelmed the 
ItaHan people and plunged the country into mourn- 
ing. 

On the 28th of December an earthquake of un- 
precedented intensity destroyed Messina, Reggio di 
Calabre, and the towns and villages of the surround- 
ing territory, causing desolation and ruin unequalled 
in modern times. According to carefully compiled 
official records 77,283 persons perished. The dis- 
aster was rendered more terrible by the fact that for 
twelve hours no help arrived, as all the local author- 
ities had perished and the few survivors had no means 
of communicating with the outside world. Sailors 
from British and Russian battleships, which happened 
to be in the neighbourhood, were the first to render 
aid. The King and Queen of Italy arrived soon after- 
wards and personally took part in the work of salvage 
and rescue, which continued for two full weeks, while 
all Italy united in providing for the homeless and 
destitute. 

This national disaster had a political influence of 
no small import to Italy. Distracted from any con- 
sideration of foreign affairs, Italy for the time being 
forgot the European crisis, and the Italians from all 
parts of the peninsula proved the solidarity of the 
Kingdom in their efforts to help their hapless brethren 
of Sicily and Calabria. 

The events of October, 1908, were in the nature of 
a dress-rehearsal for the great drama, staged by the 
Central Empires, on which they were to ring up the 
curtain in August, 1914. In 1908 the Powers, who 
were later to form the Triple Entente, were not yet 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 105 

ready to act in concert to oppose the Pan-German 
Drang nach Osten. But it was plainly evident that 
henceforth Italy did not consider herself as part of 
the Triple AlHance in any campaign of aggression 
which the Central Empires might see fit to under- 
take, and that in the event of a European war, such 
as had been threatened in 1905 and 1908, Italy could 
be expected to pursue a policy which her best in- 
terests alone would dictate, regardless of treaty agree- 
ments. 

It is not surprising that Austria took full advantage 
of the circumstances which had rendered Italy help- 
less. When the Italians were once again able to con- 
sider their position in international affairs they had 
to acknowledge that their prestige had suffered greatly 
at the hands of Austria. By the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 19,696 square miles of territory, 
with a population of over 1,800,000 inhabitants, was 
added to the realm of the Hapsburgs. Yet after pro- 
longed negotiations, Italy was only able to obtain the 
aboUtion of the privilege granted to Austria by the 
Treaty of BerHn to pohce Montenegrin waters and 
the promise of the establishment of an Italian univer- 
sity at Vienna. Baron Sonnino, speaking in February, 
1909, stated: "It behooves the country to recognise 
that it has lost weight and influence in the world, 
and to study how best to repair the damage done." 

The crisis was thus passed, but it left in the hearts 
of the Italian people the profound conviction that 
Austria had ridden rough-shod over Italian national 
aspirations. It was clear to all Italy that, after en- 
deavouring loyally for nearly thirty years to live on 
terms of friendship with the Dual Monarchy, the 



106 GREATER ITALY 

solution of their difficulties must of necessity be sought 
on the field of battle. To prepare for this eventuality- 
must henceforth be the single purpose of Italy's for- 
eign relations. In March, 1909, Giolitti dissolved 
the Chamber, and, notwithstanding the discontent of 
the country with his foreign policy, by means of 
coercive measures he was able to control the elec- 
tions and was returned with a good majority. 

An era of more careful consideration of Italy's for- 
eign poHcy is now entered upon. The period of what 
has come to be known as the "interpenetration of 
alHances" had begun. Though no official announce- 
ments were made, and the Triple Affiance remained 
in force as in the past, the friendship of the Entente 
Powers was again openly courted. On April 12, 1909, 
a British squadron visited Genoa. On the 29th, the 
King and Queen of Italy entertained very cordially 
King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra at Baia. 
A fortnight later the German Emperor was received 
at Brindisi, while the newly appointed German Am- 
bassador to Italy, M. von Jagow, who was believed in 
Italy to be strongly pro-Italian, arrived at Rome to 
counteract the tendency of Italy to ''flirt" with the 
other Powers, and announced that it was admitted in 
Italy that "the Triple Affiance is best for the peace of 
Europe." A month later a delegation of French officers 
was sent to Italy to take part in the celebrations com- 
memorating the fiftieth anniversary of the battles of 
Magenta and Solferino. But the most important 
visitor of this eventful year was the Tsar of all the 
Russias. In 1903, Nicholas II had abeady con- 
templated paying an official visit to Italy, but was 
prevented from carrying out his project by the op- 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 107 

position of Italian Socialists. This opposition had 
since died down. The Tsar now arrived in Italy, and 
was received by Victor Emmanuel at Racconigi on 
October 23. Nicholas II during his journey from 
Russia to Italy had made it a point carefully to avoid 
entering Austrian territory. The warmth of his re- 
ception and the friendly nature of the toasts exchanged 
was the source of great satisfaction to all Italians, 
and created a deep impression throughout Europe. 
In France public opinion was gratified to find that 
Italy was daily becoming more detached from the Cen- 
tral Empires. In Austria the news "of the visit of the 
Tsar was received with marked ill-humour, and in of- 
ficial circles an excuse was eagerly sought to humiliate 
Italy for her boldness in daring to initiate an indepen- 
dent policy. The occasion was not long in arising. 
Shortly after the Russian Imperial visit, the Vienna 
Government peremptorily demanded the dismissal 
from the Itahan army of one of Italy's most distin- 
guished superior officers, General Asinari di Bernezzo, 
the commander of an army corps, who, in the course 
of a speech, in presenting the flag to a body of recruits, 
remarked that he hoped that they would see it float 
over the irredente provinces. Italy, in order to keep 
the peace, complied with the Austrian demand, and 
on November 11, the general was placed on the re- 
tired list. Italian national pride was deeply wounded 
by this summary interference on the part of Aus- 
tria, and while the Vienna Govermnent gloated over 
the success of the browbeating which it had ad- 
ministered to Italy, the incident added fuel to the 
fire of hatred smouldering in the hearts of the Italian 
people. 



108 GREATER ITALY 

In December, Giolitti, following his now well- 
established custom, resigned from office, and in order 
to give a semblance of reality to the parliamentary 
system of responsible government, the leader of the 
Opposition was again called upon to take office. 
Baron Sonnino accepted the offer, and constituted 
his Cabinet, but owing to the Giohttian methods 
of party erosion which had won over nearly all the 
members of the Chamber, the Opposition represented 
only 30 members out of a total of 508 Deputies. 
Baron Sonnino, in spite of his moral courage and good 
intentions, was, owing to his uncompromising atti- 
tude, unable to win the good-will of the Chamber. 
In the face of the hostihty of a majority which frankly 
despised him, Sonnino's Cabinet could not be expected 
to survive, and after another brief rule lasting three 
months, he was overthrown. Giolitti chose as his 
successor M. Luzzatti, a distinguished authority on 
finances, who had held a portfolio in previous Cabinets. 
M. Luzzatti, who was the direct opposite of Baron 
Sonnino in temperament, desired to please everybody. 
He promised many reforms, among them universal 
suffrage, which had been loudly demanded by the 
Sociahsts, in spite of the fact that GioHtti had de- 
clared himself opposed to it. However, he succeeded 
no better than Sonnino in conciliating the Chamber, 
so that the majority would have eagerly seized the 
first opportunity to overthrow him but for the fact 
that Giohtti bade them refrain, as he wished to en- 
joy a period of rest in the country, freed from the 
worries of poUtical hfe. The Luzzatti Ministry thus 
dragged on its feeble existence through the summer 
and autumn of 1910. No untoward event disturbed 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 109 

the even tenor of world affairs. Relations with Aus- 
tria resumed, outwardly at least, a more friendly 
course. The Marchese di San Guliano, the new Ital- 
ian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was imbued with 
a deep admiration for all things German, made ev- 
ery endeavour to smooth over the strained relations 
between Italy and Austria. In August he journeyed 
to Salzburg to confer with Count Aehrenthal, and 
later to Ischl to pay his respects to Emperor Francis' 
Joseph. His visit was promptly returned by the 
Austrian Foreign Minister. As a result of these visits 
it was announced that the two countries were in per- 
fect accord regarding the status quo in the Balkans, 
and that the maintenance of the Triple Alliance in 
its full strength and vigour was the ardent wish of its 
signatories. Meanwhile the discontent of the Cham- 
ber with the Luzzatti Cabinet was steadily growing. 
Even the country felt that it was being weakly gov- 
erned. 

The crash came in March, 1911. GioHtti, with his 
usual dexterity, presented himself to all Italy as the 
man of the hour. He was welcomed by the Chamber 
and the country as the only man who could not merely 
rule, but govern. He thus again took up the duties 
of Premier on March 29, 1911. The question of uni- 
versal suffrage brought before the country by Luz- 
zatti in a complicated form was now advocated by 
Giolitti as zealously as he had hitherto opposed it. 
He proposed a much broader enfranchisement than 
had hitherto been considered advisable. At the 
same time he introduced a bill for the creation of a 
Government monopoly for life insurance. This latter 
measure was badly drawn, in flagrant violation of 



110 GREATER ITALY 

existing provisions of the law, so that it amounted 
almost to a confiscatory measure. These proposals 
aroused wide-spread opposition in the Lower House. 
The dictator found that the Chamber, hitherto so 
docile, was preparing to dispute with its maker the 
right of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the recalcitrant 
temper of Parliament, Giolitti stubbornly persisted 
in forcing the insurance bill through. The discontent 
of the Deputies increased daily. The despotism of 
the Giolittian regime was at last beginning to bear 
fruit. Yet few were found who dared to attack the 
dictator, for all knew that he might at any time dis- 
solve the Chamber, and as his electoral machine was 
still in perfect working order he would see to it that 
the "rebels" were not returned at the next elections. 
This was the situation when Parliament rose at the 
end of June. 

On July 1, the German gunboat Panther, appeared 
off Agadir. For a third time within the brief space 
of five years a European war was threatened by the 
"mailed-fist" policy of the Central Empires. The 
Moroccan question had, to all intents and purposes, 
been settled at the Algeciras Conference, which was 
further confirmed by the Franco-German convention 
of 1909. When France was compelled to extend the 
sphere of her operations in Morocco, Berlin, believing 
that the opportunity was propitious to reopen the 
whole question de novo, despatched the Panther, fol- 
lowed by the cruiser Berlin, to Agadir ostensibly to 
protect German trading interests in southern Mo- 
rocco. Once again Great Britain stood shoulder to 
shoulder iwith France. Germany thereupon (July 
15) demanded territorial compensations in Mo- 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 111 

rocco itself. This demand was firmly declined by 
France.^ 

The Moroccan question, which had been one of 
the most thorny problems in international politics, 
was now tending towards a solution, and it was evi- 
dent that the establishment of a French protectorate 
over Morocco would not be long delayed. Suddenly 
Italy remembered the engagements entered into by 
France and Great Britain regarding Italian rights in 
TripoH. 

In the dismal, confused twilight of Italian public 
opinion, depressed by long years of political servitude 
and by a system of government which had enfeebled 
and enslaved even the more vigorous intellects of 
the community, there flared forth a flame which now 
burned brightly, illuminating the darkened corners 
of Italian life and, in its fierce, white heat, sought to 
amalgamate the struggling elements [of a people en- 
deavouring to find itself. Such was the mission of 
Italian nationalism a half century after the founding 
of the Kingdom as expressed by M. Corradini and 
the small group which had gathered around him. 
This newer nationalism was in the nature of a revival 
of the older, virile spirit which had made the Risor- 
gimento possible. In the words of its leader i^ 

"Patriotism is altruistic. Nationalism is egoistic. 
When we want to express our love for Italy let us 
say 'our country' (patria); when we wish to aj95rm 
the power of Italy, let us say 'nation' (nazione)." 

^ The matter was finally settled by the Franco-German treaties, 
signed November 4, 1911. Germany agreed to recognise a French 
protectorate over Morocco; France ceded to Germany approximately 
100,000 square miles of territory in the Congo. 

2E. Corradini: "II Nationalismo ItaUano," Treves, Milan, 1914, p. 28. 



112 GREATER ITALY 

To assert the strength and vigour of Italy as a na- 
tion, to arouse the Itahans to a sense of their position 
as a World Power, was the chief aim of the nationalist 
propaganda which was now carried on actively through- 
out Italy. It was not until 1911 that the new move- 
ment came out openly with a definite, political 
programme, and ardently advocated the Tripolitan 
enterprise. The prospect of the conquest of Tripoli 
was a concrete fact which could easily be built upon. 
The propaganda of the Nationalists gained number- 
less wilHng proselytes. Few Italians recalled the fact 
that Tripoli belonged to Turkey, and that the Porte 
at the time ruled over a vast empire potentially pow- 
erful, the integrity of which was zealously watched 
over by the Powers. Fewer still concerned themselves 
with the fact that to assault Turkey, and to wrest 
from her her last remaining African possessions, would 
inevitably be the signal for a general assault on the 
Ottoman Empire, which would upset the balance of 
power of Europe, on which the peace of the world 
depended. Even the better informed, who had re- 
sisted all attempts to drag Italy into a war to redeem 
the irredente provinces, on the ground that it would 
lead to a general European conflict, light-heartedly 
gave their support to the Tripolitan expedition. 
Many, perhaps, confidently believed that the Porte 
would offer no armed resistance, and would give way 
to the pressure of Italian demands. 

The causes of this change must be sought in the 
fact that the Italian people, worn out and enervated 
by the long debilitating rule of Giohtti, were ready 
to plunge into any enterprise which they thought 
would simultaneously increase their national wealth 



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 113 

and strength as a World Power, and bring about a 
change in government. Above all, Italy through the 
great expansion of her resources, and the increase in 
her material wealth, was eager to assert the growth 
of her power as a nation. A victorious campaign, so 
the Nationalists believed, alone could proclaim this 
growth. The clamour for war grew insistently. Many 
beheved that Giolitti would never dare to undertake 
a foreign campaign. It was not expected that he 
would willingly permit Italy to enter into any enter- 
prise which might jeopardise his hold over Parliament 
and the country. Already it was whispered that he 
again would betray the best interests of Italy. 

Giohtti did not want war, yet he could find no 
way out of the crisis. His power had been so badly 
shaken as a result of his attempts to force unpopular 
measures through the Chamber during the spring 
session, that the dictator realised that he would be 
unable to withstand the ever-increasing clamour of 
public opinion, tutored by the Nationahsts, demand- 
ing the acquisition of TripoH. TripoU had been 
promised to Italy by the Powers. The subject had 
been thrashed out both in and out of Parliament for 
many years past. The conditions stipulated by the 
Powers had been fulfilled and, above all, the shadow 
of the German eagle had spread suddenly over the 
Tripolitan coastland which all Italians had been 
brought up to consider their rightful heritage. The 
time for action had come. Giolitti, after vain at- 
tempts to resist the popular outcry, unwilling to sur- 
render his dictatorship, gave way to the demand of 
the multitude, and led Italy into the Libyan War. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE LIBYAN WAR 

Aims and Aspirations. Account of the Conflict, The War 

AND After 

Italian aspirations to a share of the lands of 
Northern Africa, bordering on the Mediterranean, 
date back to the chaotic days before unity was 
achieved. Even as early as 1838, only three years 
after Tripoli had been declared a Turkish vilayet, 
Mazzini and other Italian patriots, looking , to the 
future, asserted that Tripoli must become an Italian 
colony. In 1866 Bismarck, writing to Mazzini, de- 
clared : 

"Italy and France cannot be associated to their 
common benefit in the Mediterranean. That sea is 
a heritage which it is impossible to divide among 
relatives. The empire of the Mediterranean incon- 
testably belongs to Italy, who possesses there coast- 
lands twice as long as those of France. Marseilles 
and Toulon cannot be compared with Genoa, Leg- 
horn, Naples, Palermo, Ancona, and Venice. The 
empire of the Mediterranean must be the constant 
thought of Italy, the objective of her Ministers, the 
fundamental aim of the Cabinet of Florence." ^ Words 
pleasant to Italian ears, though obviously intended to 
embroil Franco-Italian relations. 

1 "Politica Segreta ItaKana" (1863-70), Turin, 1881. Published by 
Diamilla MuUa, Mazzini's secretary. 

114 



THE LIBYAN WAR 115 

When Italy attained to nationhood aimost her 
first sohcitude was to turn her attention to the North 
African Uttoral. The severe check to ItaHan am- 
bitions administered by France in occupying Tunis, 
made Itahan statesmen all the more determined to 
gain the control of Tripoli. In 1890 Crispi resolutely 
set about to secure Italian sovereignty of the Barbary 
Coast, and by making friends with Hassuna Pasha 
KaramanH, the direct descendant of the old Tripohtan 
"Bashaws," took the first decisive step in behalf of 
Italy. In a communication dated July 25, 1890, Crispi 
addressed an informal Note to Lord Sahsbury with 
a view to receiving British sanction to his programme. 
But Lord Salisbury, while acknowledging that in 
the event of any change of the status quo in the 
Mediterranean it was indispensable for Italy to 
occupy TripoU, stated that the time for such a step 
had not yet arrived, and he bade Italy wait, adding: 

"The ItaHan Government will have Tripolitana, but 
the huntsman to bring down the stag must wait until 
it comes within the range of his gun, so that even 
wounded, it will not escape."^ 

This programme was not followed up by Crispi's 
successors in office, and the disaster at Adua so damp- 
ened the colonial ardour of the Itahans that during 
the years which followed no effort was made openly 
to press Italy's claim to Tripolitana. However, 
towards the end of this same year (1896) the Marchese 
Visconti Venosta, who had taken over the direction 
of the Foreign Office, entered into an agreement with 
France regarding the revision of the treaties respect- 

1 Crispi: "PoUtica Estera," Treves, Milan, 1912, p. 369. 



116 GREATER ITALY 

ing Tunis, and he pointed out clearly that Italy ex- 
pected compensations for this step in Tripolitana. 
Italy, in recognising French sovereignty over Tunis, 
had opened the road for her own occupation of Tripoli. 
Tunis was now admittedly for all time the terra 
perduta for the Italians, while Tripoli had become 
the terra promessa. 

In March, 1899, France and Great Britain without 
informing Italy, signed a treaty defining the spheres 
of their respective influence in Central Africa, which 
directly concerned the Tripolitan hinterland. The 
Italians were thoroughly alarmed. They feared a 
repetition of the Tunisian fiasco. The Government 
was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of its 
policy. The Ministry fell, and the Marchese Visconti 
Venosta, once again called upon to direct the destinies 
of the Foreign Office, was able to arrange a detente 
with France, which later led to definite agreements 
regarding the recognition of the priority of Italian 
interests in Tripoli. Thus in 1902 M. Delcasse, at 
the time French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was able 
to declare: 

"In exchange for assurance given by France, not 
to interfere in Tripolitana, Italy has promised to do 
nothing which could obstruct French policy in Mo- 
rocco." 

From this time onward Tripoli and Morocco were 
Hnked together in the minds of the Italians, so that 
it was inevitable that when the Moroccan question 
should come up for settlement, Italy would press 
for a solution of the Tripolitan affair. 

Italian negotiations with Great Britain regarding 



THE LIBYAN WAR 117 

Tripoli are less clear. Questioned concerning the at- 
titude of England, M. Prinetti, the Italian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, in May, 1902, replying in the Chamber 
to the query: "Whether we (Italy) could hope to 
obtain from England, regarding Tripoli's eastern 
boundary-line, a declaration identical with that re- 
ceived from France," stated "Yes, certainly, these 
same assurances have been given." ^ 

From 1902 onward, Italy showed that she meant 
to be faithful to her agreement with France respect- 
ing Morocco, and in pursuance of this poHcy, at the 
Algeciras Conference (1906), the Italian delegate 
voted with France against his ally, Germany, proving 
conclusively that Italy would not permit the Triple 
AUiance to stand in the path of her vital interests in 
the Mediterranean. 

The Italian Government repeatedly made it evi- 
dent that they had no desire to force matters. But 
when the French column marched on Fez, and Ger- 
many despatched the Panther to Agadir (July 1, 1911), 
the Itahans were spurred to action. For not only 
did the liquidation of Moroccan affairs point logically 
to a solution of the pending Tripolitan question, but 
in responsible quarters in Italy it was widely beheved 
that if Italy did not occupy Tripoli, Germany would 
do so. In recent years Germany had shown a singular 
interest in Tripolitana. A German Consulate was 
newly established at Tripoli, and a German line of 
steamers now made the city a regular port of call; 
German capital was being invested in local enter- 
prises, and towards the end of the spring of 1911, 
the Italians learned that a German group was on the 

^ "L'ltalie et la Tripolitaine," Le Correspondant, October 10, 1911. 



118 GREATER ITALY 

eve of securing considerable concessions from the 
Ottoman Government, which would have given the 
German interests essential commercial advantages in 
Tripoli which had hitherto been refused to Italians. 
The Italian Cabinet understood only too well the 
methods of German Interessenpolitik, which created 
political capital out of commercial enterprise. Itahans 
throughout the peninsula believed that the hour had 
come for Italy to pursue a vigorous policy in North 
Africa. The modification of the status quo in the 
Mediterranean, by French occupation of Morocco, 
stipulated by Lord Salisbury twenty years before, 
as a sine qua non, had at last occurred. The assent 
of the Powers had been secured. Italy, therefore, 
felt justified in seizing the occasion to vindicate her 
claims to Tripolitana and Cyrenaica. 

Italian grievances against Turkish rule in Tripol- 
itana were numerous. Italians were, so it was alleged, 
hostilely treated by Turkish officials. The new Young 
Turk regime had made matters worse rather than 
better. Insults to the Italian flag; the forcible ab- 
duction and conversion to Islamism of a young Italian 
working girl; obstacles to commercial development; 
obstruction and bad faith were charged.'^ 

On July 29, 1911, the Italian Government in- 
structed its representatives abroad that, unless there 
was an improvement in their relations with Turkey 
regarding TripoH, Italy would take action. Negotia- 
tions dragged on. Italy, it cannot be denied, desired 
no other solution than one which would give her 
complete control of Tripolitana. The Porte made 

^See semiofl&cial statement of Italian case, also Turkish reply. 
Times, September 30, 1911. 



THE LIBYAN WAR 119 

belated concessions when it was realised that Italy- 
was in earnest. Wide commercial privileges were 
suggested. Italy refused these offers. On September 
22, an anti-Italian demonstration took place in Con- 
stantinople. The next day Italian reservists of the 
class of 1888 were called to the colours. Then the 
news reached Rome that a Turkish vessel, laden with 
arms and munitions, was due to arrive at TripoU. 
On September 25, the Italian Charge 6! Affaires at 
Constantinople presented an emphatic Note to the 
Porte, warning Turkey that its attitude was un- 
friendly, and that the shipment of arms and suppHes 
to Tripoli at such a time could only be interpreted 
as a hostile act. Three days later, on September 
28, the Italians delivered an ultimatum wherein, 
after setting forth Italy's grievances, it was stated: 

''The Italian Government, therefore, finding itself 
forced to safeguard its dignity and its interests, has 
decided to proceed to the military occupation of 
TripoU and Cyrenaica. This solution is the only one 
which Italy can accept, and the Italian Government 
rehes upon the Imperial Government giving such 
orders as may prevent any opposition on the part of 
the Ottoman representatives, in order that all neces- 
sary measures may be effected without difficulty." 

The Turkish reply to the ultimatum, though con- 
ciliatory in tone, was not held to be adequate. The 
ItaUan Government, therefore, announced that: 

"As the Ottoman Government has not accepted 
the demand contained in the Italian ultimatum, 
Italy and Turkey are from this date, September 29, 
2.30 p. M., in a state of war." 



120 GREATER ITALY 

The announcement took Europe by surprise. In 
England the Turks were held to be the victims of 
Italian greed. ''Only once in the memory of Uving 
man has any war to such an extent as the present 
one taken the world by surprise. On September 25, 
for the first time, we heard that Italy had any serious 
grievance against Turkey." ^ All shades of English 
opinion were at the outset unfriendly to Italy, who was 
looked upon as a wanton aggressor. Yet for the past 
ten years the Tripolitan question had been continuously 
discussed in Italy, and for the past nine years Italy's 
rights in Tripolitana had been agreed to by the Powers, 
more especially by France and Great Britain. 

Up to the last moment it was believed at Rome 
that the Porte would accede to Italian demands, and 
that the Tripolitan expedition would be in the nature 
of a 'promenade militaire. On September 28 an 
Italian squadron proceeded to North African waters. 
The blockade of the coast of Cyrenaica and Tripol- 
tana was announced, and Italy notified Turkey that 
unless within three days Tripoli surrendered, the city 
would be bombarded. On the morning of October 1 
the cable binding Tripoli with the outside world was 
cut, and the next day the Italian fleet cleared for 
action. Even then it was not beheved that the Turks 
would resist. But word was passed that a show of 
resistance was to be made. Large numbers of the 
native civilian population fled, and on October 3, 
at 3.30 p. M., the first Itahan shell struck the old 
Spanish fort which defends the seaside of Tripoli.^ 

i"The Tur co-Italian War and Its Problems," by Sir Thomas Bar- 
clay, Constable, London, 1912, p. 21. 

2 For a detailed account of the Italian campaign, see "Italy in North 
Africa," by W. K. McClurei Constable, London, 1913. 



THE LIBYAN WAR 121 

Two hours later all resistance had been silenced. 
No troops, however, had arrived from Italy to occupy 
the town. A sudden change in Italian plans had 
diverted the first transports from heading for Tripoli 
to Tobruk, the spot which it was feared Germany 
had intention of seizing. Time had to be gained until 
troops could arrive. On October 4 another bombard- 
ment of the forts took place, and on the next day the 
Turkish troops having evacuated the city, the Arabs 
began to pillage the town. It was imperative that the 
Itahans should land to maintain order. Therefore, a 
detachment of 1,600 sailors was landed, and the Italian 
flag hoisted over the city. On October 7 Rear-Admiral 
Borea Ricci took over the governorship of Tripoli. A 
large number of sheiks and Arab notables swore al- 
legiance to the Italian Government; most conspicuous 
among them was Hassuna Pasha, whose friendship 
Crispi had gained twenty years before. 

Without incident the expeditionary force landed, 
and by October 20, after brief skirmishes, the chief 
towns of Tripolitana and Cyrenaica: Tripoli, Derna, 
Homs, and Tobruk were safely in Italian possession. 
At Benghazi alone did the Italians encounter serious 
obstacles, but the capital of Cyrenaica also fell into 
ItaUan hands after a two days' assault. Elsewhere 
Turkish resistance had been feeble, and in Tripoli 
order was so speedily estabhshed that the campaign 
seemed over before it had properly begun. The na- 
tives seemed to accept Italian rule with equanimity. 

Three days later, on October 23, came a rude 
awakening at Tripoli. The Turco-Arab forces had 
withdrawn to the south and west of the city; their 
numbers were not definitely known, but they were 



122 GREATER ITALY 

believed to be well over 12,000. At 8 a. m. they 
began an attack on the Italian intrenched positions 
to the eastward of the El Hanni plateau. It was 
soon rumoured that the Italian left had been crushed, 
and that the Turks were about to enter the town. 
Panic seized hold of the inhabitants. Suddenly the 
cry arose: "Death to the Christians." Italian soldiers 
were attacked with knives and sticks; some shots 
were fired, and in a moment what seemed to be a 
serious uprising burst forth. Orders were given to 
clear the streets, and natives found with weapons in 
hand were in some cases shot down. Whenever pos- 
sible the Italian soldiery refrained from extreme 
measures. The rumour of the Turkish advance proved 
unfounded, and order was soon restored. On the 
next day it was deemed advisable to clear out what- 
ever rebels remained. The work was trying. It re- 
quired a house-to-house search. Sharp encounters 
took place between the Italian troops and the Arabs 
who had hidden in the oasis. "But by the evening 
of October 27 the task was practically completed. 
Several thousand Arabs had been brought into Tripoli, 
and of these some 2,500 were deported to Tremiti and 
Ustica."^ The Italians had lost heavily; 13 officers 
and 361 men killed, and 16 officers and 142 men 
wounded. 

In quelling this native rising harsh measures were 
inevitable, but Europe soon rang with the tales of 
Italian atrocities, of wilful murder of helpless men 
and women, which would seem altogether unfounded. 
The opinion of Field-Marshal Lord Roberts on the 
events in Tripoli as stated in the Times of November 

1 McClure: "Italy in North Africa," p. 67. 



THE LIBYAN WAR 123 

29, 1911, is a valuable commentary in extenuation of 
the Italian action: 

"It is totally unfair, as we are a friendly nation, 
to criticise any military measures which the Italian 
Commander-in-Chief may have found it necessary to 
put in force, without having access to the informa- 
tion upon which he acted. As far as can be learnt 
from the more trustworthy reports that have reached 
this country, the Italians were suddenly faced with 
a rising of Arabs in the direct rear of their line of 
resistance. Such a desperate state of affairs would, 
in any case, warrant desperate measures to re-establish 
the equilibrium of battle. Time also was pressing, 
as the main attack by the Turks and Arabs was im- 
minent. That the means employed to re-estabhsh 
what I have called the equilibrium of battle was 
severe, is doubtless true, but in war it is usually the 
severest measures that are, in the long run, the most 
humane. No soldier will put any credence in the 
reports that women and children were deliberately 
killed by the Italians, but, doubtless, in the act of 
clearing hostile villages behind the Italian Hues many 
innocent people suffered with the guilty. Such things 
are, unfortunately, inevitable in war. 

"In no army in the world could the orders which 
General Caneva found it imperative to issue for the 
clearance of the Tripoli oasis have been carried out 
without instances of regrettable severity. The very 
urgency of the operation alone would necessitate this 
severity. Only those who have the experience of war 
in all its phases have the right to judge of the ex- 
pediency of reprisals, and then only when they have 
access to the information which was at the time in 
the possession of the directing staff." 

It cannot be denied that, after the rising of October 
23, the Italians were looked upon with mistrust and 



124 GREATER ITALY 

suspicion by the native population, and their posi- 
tion became more difficult. 

On November 5 Tripolitana and Cyrenaica were, 
by a royal decree, annexed to Italy under the generic 
nanie of Libya. The work of conquest had not, how- 
ever, been completed. The Italians held only the 
main towns along the coast and the territory imme- 
diately surrounding these. Fighting continued in a 
desultory fashion throughout the ensuing months, 
with long periods of inactivity. In Cyrenaica more 
particularly, Tiu-kish resistance was tenacious. Enver 
Bey, who at the time of the outbreak of the war was 
Turkish Military Attache at Berhn, left his post, pro- 
ceeded to the scene of action, and organised the war- 
like Arabs into an efficient force which seriously 
menaced the Italians during the early months of 
1912. Desperate fighting took place in the neigh- 
bourhood of Benghazi, resulting in heavy casualties 
on both sides. 

It would seem reasonable to lend credence to the 
report that Turkish resistance to Italy was encouraged 
and supported by Germany. Von der Goltz Pasha, 
the chief of the German mihtary mission at Constan- 
tinople, urged in so far as lay in his power — ^and this 
was very great — the continuation of the struggle, 
while the arrival of Enver Bey on the scene, coming 
directly from Berhn, would in the light of his pro- 
nounced pro-German sympathies conclusively prove 
that Germany had a direct interest in making the 
Tripolitan campaign as burdensome as possible to 
the Italians. There seems little doubt that the Berlin 
Government had expected to receive Tobruk for its 
own uses as a naval base in the Mediterranean, in 



THE LIBYAN WAR 125 

return for its acquiescence in the Italian occupation 
of Libya. This explains the undue haste of the Ital- 
ians in occupying this base to the detriment of the 
broader needs of the campaign. Further than this 
it is not unreasonable to assume that the Central 
Empires, no longer able to count on Italian support 
in the event of a European war, wished to make the 
campaign of North Africa so arduous as not merely 
materially to weaken the resources of the Kingdom, 
but actually to deter the Italians from further miH- 
tary enterprise for some time to come. 

The war against Turkey was also carried on in 
other spheres. At the very outset of hostiUties on 
September 29 and 30, an ItaUan squadron under the 
command of the Duke of the Abruzzi attacked and 
sank two Turkish torpedo-boats off Prevesa in the 
Adriatic. But Italy was prevented from carrying 
the war into European Turkey by the vigorous pro- 
tests of Austria. In November, 1911, Count Aehren- 
thal, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, declared that '' Italian action on the Ottoman 
coasts of European Turkey or the ^Egean Islands 
could not be permitted, as contrary to Article VII^ 
of the treaty of alliance." This protest, which Italy 
could not fail to heed in view of the fact that Ger- 



^ This clause, as published in the "Austro-Hungarian Red Book" in 
May, 1915, reads: 

"Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the mainte- 
nance, as far as possible, of the territorial statiis quo in the East, engage 
themselves to use their influence to prevent aU territorial changes 
which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the Powers 
signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they wiU give reciprocally 
all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their 
own intentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the case 
arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo 



126 GREATER ITALY 

many let it be known that she fully supported the 
Austrian thesis, restricted for the time being the scene 
of operations. 

Throughout the early months of the campaign 
Austria had shown herself singularly hostile to Italy. 
An Italophobe party, which found strong supporters 
in exalted circles in Vienna, led by the Chief of the 
Austrian General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hotzen- 
dorf, asserted in no veiled language that the moment 
had come to attack Italy, who was daily growing 
stronger, and at the first opportunity would fall upon 
the Dual Monarchy. The Austrian Press welcomed the 
news of Italian difficulties, and gave wide publicity to 
exaggerated reports emanating from Turkish quarters. 
Count Aehrenthal, unwilhng to precipitate a conflict 
with Italy at this time, when the Balkan problem had 
not been settled and a possible pathway to Salonika 
still lay open, was able to bring about the temporary 
retirement of General Conrad, but not before exten- 
sive military preparations had been effected by Aus- 
tria along her Italian boundary, which caused deep 
annoyance to the Italians. 

The German Press was even more bitter. The 
Italian expedition was treated as an '^act of piracy," 
and German statesmen were especially resentful that 

in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands 
in the Adriatic or the ^Egean Seas becomes impossible, and that, either 
in consequence of the action of a third Power or for any other reason, 
Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the statics quo 
for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupa- 
tion would only take place after previous agreement between the two 
Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal 
compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them 
might acquire over and above the existing status quo, and would have 
to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties." 



THE LIBYAN WAR 127 

Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance should have 
dared to endanger the position of predominance which 
Germany had acquired in the Ottoman Empire. 

Of all the European nations France had received 
with the most fair-minded equanimity the news of 
the ItaUan advance into Libya. During the early 
days of the campaign, notwithstanding the efforts 
of the pohtico-financial Press to discredit the Itahan 
enterprise, the majority of the French people looked 
upon the Tripolitan venture as a sequel to their own 
Moroccan campaign. No untoward incident had 
marred the friendly relations of the two countries, 
when, on January 16, 1912, the Italian cruiser Agordat 
stopped the French mail packet Carthage, bound for 
Tunis, and took it into Cagliari, the Sardinian port, 
on the pretext that it was carrying aeroplanes destined 
for the enemy. This action on the part of the Itahan 
authorities aroused the anger of the French, who 
demanded the immediate release of the detained 
vessel, and public opinion was united in its support 
of the most energetic measures that the Government 
might deem necessary to take. Two days later, when 
the anti-Itahan agitation was at its height, news 
reached Paris that another French steamer, the Ma- 
nouha, also bound for Tunis, had been taken, in a similar 
manner, into custody by the Italians on the ground 
that 29 Turkish passengers, who were travelling as 
doctors and nurses of the Turkish Red Crescent, 
were in reahty Turkish army officials. The French 
beheved this second incident to be a direct affront to 
their national dignity. The Government peremptorily 
demanded the immediate release of the steamers. 
On January 20 the Carthage and Manouha were al- 



128 GREATER ITALY 

lowed to proceed. The next day the French Govern- 
ment required the release of the 29 Turkish officials. 
M. Poincare, then Premier and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, speaking in the Chamber, in answer to a 
number of violent questions regarding the incident, 
used what may be termed extremely firm, if not un- 
friendly, language towards Italy. A week later the 
affair was Uquidated. Italy was compelled to hand 
over the Turkish passengers of the Manouha to the 
French authorities, while it was agreed by both parties 
to refer the whole matter to The Hague Tribunal.^ 
This regrettable incident once again, at a critical 
moment, disturbed Franco-Italian relations when 
they seemed on the eve of becoming friendly. In 
Italy the conviction was wide-spread that the Italians 
had been browbeaten by the French, while in France, 
what seemed to the French the high-handed policy 
of Italy in the Mediterranean was keenly resented. 
The war in Libya dragged on. The Italians were 
making very slow headway. The cost of the cam- 
paign now amounting to nearly 1,500,000 lire (£60,- 
000) per day was growing burdensome. In Cyrenaica 
the enemy was still able to put up a strong resistance. 
Nowhere had the Italians penetrated far into the 
interior. Though peace rumours had been at various 
times circulated, it was evident that the Porte did 
not feel itself beaten, and was unwilling to consider 



^ In May, 1913, The Hague Tribunal rendered its decision. It sus- 
tained the Italian contention that neither incident could be interpreted 
as an act of intentional hostiUty towards France. No damages were 
awarded for alleged affront to the French flag. In the case of the 
Carthage, £6,400 were awarded, while for the detention of the Manouha, 
only £200 were assessed. This verdict virtually proclaims that ItaUan 
action was justified. 



THE LIBYAN WAR 129 

the question of surrendering the last Turkish pos- 
sessions in North Africa. Early in January the Ital- 
ians gained a victory at sea, when near Kunfida, 
off the Arabian coast, an Italian cruiser, assisted by 
two torpedo-boats, sank seven Turkish torpedo-boats 
and captured an armed yacht. But the Ottoman 
Government seemed in nowise impressed by reverses, 
secure in the protection of the Powers and the ban 
placed on carrying the war into any other than the 
African zone. 

On February 27 the Italians, wearied of the inde- 
cisive nature of the contest, braved the anger of the 
European Powers, and sank two Turkish ships in the 
harbour of Beyrout. Italy by this act had once again 
opened up the Near Eastern Question. Russia, France, 
and Great Britain expressed grave concern. None 
were eager to precipitate a crisis in the Near East. 
Within ten days, Russia, acting in behalf of the Powers, 
made confidential inquiries at Rome regarding the 
terms of peace which Italy would be ready to accept. 
On March 15, the Italian Government formulated its 
proposals, which included the recognition of Italian 
sovereignty over Libya. The Porte refused these 
terms, and the negotiations fell through. 

Italy had now carried the war into the eastern 
Mediterranean, and she was soon to prove that she 
meant to push operations vigorously in this quarter. 
After due preparations, a month later, on April 18, an 
imposing Itahan squadron appeared off the entrance 
of the Dardanelles. The land batteries of the forts 
of Kum Kaleh and Sedil-Bahr opened fire. The Ital- 
ian guns soon reduced them to silence. The Ottoman 
Government became, for the first time, thoroughly 



130 GREATER ITALY 

alarmed. The closing of the Dardanelles was imme- 
diately ordered, and the chancelleries of Europe were 
busied with negotiations regarding this event, while 
Austria threateningly announced that it declined to 
admit the right of Italy to make an attack on Turkey 
in Europe, and that further action in this quarter 
would result in serious consequences. A month later 
the Dardanelles were reopened for traffic. 

But the bold course pursued by the Italians was to 
have a profound repercussion throughout Europe 
and the Near East. Italy in the face of the protests 
of Europe had dared to hunt the Turk in his lair. 
The Near Eastern Question, which for the past thirty 
years had never been faced since the Congress of 
Berlin had patched up a makeshift peace in the 
Balkans, was once again the problem of the hour. 

The Itahan fleet now cruised unmolested about the 
^gean, cutting cables, and shelhng various points 
both on the mainland and the Turkish Islands. 
Reahsing that the umbrage of the Powers was not 
very terrible, the Italians made ready to gain a foot- 
hold in the JEgean which could not fail to prove useful 
in the future. On May 4, an Italian expeditionary 
force landed at the Island of Rhodes, and, overcoming 
the tenacious resistance of the Turkish garrison, en- 
tered the city of Rhodes, while the Turks retreated 
to Psithos, in the interior of the island. Simulta- 
neously other islands of the Sporades, known as the 
Dodecanese group, were occupied by the Itahan 
forces. On May 17 the Turkish troops at Psithos 
were surrounded, and after a stiff encounter were 
forced to surrender. By the end of May, Italian rule 
was firmly estabHshed in the ^Egean Islands, though 



THE LIBYAN WAR 131 

the occupation was reported to be merely tempo- 
rary. 

In the meantime a period of renewed activity had 
been inaugurated in TripoUtana. The ItaHan forces 
pushed westward and encountered a stubborn re- 
sistance at Zanzur. The Turks had dug themselves 
in and strongly fortified their positions about the 
oasis. Here one of the bloodiest battles of the cam- 
paign was fought, and though the ItaUans gained a 
notable success, it was not until three months later, 
on September 20, that the oasis was occupied. Not- 
withstanding the torrid summer heat, the Itahans 
pushed their operations in aU directions. The Arabs, 
now well organised, put up a plucky fight, but were 
slowly succumbing to the methodical ItaUan advance. 
The war in many sectors had settled down to static, 
trench-warfare, with frequent salHes by the Itahans 
and fm-ious counter-attacks by the Turco-Arab troops. 

The Porte at last reahsed that nothing was to be 
gained by prolonging the conflict. Furthermore, 
news was reaching Constantinople of efforts which 
were being made to form a league of the Balkan States, 
directed against Tm-key. The thunder of the Itahan 
guns in the iEgean had drifted across the Balkans 
and aroused the longing of the Serbs, the Greeks, and 
the Bulgars to emancipate their kinsmen still under 
Turkish rule. 

On July 12 secret peace negotiations were initiated 
at Ouchy, near Lausanne, Switzerland, between Prince 
Said HaHm, the Turkish representative, and a com- 
mission of three ItaUan delegates, MM. Bertolini, Fusi- 
nato, and Volpi. It was evident at once that there 
seemed httle chance of securing a satisfactory settle- 



132 GREATER ITALY 

ment. The ItaKan Government realised that the 
only way by which it could hope to attain its de- 
mands was to push military activities ahead with 
all possible energy. 

A week after 'pourparlers had been begun, five 
Italian torpedo-boats sUpped up the Dardanelles on 
a raiding expedition which, though a daring enterprise, 
achieved no tangible advantage. Fighting continued 
actively in Tripolitana, while the peace negotiations, 
which had been interrupted, were resumed at Caux 
between the Itahan delegates and two new Turkish 
envoys, Naby Bey and Fahreddin Bey. The Italian 
Government now made permanent arrangements for 
the governance of Libya. General Caneva, who had 
been in sole command since the outbreak of the war, 
after receiving high honours was relieved, and as the 
principal as well as minor points along the coast were 
now safely in Italian hands, Libya was divided into two 
distinct provinces of Cyrenaica and Tripolitana, each 
having its own governor and separate administration. 

Through August and September the peace negotia- 
tions were tortuously pursued. The patience of the 
ItaUan delegates, their firm resolve to obtain their 
own terms, contrasted with the indirect ''bluff" of 
the Turkish envoys, who made desperate attempts 
to secm-e a more favourable peace. 

On October 1, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece mobil- 
ised their forces. Reshid Pasha thereupon arrived 
in Switzerland from Constantinople with full powers. 
Eight days later Montenegro declared war on Turkey, 
and the other States of the Balkan League joined in 
the war. The position of the Ottoman Empire was 
critical, assailed by the strong league of Balkan States, 



THE LIBYAN WAR 133 

with the ItaHan war unfinished. The Porte never- 
theless procrastinated. On October 12 the ItaHan 
Government forwarded what amounted to an ul- 
timatum to Turkey, demanding that its terms of 
peace be accepted within five days, and at the same 
time the ItaHan fleet was ordered into the iEgean. 
Thus under pressure, Turkey, on October 16, signed 
the preHminaries of peace. Two days later the Italian 
and Turkish plenipotentiaries affixed their signatures 
to the final draft of the Treaty of Lausanne. 

By the terms of the treaty Italy acquired the sover- 
eignty over Tripolitana and Cyrenaica. The Italians 
engaged to evacuate the Dodecanese as soon as the 
Turkish officials, both civil and miHtary, had left 
Libya. In view of the fact that the Turkish Govern- 
ment had reason to fear that Greece would seize the 
islands if Italy evacuated them, no steps were taken 
to carry out this provision, and Italy stiU holds the 
islands. Wide reHgious freedom was granted by special 
decree to the populations of Libya, and the complete 
freedom of worship assured; the name of the Sultan 
was stiU to be pronounced in public prayers, and the 
Sultan was to appoint his representative in Libya, 
who was to look after Mohammedan interests. 

Thus the war, which had lasted for nearly thirteen 
months, came to an end. Russia, who throughout 
the campaign had shown herself friendly to ItaHan 
interests, immediately recognised ItaHan sovereignty 
over the conquered provinces, followed by the other 
Powers, except France, who delayed her recognition 
for several days; a fact which was widely commented 
upon at the time. The Turk had been driven out of 
Africa, and the act of the Italians was a signal for the 



134 GREATER ITALY 

Balkan peoples to unite and drive him "bag and bag- 
gage out of Europe." 

Italy had entered the war believing that it would 
be more of a miUtary promenade than a serious cam- 
paign. As time passed, and the war became more 
costly; as the number of casualties increased, and 
the expenses of the expedition mounted to unprec- 
edented figures, many Italians expressed concern 
lest the people become discontented; lest scenes such 
as were witnessed during the Abyssinian war be re- 
peated. But the Italian people had progressed greatly 
since those days. The war in Africa was to show that 
Itahans of all parts of the peninsula had attained to 
a sense of national consciousness. The Italian army 
had undertaken a difficult campaign abroad on a 
large scale, and had acquitted itself with great credit. 
The slowness in the operations and a certain timidity 
of command were due mainly to political reasons. 
The Government of Giolitti, which had entered upon 
the war only after much pressure had been brought 
to bear, constantly dreaded a serious reverse, which 
might end in an episode such as accompanied the fall 
of Crispi. Yet when peace with Turkey was finally 
concluded, Giolitti, speaking in the Chamber on 
December 3, 1912, could exclaim with truth: 

"The peace which we have concluded, leaves Italy 
stronger and more respected; it gives her a great 
colony in the Mediterranean opposite her own terri- 
tory; it gives her a mission to perform (and it is 
not a small matter for a great people to have a mission 
to perform); it gives her, furthermore, as a great 
Power, full Hberty of action. With this full Hberty 
of action in times of difficulty we can provide ef- 



THE LIBYAN WAR 135 

ficaciously for the defense of our interests, and we 
can at the same time enforce our authority to pro- 
tect the legitimate interests of other people." 

The Libyan war up to this time had cost Italy 
458,000,000 hre (£18,320,000.)' Notwithstanding the 
fact that the campaign was difficult and casualties rel- 
atively very heavy, the Italian people sustained the 
ordeal with splendid spirit. Nearly 200,000 men had 
taken part in the fighting, and the patriotism of the 
Itahan people had brilKantly asserted the growth of 
soHdarity and unity throughout the length and breadth 
of the Kingdom. 

The African campaign had, however, again alienated 
the friendship of the Powers. The inimical attitude 
of France after the Carthage incident, the sulky mood 
of the French people regarding the fait accompli when 
Itahan sovereignty over Libya was finally acknowl- 
edged, and the harsh British criticism of Itahan 
methods and motives, made a strong impression in 
Italy. For the ItaHans had counted on the support 
and sympathy of France and Great Britain, with 
whose approval the Tripolitan campaign had been 
undertaken. The active opposition of Austria and 
Germany had not surprised the people of Italy, and 
made them desirous of freeing themselves from the 
shackles of the Triple Alliance. But Itahan leaders 
beheved that the Triple Alliance still served the best 
interests of peace. Germany was quick to gauge the 
significance of the dissatisfaction, rife in Italy, with 
France and Great Britain. To bind Italy more firmly 

^ The estimate of the actual total cost of the campaign made in 
February, 1914, was £46,000,000. 



136 GREATER ITALY 

to the Central Empires it was expedient to proclaim 
unequivocally the strength of the Triple Alliance. 
Thus on December 7, 1912, eighteen months before 
the date of expiration, the Triple Alliance was once 
again renewed. 

Italy now entered upon a period of what appeared 
to be the closest intimacy with Austria-Hungary. 
Not for many years had there been such a seemingly 
amicable understanding. Italy supported the Aus- 
trian contention regarding the inviolability of Al- 
bania. The Itahan Government agreed to co-operate 
with the Dual Monarchy to compel Montenegro to 
evacuate Scutari; an Austro-Itahan Note was handed 
to Greece, demanding its withdrawal from southern 
Albania. Yet everywhere Italy was actively safe- 
guarding her interests, compelhng the Vienna Govern- 
ment to consider Italian aims. 

During the spring of 1913 severe fighting continued 
to take place in Libya, where the Itahans encountered 
a determined opposition on the part of the Arabs. 
In Cyrenaica the problem of pacification was ex- 
tremely difficult, owing to the um'uly nature of the 
population. Fresh troops were despatched to Africa, 
and engagements took place intermittently throughout 
the summer with bands of raiding Arabs. 

On July 2 the King and Queen of Italy, on their 
way to pay a visit to the Swedish Court, were enter- 
tained with much cordiahty by William II and the 
Empress at Kiel. Though no official communication 
was made, it was known that at this meeting Itahan 
interests in Asia Minor were considered. The Italian 
Press now for the first time discussed Italy's ''Asiatic 
policy," and three months later it was announced 



THE LIBYAN WAR 137 

that a group of Italian financiers had been granted a 
concession to build a railway in southwest Asia Minor, 
from Adalia on the Mediterranean northwest of Cyprus, 
to a junction point on the Bagdad Railway. 

Meanwhile, the Italians had established themselves 
firmly in the Dodecanese. At Rhodes municipal im- 
provements had been taken rigorously in hand; city 
lighting and road building had been speedily pushed 
forward; a good postal-service was estabhshed, and 
plans were made to open ItaUan schools, in spite of 
the fact that France, inspired in part by phil-Hellenic 
motives, expressed grave concern regarding the con- 
tinuance of the Italian occupation of the islands. 
Thereupon Sir Edward Grey, on behalf of the Entente 
Powers, addressed a formal Note to Italy, demanding 
the evacuation of the islands in accordance with her 
promise. The Triple Alliance repHed to this Note, on 
behalf of Italy, though no definite assurances were 
given regarding evacuation. 

Thus Italy, who two years before had been satis- 
fied to play a negative role in world poHtics, sud- 
denly found herself in a position of doixiinant in- 
fluence. She had possessed herself of Libya in the 
face of the opposition of nearly all the Powers; she 
had matched her strength against Austria; assured 
the integrity of Montenegro and the neutrality of 
the Otranto Channel; she had furthered the estab- 
Hshment of an independent Albanian kingdom, and 
thus blocked the designs of Serbia to an outlet to the 
Adriatic, and prevented the expansion of Greece. 

But if on the surface Italy seemed in agreement 
with her Austrian ally, many incidents showed how 
precarious were the foundations of their friendly 



138 GREATER ITALY 

understanding. The Libyan war had aroused afresh 
the irredentist aspirations of the Itahans, while Aus- 
tria deUberately chose to continue her anti-Itahan 
policy in the Adriatic. In August, 1913, at the time 
when General Caneva, the conqueror of Libya, was 
paying an official visit to Vienna, orders were issued 
dismissing all the ItaUan employees of the municipal- 
ity of Trieste. This intentional affront to Italy could 
not fail to excite popular indignation throughout the 
peninsula. The relations between the two countries 
were further strained when, during this same month, 
the Vienna Government broached to Italy the project 
of attacking Serbia, in order to break the rising power 
of the Serbs (a plan which the Dual Monarchy was 
to put into execution twelve months later), and re- 
quested Italian acquiescence to this plan. Rome 
categorically refused to consider such a project, and 
warned Count Berchtold that such a policy of aggres- 
sion could not be undertaken with the consent of Italy. 
General Conrad von Hotzendorf had been reappointed 
to the position of Chief of the Austrian General 
Staff, and there were many indications that the Dual 
Monarchy proposed at the opportune time to carry 
out its Balkan poUcy, relying only on the support of 
Germany. 

Giolitti, who had been in office during these event- 
ful years, took unto himself the full credit of the vic- 
torious TripoUtan war and the successful peace. He 
had renewed the Triple Alliance, and Affirmed the 
important position of Italy in European affairs. In 
October, 1913, the universal suffrage law which he had 
decreed was put to test. The number of voters had 
been raised from three million to eight million, yet 



THE LIBYAN WAR 139 

so well did the dictator control the situation, that 
the elections resulted in an overwhelming majority 
for himself. Nevertheless, five months later, in March, 
1914, Giohtti retired from office. There was no ap- 
parent reason for his retirement except that, as was 
his custom, he withdrew for the time being from pubhc 
affairs in order that his successor should grapple with 
the difficulties arising out of his own administration, 
or rather maladministration, which could no longer 
be staved off. Thus after a dictatorship lasting eleven 
years and four months Giolitti, still the most power- 
ful personage in Italian public affairs, retired to private 
Hfe to watch and wait for an opportune moment to 
return to power. 

During the decade of his "regency," he had cor- 
rupted the poHtical life of Italy; he had demoralised 
Parliament by his methods of party-erosion so that 
no vigorous opposition remained. He had blotted 
out party fines so that though there were groups, 
there were no real parties. He had been a Liberal 
and then turned Conservative, and even semi-Clerical. 
He had adopted the programmes and policy which 
seemed most likely to succeed, and taken unto him- 
self the credit thereof. He left office with the finances 
of the country compromised, its foreign policy obscure, 
and the subversive forces of the State strengthened. 
Notwithstanding the demoralised state of Itafian 
political life, the resilient strength of the Italian people 
was soon to reassert itself. Giolitti's hold on the 
country was wide-spread but had nowhere taken deep 
root. It had undermined, but not sapped, the vitality 
of the country. So that when, during the great up- 
heaval that was to come in May, 1915, Giolitti en- 



140 GREATER ITALY 

deavoured to oppose the will of the nation, he was 
swept aside by the mighty current of popular opinion, 
by the sacred desire of the Italian people to fulfil 
their manifest destiny. 



CHAPTER VII 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 

Social and Vital Statistics. Industrial and Commercial 
Expansion. Colonial Dominions 

The fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the 
Kingdom was celebrated in 1911 throughout Italy, 
with appropriate ceremonies. In Rome the vast 
monument to King Victor Emmanuel II was un- 
veiled. Covering the greater part of the slope of the 
Capitoline Hill, facing the Corso, glitteringly new, 
of white marble with the equestrian statue of the 
King in gilt bronze, it symbolised characteristically 
ItaUan aspirations for expansion and world power, 
and represented the achievement of United Italy 
under the leadership of the House of Savoy. No 
other monument in Italy since the days of the Rome 
of the Caesars had been undertaken on such a grandiose 
scale. Aside from any discussion of its artistic merit, 
it proclaimed significantly the Italian craving for 
"bigness," and was a forceful assertion of the unity 
of the nation. In Turin, the home of the Piedmontese 
Kings, an international industrial exhibition was 
held, which showed to the world for the first time the 
giant strides of Italian economic development. The 
statistics, carefully compiled at this time, afford a 
gHmpse of the position of present-day Italy in the 
affairs of the world, and bring home the saHent features 
of Italian growth and expansion. 

141 



142 GREATER ITALY 

The area of the Kingdom of Italy, including Sicily 
and Sardinia, is 110,623 square miles. According to 
the census, taken in the Jubilee year (June 10, 1911), 
the population amounted to 34,686,683 inhabitants, 
as compared with only 28,801,154 in 1871, which is 
an increase of nearly 23 per 100. When it is taken 
into consideration that during this period over five 
and a half million Italians have emigrated, and still 
retained their Italian nationality, the figures here 
given are representative of a vast growth in population 
well over 50.1 per 100, which Russia (103.4 per 100) 
and Germany (58.1 per 100) alone of European na- 
tions have outdistanced during the same period. Com- 
pared with the growth of the other great Latin State 
of Europe, France, whose increase of population during 
this half century has only been 9.7 per 100, it would 
seem probable that within a very brief space of time 
the population of Italy will be greater than that of 
France, which in 1911 had 39,601,500 inhabitants,^ and 
is now reported as stationary or even declining. 

In examining the records of Itahan vital statistics, 
marked improvement is everywhere met with. Italy 
to-day occupies third place among European nations 
in point of natural increase of her population, as 
against fifth in 1871. Though her birth-rate has 
declined in common with that of the rest of Europe, 
(32.4 per 1,000 inhabitants), only Russia and Hun- 
gary can show a better record. 

For many years Italy had almost the highest death- 

^ The Italian population in Europe, not incorporated in the Kingdom 
of Italy, is estimated at 2,495,549, occupying a territory of approxi- 
mately 23,288 square miles, distributed as follows: Monaco, 19,121; 
Switzerland, 171,166; Malta, 228,442; France (Nice and Corsica), 
536,820; Austria, 1,540,000. 



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 143 

rate in Europe. To-day, by great amelioration in 
the sanitary condition of the population, not merely 
in the cities, but more especially in the rural dis- 
tricts, the ratio of mortality has been materially re- 
duced. The manner in which malaria, which as re- 
cently as 1900 still averaged as high as 31 per 100 
of the population in the contaminated districts of 
the Maremma, was reduced to only 2 per 100 in 1908, 
and pellagra, which in 1881 totalled 104,000 cases, 
and notwithstanding the insidious character of the 
disease was reduced by over two-thirds, are fair ex- 
amples of the advance made in stamping out prevent- 
able disease in Italy. However, the death-rate in 
Italy is still higher than in the other chief European 
States, varying between 19.6 to 21.9 per 1,000, as 
compared with Great Britain (14.8), France (17.98). 
The excess of births over deaths in 1911 in Italy 
amounted to 350,734 or 10.1 per 1,000. 

The principal cause of this relatively small in- 
crease in population, notwithstanding the fecundity 
of the race, is emigration. Bad crops, low wages, 
bad housing conditions in the south of Italy, the 
desire to improve their economic status, and the ex- 
ample of so many successful emigrants who have re- 
turned home prosperous after a few years abroad 
are the chief causes of emigration. For a long period 
these able-bodied young Itahans, who had gone 
forth into the world to earn a Hvelihood, owing to 
the short-sighted policy of the Government, which 
endeavoured to obstruct emigration, found themselves 
abandoned to their own resources. This is no longer 
the case. The Italian Government now reaUses that 
this great stream of emigrants is not merely a means 



144 GREATER ITALY 

of propagating Italian influence in the less populous 
districts of the New World, more particularly in 
South America, but that it is the source of an ever- 
increasing income, which has begun to flow into Ital- 
ian coffers from abroad. Moreover, many of those 
who have emigrated in poverty, return to Italy to 
enjoy the fruits of their hard- won fortunes, bringing 
with them modern ideas and influences, which has 
done much to rouse the peasantry of the South from 
its apathy. From 135,832 emigrants who left Italy 
in 1881, when the tide of emigration set in, the figures 
have risen until they reached the astonishing total 
of 872,598 in 1913. Of these 313,032 emigrated to 
Em-opean or Mediterranean countries, while 407,475 
set out for the United States and Canada, and 145,- 
702 for the Argentine Republic and the other South 
American States. The number of ItaHan emigrants 
who returned to Italy during this year, numbered 
188,978. According to the official pubhcation, An- 
nuario Statistico Italiano (1913), the number of Ital- 
ians resident abroad mmibered 5,557,746. In recent 
years, these Italian emigrants, living abroad, have 
remitted annually important sums of money to their 
relatives and famihes who have remained in Italy. 
According to computation made of the postal money- 
orders received in Italy from emigrants abroad, these 
amounted to nearly £5,000,000 in 1913 from this 
one source, and showed an increase of £1,360,000 
since 1906. 

Sixty per cent of the population of Italy are en- 
gaged in agriculture. Though the trend towards in- 
dustrial pursuits is increasing, agriculture in its varied 
forms still remains the foundation of the nation's 



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 145 

wealth. The total value of the whole agricultural 
produce in 1910 was estimated at £28,000,000. Great 
efforts are being made to increase the productivity 
of the soil by the use of carefully selected fertilisers. 
The vineyards are now the subject of scientific atten- 
tion, and greater care is being paid to the quahty of 
the wines. Mechanical implements are being in- 
troduced, and in certain regions in the northern dis- 
tricts, more particularly in Emilia, where co-operative 
methods are much in vogue, the initiative and im- 
provements introduced in dairy-farming and in the 
making of cheese, butter, etc., have been widely copied 
abroad. These co-operative societies, which have 
sprung up everywhere in the north of Italy, are spread- 
ing rapidly and have proved themselves eminently 
successful, contributing much to the prosperity of 
Italy. ^ Rural credit banks to help the farmers with 
loans, agrarian unions, and Government travelhng 
teachers of agriculture, who visit every district to 
instruct the farmers in the most approved and modern 
methods of carrying on their particular type of farm- 
ing, have multiplied. 

The case of the South is different, the conditions 
there are still far from satisfactory. The appalhng 
poverty of the people — a man's wages are often not 
more than 6d. a day — ^is here the chief incentive to 
emigration, as a way out of an unbearable situation. 
Vast estates, absent landlordism, and all the evils 
of a defective agrarian system, have for so long been 
the rule, that the progress that is being made has as 
yet borne but little fruit. 

^ In 1910 there were 5,064 co-operative societies, and the returns 
from 4,222 showed 817,529 members. 



146 GREATER ITALY 

Though Italy is not a country of mineral wealth, the 
output of her mines in 1910 was valued at £3,210,000. 
Owing to the fall in the price of sulphur, the output 
of the SiciHan sulphur mines, which two decades ago 
was of great importance, has materially decreased, 
whereas the tonnage of iron has increased greatly, 
amounting to 551,000 in 1910. Copper, zinc, and lead 
were also mined in small quantities. The value of 
the products of the rock quarries, travertine, marble, 
etc., has increased to approximately £2,000,000. 
Italy produces only about one-twelfth (562,000 tons 
in 1910) the amount of coal which is annually consumed 
there, and though this has in a measure retarded her 
industrial development, it has encouraged her en- 
gineers to seek methods of emancipating Italy from 
the need of coal. It has been conservatively estimated 
that the streams and rivers of Italy could furnish her 
with over 5,000,000 horse-power. According to recent 
reports (1914), 968,100 electrical horse-power were in 
operation. Italy thus leads all Europe, and is second 
only to the United States in this field. The first 
electrified railway to be successfully operated in Eu- 
rope was inaugurated in 1890 on the line between 
Florence and Fiesole, and the work of electrification 
has been steadily extended. A direct electric line 
from Rome to Naples, a distance of 120 miles, is near- 
ing completion, and it is hoped that eventually the 
entire railway system of the peninsula will be operated 
exclusively by electricity. 

Notwithstanding the high price of coal in Italy, 
industrial progress has been steady. According to 
the census taken in 1911, 2,305,720 persons were en- 
gaged in industrial labour, of whom one-fourth were 
in Lombardy. 



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 147 

Whereas very little pig-iron was produced in Italy 
as recently as 1900, and the production was only 
seriously undertaken within the present decade, the 
output, 353,000 tons (1910), was nearly threefold as 
great as when the census was taken four years before; 
while in the same four-year period the output of 
WTOught-iron increased from 237,000 to 311,000, and 
steel from 333,000 to 670,000 tons. During this 
period the value of the products of chemical industries 
increased from £4,093,000 to £6,001,000. The textile 
industries also developed most rapidly. The pro- 
duction of raw silk has more than tripled since 1875, 
while the value of silk and woven silk products ex- 
ported in 1911 is estimated at close to £18,000,000, 
so that Milan now rivals Lyons as the centre of the 
silk trade of the world. Cotton-mills have sprung up 
everywhere in northern Italy, and Itahan cotton 
fabrics were already competing in foreign markets, 
the exports to Turkey alone amounting to over 10,000 
tons, while the value of cotton exports totalled (1911) 
£7,320,000. The beet-sugar industry shows an equal 
expansion. In 1899 only 5,972 tons were produced, 
while the figures for the production eleven years later 
are 173,184 tons, besides 62,700 tons of syrups and 
molasses. Italy supplies nearly one-third of the total 
world consumption of ohve-oil, her exports (1911) 
in this article amounting to £1,800,000. The Italian 
automobile industry has won for itself a position of 
creditable pre-eminence, and the export of Itahan 
automobiles, though numerically small, were valued 
at £1,100,000. 

Italy was a late comer in world markets, yet the 
figures of her commercial development are amazing. 
In 1910 imports into Italy, excluding precious metals. 



148 GREATER ITALY 

amounted to £129,839,039, and her exports during 
this year were valued at £83,199,095. "It was cal- 
culated that between 1898 and 1910, Italian imports 
had risen 143 per cent, and her exports 124 per cent — 
increases which surpass those of all other countries 
except the exportation figiu"es of the United States." ^ 
Italy's chief imports are cereals, raw cotton, coal, 
chemical products, machinery, and wood. Her chief 
exports are silk, cotton and silk goods, fruits, wine, 
and agricultural produce. Exclusive of coal, which 
came chiefly from Great Britain, and raw cotton from 
the United States, Germany, as was to be expected 
from her position of control over Italian markets, 
fm-nished Italy with nearly one-foiu-th of her total 
imports; while Germany was Italy's best customer, 
ItaUan exports to Germany being nearly £4,000,000 
greater than to the next best customer, the United 
States, with Great Britain third on the list, in 1911.^ 

As in other fields, the increase in Itahan maritime 
trade has been important. The number of ships 
which entered and cleared Italian ports in 1910 was 
312,689, with a tonnage of 102,390,908 as compared 
with only 32,070,704 tons in 1881, while the Itahan 
mercantile marine numbered 680 steamships, with a 
tonnage of about 630,000, and 4,723 saihng ships of 
approximately 440,000 tons. 

Naples is now the first port of Italy, and has shown 
the extraordinary increase of nearly 50 per cent in 
tonnage in the four-year period 1906-10. The 
harbour facilities have been greatly extended, and 

1 The " Britannica Year Book," 1913, p. 1045. 

2 For the year 1914, that is, before Italian participation in the Euro- 
pean War, the imports from Great Britain to Italy exceeded those of 
any other country. 



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 149 

large sums have been voted for harbour improvements. 
Genoa, long the most important port in Italy, has 
now taken second place. The congestion of traffic 
at Genoa and the difficulty of increasing dockage 
facilities have hampered its growth. Venice is Italy's 
third mercantile port, though Palermo is competing 
strongly and has already won third place in passenger 
traffic. 

The total mileage of railways in 1907 amounted to 
10,368, and there have been few new hnes opened, 
though a certain amount of doubling of existing Hnes 
has taken place. ItaHan railways have passed through 
many vicissitudes. At the outset, built and operated 
by the State, they were, in 1885 turned over to private 
corporations, and then repurchased by the State in 
1905. The value of ItaHan railways in 1911 was 
estimated at £295,500,000 and the profits at £6,000,- 
000. There has been much improvement in adminis- 
tration in recent years, and great efforts are being 
made to bring the passenger traffic up to the level 
of that of the chief European States. Steam and 
electric tramways have a mileage of 3,018, while 
motor-onmibus service is steadily being extended 
through rural districts not tapped by the railways, 
and over 2,000 miles of highroad were thus under 
operation. The motor Hnes receive subvention from 
the Government. 

The number of post-offices in Italy in 1910 was 
10,238, while the number of letters handled increased 
by 600,000,000 between 1906 and 1912. There were 
8,147 telegraph offices in 1912, as compared with only 
1,930 eight years before. The figures for 1912 include 
22 wireless stations. The development of the tele- 



150 GREATER ITALY ^ 

phone system has been even more rapid. In 1904 
there were only 92 urban and 66 interurban systems, 
while by 1910 there were 219 urban and 426 inter- 
urban systems, and the expansion continues steadily. 

The great economic development during the past 
two decades has brought Italy up from the rank of 
a ''poor" country, to which she was long confined, 
to that of a nation of ever-increasing wealth and well- 
being. The North of Italy is one of the most prosperous 
regions of Europe, and if the total of Italian wealth 
is still much below that of the other Great Powers 
its increase has been considerable. According to esti- 
mates of an ItaHan economist, the private wealth of 
the nation is estimated at over eighty milhard lire,^ 
nearly three and a fifth thousand millions sterling or 
about £90 per capita. This amount is an estimated 
increase of a thousand milhon sterling in a decade. 
These figures are of necessity only approximate, and 
a more accurate insight into the increasing wealth of 
Italy is gained by looking into the condition of the 
savings-banks. In 1901 the total deposits in the 
savings-banks, credit banks, and other similar insti- 
tutions, averaged about £3-4-0 per head. At the 
end of 1910 these deposits had increased to £6-3-0 
or nearly 50 per cent, in the nine-year period, and 
the total amounts thus deposited were £214,500,000. 
To this figure must be added £74,000,000 in the 
postal savings-bank, and £98,000,000 in savings in 
ordinary banks. 

During the early years of Italy's existence as a 
united Kingdom, her financial position was precarious. 

^Prinzivalli: "L'ltalia nella sua Vita Economica," Treves, Milan, 
1915, p. 66. 



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 151 

The new State had inherited a long Hst of debts from 
the various units incorporated in the Kingdom. The 
war of 1866 had added to the ah-eady overburdened 
Itahan finances. This year ended with a deficit of 
£28,840,000. Only the most stringent econoihy and 
drastic forms of taxation could save the young State 
from bankruptcy. A grist tax {macinato) was in- 
troduced, which, though highly unpopular as it in- 
creased the price of bread appreciably, netted the 
relatively large sum of £3,200,000 a year; while econ- 
omies introduced in all State and Government depart- 
ments and the expropriation of Church property 
saved the situation. Yet the period of financial dif- 
ficulties was not at an end, and though the deficits 
were reduced from year to year, the size of the budget 
increased rapidly. It was not until after the incor- 
poration of Rome in the Kingdom, and the unsettled 
state of the country came to an end, that Italian 
finances began to be on a more stable footing. The 
year 1875 showed the first surplus, and for the ensuing 
decade the financial situation of the country was on 
a solvent basis. The economies were by degrees 
abandoned; the country now entered upon a period 
of premature expansion. The grist tax was abolished, 
extravagant expenditures on railways, unsound bank- 
ing, and later, burdensome colonial enterprises again 
brought on a period of financial difficulties, and the 
long years of increasing deficits from 1884 to 1898 
were finally terminated by careful economies and 
reforms which once again rescued Italy from financial 
chaos. Din-ing the ensuing fourteen years, owing in 
part to the great economic development of the coun- 
try, Italian finances showed a yearly surplus, not- 



152 GREATER ITALY 

withstanding the fact that expenditures increased 
over thirty milUons sterhng. The Itahan Rente, which 
stood at 78 in 1893 soon passed par, while a conversion 
of the Debt, carried out in 1906, brought about an 
economy of a miUion and a half sterling a year. Though 
at the time it seemed as though the Tripolitan war 
had not affected Italy's financial position, yet a period 
of appreciable deficits was again inaugurated during 
the past three fiscal years. During the year 1913-14 
the receipts of the exchequer amounted to £100,950,- 
000, and the expenditure was £107,506,400, showing a 
deficit of £6,556,400. 

Revenues are derived chiefly from imposts on 
lands, buildings, and personal estates; monopolies 
on salt, tobacco, and the lottery, and taxation on im- 
ports. Italy has not only a high protective tariff, 
but also taxes necessities, not produced in the coun- 
try, such as wheat, sugar, coffee, etc. The expenses 
of collection are heavy, the burden of taxation is very 
unevenly distributed, and weighs onerously on the 
poor. The service of the National Debt still repre- 
sents a great proportion of expenditure, amounting to 
about twenty and a quarter millions sterling yearly. 
In 1913 the figures of the debt on the Grand Livre 
amounted to £551,920,000, of which only approx- 
imately 12 per cent is owned abroad. The gold held 
by the Bank of Italy (June, 1912) was £40,976,000. 

Crime in Italy is decreasing. Brigandage, in its 
more picturesque forms, which was once indigenous 
in Calabria, has been wiped out, and the "Camorra" 
has been shorn of much of its vigour as a result of the 
Viterbo trial of 1912. Vendettas still survive in the 
southern provinces, and though homicides are pro- 



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 153 

portionately more frequent in Italy than in any other 
European country, their number is rapidly diminishing, 
having decreased by nearly 50 per cent since 1880. 

Hand in hand with this decrease in criminality, 
there has been a slow though steady increase in edu- 
cational faciUties. The Italian Kingdom's inheritance 
of ilUteracy was appalling. The percentage of il- 
literates in 1871 was 73 per cent, the second highest 
in Europe. In 1910 it was still 50 per cent for the 
total and 30 per cent for the male population. In the 
North of Italy education is widely diffused, and the 
schools are efficient; in the South they are still defec- 
tive, yet much progress has been made in elementary 
schools, both in numbers and attendance. The total 
number of schoolrooms has risen in a decade from 
61,777 to 68,031 (1911), while attendance has increased 
during this period nearly 400,000 to 3,150,249 or 9.3 
per 100 of the population. Schools for adult illiterates, 
estabhshed in 1906, had an attendance of 128,000, of 
whom four-fifths were men. Though increasingly 
large credits have been voted for educational pur- 
poses, there is still much room for improvement, 
especially in the South of Italy where school build- 
ings are inadequate, the teachers poorly paid, and 
evasions from school attendance common. Though 
the Ginnasi and Licei, or classical secondary schools, 
show a distinct decrease both in number and atten- 
dance, the technical schools and institutes have gained 
appreciably, both of these latter gaining nearly 50 per 
cent in numbers of scholars in the eight-year period 
1902-10. The 500 technical schools had in this latter 
year 83,621, and the technical institutes 20,305, schol- 
ars in attendance. This trend towards technical train- 



154 GREATER ITALY 

ing cannot fail to have a very beneficial effect in Italy, 
where in the past the liberal professions were far too 
overcrowded. The rapid economic development of 
Italy is now attracting more and more the type of men 
into business who hitherto wasted their time in some 
Government sinecure after completing a course of study 
at a university. So that it is not surprising to find 
that the number of students in attendance at the uni- 
versities (28,000) has been practically stationary during 
the past decade. 

Italy, in order to protect herself from foreign ag- 
gression, from the earliest days of her existence felt 
the necessity of having a strong army. After her en- 
trance into the Triple Alhance she further increased 
her effectives, and voted large credits for military 
purposes, which caused serious financial embarrass- 
ment. Though the army budget was subsequently 
reduced, the Italian General Staff has always been 
directed by intelligent and efficient officers, whose 
spirit of initiative has kept the Italian forces in the 
vanguard of development in all branches of military 
science. Italy was the country first to train troops 
for mountain warfare, and her corps of Alpini were 
imitated by both France and Austria; as were her 
Bersaglieri, the first chasseurs a pied or light infantry 
in Europe. Aviation was actively encouraged as 
an essential branch of the service from the very 
earhest days of its practical usefulness, and dirigibles 
were first used in modern warfare by the ItaHans 
during the Tripolitan campaign. Italy was one of 
the first countries to adopt an "invisible" field uni- 
form. Though hampered by lack of funds, her armies 
have been kept up to a high standard of efficiency 



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 155 

and discipline. Service in the Italian army is com- 
pulsory, beginning with the age of 20; the men re- 
maining 19 years with the colom-s. Active service, 
formerly 3 years in the infantry and 5 years in the 
cavalry, was reduced to 2 years, while those paying 
£48 and passing an examination were required to 
serve only one year. The peace footing of the Italian 
army was 14,000 officers and 255,000 men, while the 
nominal war footing was 1,215,000. The actual war 
footing, however, was 41,692 officers and 3,433,150 
men in 1913. 

Concerned with her position as a naval Power, 
and owing to the great length of her coast-line, Italy, 
when she entered upon the period of colonial ex- 
pansion, made a great effort to bring her navy up to 
a high standard. She embarked upon a daring pro- 
gramme of naval construction, and set the example 
of building monster ships, armed with monster guns, 
the preciu-sors of the modern Dreadnoughts. As the 
result of great enterprise and efforts, by 1893 Italy 
had reached the position of third naval Power in the 
world, ranking immediately after Great Britain and 
France. But, owing to financial difficulties, her am- 
bitious policy of naval expansion had to be abandoned, 
so that one by one the United States, Germany, and 
Japan passed her, and the Italian navy now ranks 
sixth. During the past decade Italian expenditures 
for naval purposes have again risen. The total naval 
effectives in 1913, on a peace footing, included 2,016 
officers and 32,984 men, with 329 vessels of all types. 
Her programme of naval construction for that year 
provided for seven new ''Super-Dreadnoughts," a num- 
ber exceeded only by Great Britain and France. 



156 GREATER ITALY 

The total area of Italy's colonial domain is approxi- 
mately 1,250,000 square miles, with a population of 
1,580,000 inhabitants. The area of Libya is roughly 
1,000,000 square miles, and has a population estimated 
at 900,000. The ItaUan occupation of Libya has en- 
tailed considerable expenditure amounting to well over 
£50,000,000, though the rapid increase in trade be- 
tween Italy and her new colony has, in a measure, 
compensated therefor. The number of steamships ar- 
riving in Italian ports from Libya has risen from 9, 
with a tonnage of 9,637 in the year 1908, to 705 with 
a tonnage of 1,408,000 in 1912; while during the same 
period the number of ships clearing from Italy for 
Libyan ports rose from 42, with a tonnage of 55,342 
to 990 with a tonnage of 1,863,825. The value of the 
annual exports from Libya to Italy has increased nine- 
fold during this same four-year period from £27,053 
to £236,098; imports from Italy to Libya having risen 
from £120,822 to £4,031,542. Communications be- 
tween Libya and Italy have been greatly improved, 
so that Tripoli may now be reached in forty-eight hours 
from Rome. 

Eritrea, with an area of about 85,000 square miles, 
had a population of 278,893 at the last census, of whom 
3,949 are Europeans. The military force is chiefly 
native, commanded by Italian officers. The expendi- 
tures for the year 1911 amounted to £559,000, of which 
Italy contributed one-half. During the four-year 
period, 1908-12, imports have doubled, totalling 
nearly £1,000,000, while exports from Eritrea proper 
have increased threefold to £374,872. Though the 
development of Eritrea has hitherto been slow, Italy 
has high hopes for the future of the colony. A care- 



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 157 

ful investigation has shown that as soon as adequate 
transportation faciUties are provided, Eritrea will be 
able to produce enough cotton to make Italy inde- 
pendent of American cotton. The work of railway 
construction is being rapidly carried on. The lines in 
existence now extend to 111.5 miles, and £200,000 
was allotted in 1911 for extensions. 

Italian Somaliland is an extensive tract of land 
hitherto Httle exploited. The annual expenditures 
amount to about £200,000. The colony exports ivory, 
coffee, cotton, and gums, and imports cotton goods, 
chiefly from Italy, the total trade of the colony amount- 
ing to £430,506. 

Italy further occupied in the ^gean, Rhodes and 
other smaller islands. The expenses of occupation at 
the end of 1913 amounted to £850,000. 

In looking over this very brief survey of the econ- 
omic and social development of Italy, one cannot fail 
to be impressed by the great progress which the coun- 
try had made during the half century since unity had 
been achieved. A new force was arising, which, with 
the passing years, was more and more to assert its 
power in the world. The Italian people were not blind 
to the fact that there remained much to be done to 
establish on a solid foundation this vast economic 
edifice, which had sprung up so rapidly. To check 
the wastage of emigration, to educate her peoples of 
the South up to the standards of the Western world, 
still awaited to be carried out. But of greater imme- 
diate importance was the necessity of freeing the 
economic life of Italy from foreign control, of eman- 
cipating the country from German domination. These 
were the two great tasks to which Italy was next to 



158 GREATER ITALY 

turn her energies. Confident in her strength, relying 
on the united effort of her peoples, who under the 
aegis of the House of Savoy were rapidly losing their 
regionalist traditions, so that ''Italy" was no longer 
merely a word, but meant to each and every Italian 
"la patria/' such was the Italy which could calmly elect 
to follow the course best suited to her vital interests, 
when the hour came. In this hour the true strength 
of the nation was to be revealed. 



CHAPTER VIII 
THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 

Rome the Capital of the Kingdom of Italy. The Law of 

GUABANTEES. ThE RoMAN QUESTION 

Among the various problems which have con- 
fronted the new Kingdom of Italy, none has been 
more difficult and vexatious than that of its relations 
with the Papacy. Though an Italian Pontiff, elected 
by a majority of Italian cardinals, sits on the throne 
of St. Peter, no Pope has hitherto become openly 
reconciled to the loss of his temporal power, and the 
King of Italy is still considered by the Vatican and 
its entourage as the unlawful usurper of the rights and 
privileges, as well as the estates, of the Holy See. 

It was on September 19, 1870, that the Italian troops 
under the command of General Raffaele Cadorna stood 
before the walls of Rome. King Victor Emmanuel 
had, in a letter couched in terms of filial affection, 
prayed the Pope, Pius IX, to renounce his temporal 
prerogatives, and thus permit the peaceable accom- 
plishment of ItaHan unity, which with the incorpora- 
tion of Rome in the Kingdom would be complete. The 
Pope refused to comply with this request, stating that 
he would resist by force of arms all attempts to de- 
prive him of his dominions. On September 20 the 
Italian forces, after a bombardment of the city last- 
ing five hours, entered Rome through a breach in the 
walls near the Porta Pia. Seeing that further resis- 

159 



160 GREATER ITALY 

tance was useless, the Pope ordered his troops to re- 
tire, and as a protest to the world against the violation 
of his sovereignty, Pius IX shut himself up in the 
Vatican, never to leave it, a self-interned prisoner. 
This was not the first time in recent years that the 
Popes lost their temporal power. As a result of the 
Napoleonic invasion of Italy a republic was proclaimed 
in Rome in 1798 which lasted but a brief period. In 
May, 1809,, the Papal States were, by a decree issued 
by Napoleon from Vienna, annexed to the French 
Empire, and not until his downfall, five years later, 
did the Pope again enter into possession of his domain. 
The Papal authority was for a third time overthrown 
in 1849. In February, Mazzini, the hero of Italy's 
early struggles for unity and independence, hastened 
to Rome; Pope Pius IX was driven from the city; a 
repubhcan form of government was set up under the 
leadership of Mazzini. The Romans believed that 
they could rally around them all Italy, but the at- 
tempts failed. Tuscany refused the invitation to 
join the Romans, and the disastrous effort to throw 
off the yoke of the Austrians in the North dampened 
the ardour of the Itahans. The Pope from his exile 
at Gaeta sought foreign aid to bring about his re- 
establishment. France, though at this time a repubhc 
under the presidency of Louis Napoleon, the future 
Emperor, under the pretext of protecting the new 
Roman republic, fitted out a small expedition and 
despatched the force under General Oudinot to Rome. 
The Republicans, led by Garibaldi, suspecting the 
good faith of the French, gave battle and obliged them 
to retreat. The French, further reinforced, now openly 
announced their object of reinstating the Papal au- 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 161 

thority. On June 3, they began the siege of Rome. 
For a month Garibaldi's legions held out against the 
French besiegers. Finally on July 2, it was deemed 
impossible to hold the city any longer. Garibaldi, 
with the remnant of his forces withdrew, and Rome 
once again was compelled to accept the rule of the 
Popes. 

But the temper of the Roman people during this last 
uprising showed clearly that they would not rest con- 
tent until they had overthrown for all time the rule of 
the Papacy. Rome was now permanently garrisoned 
by French troops. This force of some 15,000 men was 
not withdrawn until 1866. As soon as the French 
left the city. Garibaldi again planned an expedition 
to conquer the capital. Italian unity had now pro- 
gressed towards its triumphant achievement. Under 
the House of Savoy all Italy had been united into one 
great State. Rome alone remained outside the union. 
The Itahan Government, out of fear of France, had 
by a convention, signed September 15, 1864, agreed 
not to undertake an expedition against Rome, or to 
make any attempt to incorporate the city in the new 
Kingdom. Knowing that Garibaldi was contemplat- 
ing such an expedition, the Italian authorities re- 
moved him to Caprera, a small island close to the coast 
of Sardinia, under an armed guard. Garibaldi, how- 
ever, eluding his guardians, made his way safely back 
to Tuscany, and gathering together his legionaries, 
marched against Rome. In a first encounter the 
Papal troops were defeated at Monte Rotondo on 
October 29, 1867. In the meantime Napoleon III 
had despatched a fresh army to the assistance of the 
Pope. On November 3, at Mentana the Garibaldians 



162 GREATER ITALY 

met the French and were badly beaten. Garibaldi 
returned to his exile at Caprera, and the French again 
garrisoned Rome. 

The fifth and final attempt to deliver Rome from 
Papal rule was at last successful. The French troops 
were withdrawn from Rome at the outbreak of the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870. At the downfall of 
the French Empire, on September 4, 1870, the Italian 
Government, released from the engagement entered 
into with Napoleon not to occupy Rome, set about 
the undertaking which they so speedily brought to a 
successful issue. 

On October 2, the inhabitants of Rome and the 
Papal States, by a plebiscite solemnly voted their 
adherence to the Kingdom of Italy. Rome was there- 
upon proclaimed the capital of the country. King 
Victor Emmanuel II and the Government removed 
from Florence to Rome. The King took up his res- 
idence in the Quirinal, the former summer palace of 
the Popes. Thus the temporal power of the Papacy, 
which with brief interregnums had lasted for eleven 
centuries, came to an end. 

Pius IX continued, however, not to recognise the 
new authorities, or to treat with them in any manner. 
The ItaHan Government, wishing to regulate by 
statute its relations with the Papacy, had, in May, 
1871, passed the so-called "Law of Guarantees," 
whereby the Pope is conceded nominal privileges 
and prerogatives as a sovereign, his person is invio- 
lable, his residence at the Vatican, as well as at the 
Lateran and the Villa Castel Gandolfo, enjoy ex- 
territorial rights. The Pope is to have his own armed 
guards, receive Envoys and Ministers from foreign 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 163 

sovereigns unmolested by the Italian authorities. 
Furthermore, besides other provisions wliich provide 
for every probable eventuahty, the Italian Govern- 
ment pledged itself to pay an annual indemnity of 
3,225,000 lire (£129,000) towards the maintenance 
of the Holy See; a sum which was equal to the normal 
Papal budget. 

The perplexities of the Italian authorities were not, 
however, smoothed over by the passage of the Law 
of Guarantees. Pius J.X throughout his pontificate 
obstinately continued to ignore its terms. He refused 
to accept the proffered indemnity, and repeated his 
protests to the world against the usurpation of his 
temporal authority. 

Though there was a small and cultured element 
among the Roman churchmen, who were convinced 
that the Church could develop its prestige and ex- 
tend its spiritual sway throughout the world more 
widely if the Pope no longer had to concern himself 
with temporal problems of civil administration, the 
majority of the Curia, as well as pious Catholics 
throughout Italy, felt that the Pope must inevitably 
be impeded in the exercise of his Papal functions by 
the presence of another authority in Rome. 

The entry of the ItaUans into Rome, instead of solv- 
ing the Roman Question, had thus on the contrary 
virulently revived it. Foreign nations which had 
hitherto shown undivided sympathy for the cause of 
Italian unity, England, Prussia, and Belgium — ^in 
the first the Irish Catholics, in the latter the Clericals 
— joined in protesting, both in and out of Parliament, 
against the Italian occupation of the Eternal City. 
Cavour's programme of a "free Church within a free 



164 GREATER ITALY 

State," was the plan which the Itahan Government 
set about loyally to execute. The separation of the 
Church and State, it was believed, might be carried 
out without prejudice to either. And though Pius 
IX, who had been despoiled of his temporal sov- 
ereignty, could not be expected to accept the new 
status, it was confidently hoped that his successor 
would in time inaugurate a more conciliatory poHcy. 
As long as Pius IX lived the Italian Governments 
maintained an attitude of patient toleration. The 
anathemas and invectives hurled against them were 
borne in a spirit of contrition. They were waiting 
for better days. 

In 1878 the Pope died. The Conclave assembled 
to elect his successor. Unmolested, and in complete 
security and privacy, the College of Cardinals met for 
the first time under the new regime. In the most im- 
posing, as well as well-ordered Conclave held in many 
centuries, after an unusually brief meeting of only thirty- 
six hours, Cardinal Pecci was elected Pope, and as- 
sumed the title of Leo XIIL The new Pontiff in no- 
wise resembled his predecessor. A man of broad views, 
and in many respects fully aUve to the needs and con- 
ditions of our times, an acute observer and skilful 
poHtician, he nevertheless, in the very first act of his 
reign dealt a cruel blow to the hopes of the Quirinal. 
It was confidently expected that Leo XIII would 
consent to be crowned publicly in St. Peter's. Instead, 
his coronation took place in strict privacy in the 
Sistine Chapel and the new Pope at once let it be 
known that he saw fit to consider himself the prisoner 
of the Italian Government, and locked himself up in 
the Vatican. 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 165 

Moderate in his acts as in his language, conciliatory 
in his attitude towards the peculiar needs of his Cath- 
ohc subjects within the boundaries of their respective 
States, amenable to new ideas, Leo XIII was anxious 
and wilHng to compromise on almost every question 
except that of Rome. Undaunted, the partisans of 
a reconciliation between the Vatican and the Quirinal 
endeavom-ed to accommodate the relations between 
them. In the Itahan Chamber the matter was favour- 
ably discussed, and proved the eagerness of the Ital- 
ians to put an end to an equivocal situation. Leo 
XIII speedily quashed these negotiations when he 
sharply asserted his inalienable right to the temporal 
sovereignty of Rome. He maintained that Rome 
was not large enough to hold both a King and a Pope. 
Unable to persuade the Italian Government to leave 
the city and estabhsh the capital in Florence or 
Naples, the Pope outwardly made preparations to 
leave Rome. He caused an inventory to be made of 
the treasures of the Vatican, which he proposed to 
convey abroad. The Italian Government became 
alarmed, for though the presence of a recalcitrant 
Pontiff in their midst was a source of much embar- 
rassment, nevertheless, the removal of the Papacy 
would be a serious blow to the prestige of the young 
Kingdom. 

Leo XIII, in order to strengthen his position in his 
conflict with the Italian Government, came to an 
understanding with Bismarck. A reconciliation be- 
tween the Pope and the instigator of Catholic per- 
secution in Germany was effected. The Kulturkampf 
came to an end, and we see Leo XIII using his in- 
fluence with the German Catholics to persuade them 



166 GREATER ITALY 

to accept Bismarck's dictates, while the Iron Chan- 
cellor offered the Pope a dignified asylum in Germany, 
should he wish to remove the Papacy from Rome, 
although this project was never carried out. The chief 
aim of Leo XIII had been to increase his moral in- 
fluence abroad, as well as to raise the status of ascen- 
dency of the Pope in poUtical matters. A skilled 
diplomatist, and a genial Pontiff, he readily created for 
the Papacy a high place in international affairs. He 
was selected by various foreign States to act as ar- 
bitrator in their territorial quarrels, and his verdicts 
are luminous examples of astute and sound judgment, 
tempered by moderation and justice. 

Yet Leo XIII never ceased to look upon the Italian 
Government with a hostile eye. He was able to cause 
innumerable embarrassments to the Quirinal, and 
during the early years of the new Kingdom the dom- 
inant figure of Leo XIII in the affairs of Rome pre- 
vented the Italians from developing their national 
strength and consciousness as rapidly as would have 
been otherwise possible. The Papacy, throughout his 
long reign, continued to ignore the Italian Government, 
and refused to treat with the Quirinal or to permit 
any loyal CathoHcs to take part in the public hfe of 
Italy. Wherever possible the Roman Curia placed 
obstacles in the path of the Italian authorities. 
The Pope forbade Catholic sovereigns to pay visits 
of State to the Italian capital, and the pride of the 
Italians was humbled by the strict observance of this 
command by the rulers of all Catholic States. Leo 
XIII, while receiving Ministers and Embassies from 
other States, refused to negotiate even distantly with 
the Italian authorities, and in matters both great and 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 167 

small, the influence of the Papacy tenaciously op- 
posed the increasing strength of the new Italy. So 
that within the Kingdom there remained this polit- 
ically hostile power which militated against the best 
interests of the country, and continued to be a source 
of disintegration rather than of unity. 

As the years passed, and the Papacy tacitly tolerated 
the status quo, a new programme to regulate the posi- 
tion of the Vatican was brought forward, which though 
not enunciated clearly until the succeeding pontificate, 
further complicated the situation. When the Pope 
reahsed that no moral suasion would induce the King 
of Italy to leave Rome, and that no foreign State 
would undertake an armed expedition to re-establish 
the temporal authority of the Papacy, it became the 
ambition of many churchmen to place the Vatican 
under international protection — ^in other words, to 
internationahse the Roman Question — and secure the 
enforcement of the Law of Guarantees or other similar 
statutes, by international sanction, thus placing the 
Pope beyond the jurisdiction of the Italian author- 
ities. This plan, in view of the fact that Catho- 
lics, nominally subjects of the Pope, are to be found 
in all countries of the world, seemed peculiarly well 
adapted to secure greater liberties for the Papacy, as 
well as increased prestige. However, from the outset 
this proposal was vigorously opposed by the Itahan 
Government. They maintained that the Roman 
Question was cosmopolitan and not international. 
It was cosmopolitan because the Catholic Church, 
as its name implies, embraces the whole world; it 
was not international because no one group of nations 
has the right to guarantee by treaty the maintenance 



168 GREATER ITALY 

of the Papacy. Italy's Law of Guarantees regarding 
the Holy See is a unilateral contract, arising out of 
the fact that the residence of the head of the Catholic 
Church is situated within the boundaries of Italy, 
and that some arrangement had to be made to define 
the relations of the Papacy towards the civil author- 
ities. Italy thus endeavoured to combat any ten- 
dency, which might arise abroad, to regard favourably 
the plan of internationalisation, and to affirm pos- 
itively her right to be the sole arbiter of the Roman 
Question which she considered a purely domestic 
problem. 

Upon the death of Leo XIII in July, 1903, the Con- 
clave again met at Rome, to consider the election of 
his successor. Leo XIII, throughout his pontificate, 
had been ably assisted by Cardinal RampoUa del 
Tindaro, his Secretary of State, a man who by his 
training, natural gifts, and his tolerant views, seemed 
well-fitted to bear the Papal burden. The candidature 
of Cardinal RampoUa had received the support of 
the French Government, and the Italian authorities 
would have welcomed his election, but the Emperor 
of Austria, at the suggestion of Germany, on this oc- 
casion made use of his ancient prerogative of veto, 
and prevented the elevation to the Papacy of a man 
who, it was believed, would have considered the re- 
lations of the Vatican and the Quirinal in a new light. 
Cardinal Sarto, Archbishop of Venice, was the com- 
promise candidate upon whom the election fell. Of 
humble parentage, he had risen from the position of 
village priest, through all the grades of the ecclesias- 
tical career, to the throne of St. Peter. A man of great 
humility and rehgious zeal, whose piety and devotion 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 169 

were known throughout Italy, yet unversed in the 
legal aspects of the position of the Vatican and the 
intricacies of the Roman Question, he took little in- 
terest in the pohtical role of the pontificate. Pius X, 
a "rehgious Pope," more engrossed with the affairs 
of heaven than those of this earth, engaged in sup- 
pressing ''Modernism," concerned with matters of 
ritual and dogma, neglected the more immediate 
problem of the relation of the Papacy to Italy. Though 
he departed from the policy of Leo XIII of playing 
an active political role, this did not imply that he held 
a more tolerant view of the matter of temporal juris- 
diction. He followed and thus stamped as a tradi- 
tional custom the idea of considering the Pope the 
"Prisoner of St. Peter's," and rejected the Law of 
Guarantees. 

In his first encyclical of October 4, 1903, Pius X 
seemed to indicate that the Roman Question was 
closed. A number of Italians already proclaimed 
that the day of reconciliation of the Kingdom and the 
Papacy had at last arrived. Pius X withdrew the 
non expedit and freely granted permission to all loyal 
Catholics to take an active part in the political life of 
Italy, which the intransigent policy of his predeces- 
sors had prohibited; he assumed a more conciliatory 
attitude regarding the giving of religious instruction 
in the schools; sanctioned the singing of the Italian 
national anthem by the Catholic societies, and ad- 
mitted the Italian flag within the precincts of the 
Vatican. But it was soon evident that these con- 
cessions were of no real significance when compared 
with the broader issue of the sovereignty of Rome. 
Pius X was to seize the first opportunity to voice 



170 GREATER ITALY 

his protest against the usurpation of the Kings of 
Italy. 

In the autumn of 1904, President Loubet of France 
paid an official visit to the King of Italy at Rome. 
The Pope immediately issued a circular note to the 
Powers, protesting against the visit of the chief of a 
great Catholic State to "him who, against all right, 
holds my temporal sovereignty, and impedes its liberty 
and independence." The result of this protest was 
the severing of diplomatic relations between France 
and the Vatican. 

Pius X had ascended the Papal throne accompanied 
by the best wishes of the Italian people. The sim- 
plicity of his court contrasted vividly with the pomp 
and ceremony of the reign of Leo XIII. His humble 
birth, his affectionate regard for his sisters, who still 
remained simple peasant women, as well as the peace- 
ful atmosphere of goodness, which impressed all those 
who came in contact with the Pope, created a legend 
which enveloped the Pontiff in a halo of sanctity. 
Never before had a Pope received Venetian peasants 
in the sumptuous private apartments of the Vatican; 
received them not as a sovereign but as a friend. 
Christian and Jew were alike admitted into his pres- 
ence, and every one who so desired had access to the 
Holy Father, who was intent upon re-establishing the 
rule of Christ in its literal form of "peace on earth, 
good-will to men." So that the repressive acts which 
took place under Pius X were ascribed chiefly to the 
Papal entourage. 

During the later years of the pontificate of Pius X, 
the Papacy revived virulently its anti-Italian policy. 
The celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 171 

founding of the Kingdom of Italy, in 1911, was seized 
upon by the Pope to proclaim that all good Catholics 
must consider these, ''days of deep mourning." Hence- 
forth Pius X took every opportunity to bring before 
the world the thorny subject of the temporal powers 
of the Papacy. At the same time the question of in- 
ternationalising the Law of Guarantees was brought 
to the fore, and became the object of careful con- 
sideration and study by Vatican jurists. 

The outbreak of the European War found Pius X 
still occupying the throne of St. Peter. The terrible 
conflict which had been enkindled throughout the 
Christian world was said to have been a source of deep 
anguish to the Holy Father. Borne down by age and 
infirmity, bewaihng the fate of his fellow men, Pius 
X sank into his grave on August 21, 1914. 

Ten days later fifty-seven Cardinals assembled in 
the Vatican to elect the two hundred and sixtieth 
Pope. Many of the prelates who had gathered here 
came from States now at war, and none could entirely 
divest themselves of their national allegiance, or put 
out of their thoughts the national passions and prej- 
udices engendered by the conflict. The state of the 
Church might well give them cause for preoccupation. 
Under the late Pontiff the prestige of the Papacy had 
been slowly decfining. The gravity of the moment 
demanded that the reins of the CathoHc Church be 
placed in able hands if the Papacy was again to play 
an important part in worldly affairs. It, therefore, 
was evident that a "political" Pope must be intrusted 
with the keys of St. Peter's. 

The papabili, as the candidates for Papal honours 
are designated, were not numerous. No strong 



172 GREATER ITALY 

personality dominated the Conclave. During the first 
and second of September, when the ballots were 
counted, none of the candidates received two-thirds 
of the total votes "necessary for election. It was 
noticed, however, that the Cardinal Delia Chiesa, 
Archbishop of Bologna, who had come into the Con- 
clave a relatively unsupported candidate, not even 
ranked among the more important papdbili was 
slowly gaining the suffrages of his colleagues. During 
the ballot taking of September 3, no agreement could 
be reached. Finally to break the deadlock, when it 
became evident that neither of the leading candidates, 
Cardinals Maffi and Serafini, could secure the neces- 
sary majority, on the first ballot of September 4, 
Cardinal Delia Chiesa received 39 votes, the number 
strictly necessary for his election. 

During the Conclave the Pope-elect had followed 
the proceedings with a cool and dispassionate eye. 
He seemed to take little interest in what was going 
on; upon hearing the announcement of his election, 
the new Pontiff seemed unmoved. In answer to the 
question of what name he would assume, the Pope 
replied in a calm voice, ''Benedict XV." In taking 
the name of Benedict, the new Pope wished to show 
that he intended to break away from the tradition of 
both Leo XIII and Pius X. 

According to custom, three sets of white Papal 
robes of different sizes are prepared in advance, as 
the Pope on his election is immediately clad in his new 
vestments, and receives the homage of the assembled 
Cardinals. Benedict XV now entered the Sistine 
Chapel arrayed in the Papal robes of the smallest size, 
yet even these were too large, and they shrouded his 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 173 

shrunken form in deep folds. His face, thin and drawn, 
wearing heavy lensed, gold-rimmed spectacles, peered 
out from over his white-caped gown, inquisitive, yet 
confident and self-possessed. The Pope received the 
obeisances of the Princes of the Church with great 
dignity. His countenance bore no trace of emotion. 
Those who saw him declare that it seemed as though the 
new Pope had been accustomed to his role all his life. 

On placing the triple tiara on the head of Cardinal 
Delia Chiesa, the Conclave had fulfilled its mission 
and elected a "political" Pope. The reign of Pius X 
already seemed covered with the dust of ages. A new 
era was to open in the history of Rome. Never before 
had a Pope been called upon to face a more grave 
and serious crisis, both within and without the Church. 
Benedict XV, undaunted by the diflSculties which 
loomed before him, entered resolutely upon his new 
duties, and the evening of the day of his election to 
the throne of St. Peter, found the Pope busy, person- 
ally dictating telegrams, announcing his accession, 
to foreign sovereigns. 

Benedict XV is the son of the Marchese Delia 
Chiesa, of an ancient Genoese patrician family. Born 
at Genoa on November 21, 1854, he was ordained a 
priest in 1879, and then pursued his studies in canon 
law, more especially in ecclesiastical diplomacy at 
Rome. When Cardinal Rampolla, at the time a 
monsignor, was sent as Papal Nuncio to Spain in 
1883, he took with him as his secretary, Delia Chiesa. 
The young priest, who soon revealed great diplomatic 
aptitude, became the confidential adviser of his chief, 
and when later Cardinal Rampolla assumed the office 
of Secretary of State at the Vatican, Monsignor Delia 



174 GREATER ITALY 

Chiesa became his principal secretary, and was the 
active collaborator of RampoUa and Leo XIII during 
the busy days of the Leonine pontificate. When at 
the death of Leo XIII, Cardinal Rampolla retired 
from participation in Papal affairs, Delia Chiesa did 
not follow his example. He remained at his post at 
the Vatican, ready to serve his new master. Cardinal 
Merry del Val, who became Secretary of State. But 
an astute and skilled diplomatist such as Monsignor 
Delia Chiesa, could not long tolerate the careless 
trend which Papal policy now followed, nor did he 
ingratiate himself with his new chief. It was, there- 
fore, not long before he was relieved of his func- 
tions, and in 1907 he was sent into relative exile to 
Bologna, as Archbishop. Raised to the cardinalate, 
he continued to interest himself in the broader issues 
of Papal affairs, and refused to be drawn into the 
local dissensions of his diocese. 

Thus Benedict XV came to the pontifical magistracy 
endowed by long years of patient training, as well 
as by his natural gifts, with those qualifications of 
statecraft most useful to a "political" Pope. The 
Roman Curia could well believe that it had chosen 
wisely in selecting this skilled manipulator of diplo- 
matic niceties, who was so familiar with both ec- 
clesiastical and lay problems of international import; 
Benedict XV could be counted on to direct, guide, and 
govern in a manner worthy of the best worldly tradi- 
tions of the Vatican. Firm, subtle, adaptable, he had 
devoted his life to the cause of affirming the temporal 
power of the Vatican, and had had a large share in 
its triumphs under Leo XIII. The new Pope could 
not fail to grasp the significance which his accession 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 175 

to the pontificate would have to the world. Never 
in recent years had the civilised nations of the earth 
looked to Rome in such a mood of humility. In a 
world where the moral code was being daily violated, 
where treachery and treason and a ruthless disregard 
for the rights of mankind had become the rule, where 
the most elemental laws of justice and humanity were 
wholly disregarded, the figure of the Pope rose out of 
the flames of battle, the calm and just arbiter, whose 
word would at this juncture carry the full weight of 
divine inspiration. 

Belhgerents and neutrals alike waited for the pro- 
nouncement of the new Pontiff. By a frank, out- 
spoken statement of policy, by a condemnation and 
censure of the violation of the accepted code of war 
and of international law, by a high-minded and af- 
firmatively authoritative exposition of broad. Chris- 
tian principles, which even belligerents would be 
bound to respect, it was confidently expected that the 
Papacy would lend its great moral support in main- 
taining the structural fabric of society. 

But the Pope had too long been accustomed to the 
arts of diplomacy to be able to view with a broader 
and more statesmanlike grasp the value of such an 
undertaking. In his first encyclical, Benedict XV 
proved that he was more concerned with what he 
believed to be the immediate needs of the CathoHc 
Church than with those of mankind. The Pope 
showed himself eager to take advantage of this seem- 
ingly favourable opportunity to rehearse the grudges 
and grievances of the Vatican. After fulminating 
against present-day society and discoursing on the 
tendencies towards ''independence," deploring the 



176 GREATER ITALY 

absence of all respect for authority, and dwelling on 
the "absurdity of socialism," the Pope discusses the 
dissensions within the Church, condemns Modernism, 
and, in the concluding and more important paragraphs, 
reaffirms "that for too long a time the Church has 
not enjoyed that liberty of which it has need," and 
joins in a prayer for the prompt re-establishment of 
peace among nations, "the desire for the cessation of 
that abnormal condition in which the head of the 
Church finds himself." 

These are the chief contents of the first important 
statement of the new Pope to the world. To many 
influential Catholics this encycHcal came as a distinct 
disappointment; to the world at large it appeared as 
a weak and insignificant document. The Italians 
were visibly annoyed that the Pope should see fit to 
make use of the occasion to bring to the notice of 
Europe the petty quarrel of the Vatican with the 
Italian Government. The Allies had expected at 
least a reference to the war, and a condemnation of 
its instigators. In France, the election of Benedict 
XV, the confidential adviser of Cardinal Rampolla, 
who had always been a warm friend of France, was 
hailed with much sympathy, and it was hoped that 
the new Pope would show some traces of the former's 
friendship for France. It was even confidently pre- 
dicted that the estrangement between the Vatican 
and the French Republic would be brought to an end 
by Benedict XV. The revulsion of feeling was spon- 
taneous and immediate when the attitude of the Pope 
regarding the war became known. For the Papacy 
proclaimed its strict neutrality, just as the States 
not engaged in the war had done. It was the aim of 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 177 

the Vatican, leaving aside its moral and spiritual r61e, 
to conform itself to the habitual acts of non-bellig- 
erent, temporal States. 

It soon appeared evident that the Vatican was by 
degrees falling under the influence of the Central 
Empires. The diplomatic representatives of Prus- 
sia, Bavaria, and Austria at the Vatican, owing in 
part to the fact that neither France nor Great Brit- 
ain maintained a mission at the Papal Court, while 
the Russian Envoy was without influence, had by direct 
negotiations been able to persuade the Pope that the 
best interests of the Holy See were more closely Hnked 
with those of the Central Powers, than with those of 
the Allies. As Prussia was pictured as representing 
law and order, blind obedience, systematic control, 
and Austria is the greatest Catholic State, it is not 
difficult to understand that the Pope felt more sym- 
pathy with these than with republican France, heret- 
ical England, or schismatic Russia. Nor were the 
Austro-German envoys slow to make definite promises 
that the question of the re-establishment of the tem- 
poral power of the Papacy would receive careful con- 
sideration at the coming peace conference, and they 
are reported to have pledged the support of the 
Central Empires to the project of internationalis- 
ing the Law of Guarantees, should the broader issue 
fail. 

Busied with his diplomatic negotiations, careful 
not to displease Germany or Austria, the Pope re- 
frained from expressing any opinion regarding the 
violation of Belgian neutrality, even when it was 
presented to his notice by Cardinal Mercier, Primate 
of Belgium. The reply of Benedict XV to the vibrant 



178 GREATER ITALY 

appeal of the Belgian Cardinal is a vague expression 
of generalities, devoid of significance. 

In order to present the cause of the Allies directly 
to the Vatican, Great Britain, in December, 1914, 
decided to send a duly accredited, diplomatic mission 
to the Papal Court. Though well received, the British 
Envoy was unable to wean the Papacy from its now 
decidedly pro-German tendencies. England had other 
causes for grave discontent with the Vatican. In 
Rome the Irish Catholics were in direct relations with 
the Germans, and it is rumoured that it was through 
their medium that the intercourse, which later re- 
sulted in the Easter Revolution of 1916 in Ireland, 
was actively carried on. It was noticeable and com- 
mented upon in the Eternal City, that the Irish 
Catholics continued their relationship with the Ger- 
man Envoy to the Vatican, even after the arrival 
of the British mission, which they feigned to ignore. 
Papal temporal prestige was greatly increased by the 
presence of a Minister Plenipotentiary from Great 
Britain, who after a period of four centuries again 
renewed diplomatic relations between the Vatican 
and the Court of St. James. Benedict XV was to be 
gratified with further solicitations for the opening up 
of diplomatic intercourse, first from the Ottoman 
Empire, then from the Netherlands. 

While the Vatican, under the guidance of Benedict 
XV was increasing its temporal prestige, the Quirinal 
was leading United Italy through the tortuous nego- 
tiations with the Dual Monarchy, which were ulti- 
mately to end in JtaHan intervention in the European 
War. 

As soon as the course which the Italian Government 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 179 

was pursuing became more clearly defined, as soon as 
it became evident that Italy was preparing to range 
herself on the side of the Allied Powers, the Papacy 
began to exert all its influence to maintain Italian 
neutrality. For the Vatican feared that if Italy were 
to declare war on the Central Empires the position 
of the Austro-German representatives, accredited to 
the Papal Court, would become untenable, and they 
would be forced to leave Rome. In this question, as 
well as in all others which have arisen under the Bene- 
dictine pontificate, what was believed to be the best 
interests of the Vatican were alone considered. It so 
came about that the Vatican mobilised all its resources 
to prevent Italian participation in the war, and thus 
actively supported the efforts of the Austro-Germans. 
Spiritual and secular arguments were linked together, 
and presented to the numerous loyal Catholics of the 
Kingdom, bidding them to resist the current of inter- 
vention. The Vatican let it be understood that if 
Italy should engage in the war, the Papacy would 
consider seriously the question of emigrating to some 
neutral country, and negotiations were actually set 
in motion with a view to securing asylum for the 
Pope in Spain. 

Thus the Quirinal found itself in open conflict with 
the Vatican, and though ItaUan participation in the 
war was brought about, there nevertheless remained 
a remnant of "Neutralists" who, encouraged as much 
by the Vatican as from independent sources, prevented 
Italy from putting forth a strong and united effort 
during the first year of the war. 

The declaration of war against Austria, and the 
consequent departure of the diplomatic representatives 



180 GREATER ITALY 

of the Central Empires, accredited to the Holy See, 
in May, 1915, gave the Vatican the opportunity again 
to voice through the Papal Press its protest against 
the intolerable position in which the Papacy found 
itself, in that it "would henceforth be able to com- 
municate only with one group of beUigerents, and 
thus would not be in a position to obtain all the in- 
formation which is necessary for an exact under- 
standing of the international situation." This as- 
sertion is not borne out by facts. In an official ut- 
terance the Italian authorities stated, "The Pope 
continues to exercise his apostolic office with all pos- 
sible liberty. The Law of Guarantees remains in 
force in its entirety, and the Pontiff despatches to- 
day, as he did before the war, his communications in 
cipher, while his diplomatic couriers travel with 
sealed despatches, which are not subject to any cen- 
sorship." The establishment of the Austrian and 
German Embassies to the Papacy, at Lugano in Swit- 
zerland, bears out the truth of this statement. 

During the first year of the Italian participation 
in the war, the Vatican was able to exercise great 
influence on its conduct. The lack of cohesion of 
public opinion regarding the war, the efforts made 
to prevent Italy from putting forth her full strength, 
and above all the undisguised sympathy which num- 
bers of Italians, belonging to "Black" circles at Rome, 
professed for the Central Empires, were a direct out- 
come of Vatican influences. However, the patriotism 
of the Italian Catholics finally triumphed, and in the 
"National Ministry," which was formed in June, 
1916, we find the leader of the CathoHc party as Min- 
ister of Finance. The attitude of neutrality of the 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 181 

Italian-born Pontiff is deemed unpatriotic. Had the 
Pope confined his efforts to playing a purely spiritual 
part, had he remained aloof from the conflict, his 
pohcy might, if not understood, at least have been 
condoned. But the patent efforts of the Papacy to 
frustrate the plans of the Quirinal, to obstruct the 
fulfilment of the obvious destiny of national expansion 
of the Kingdom of Italy, has wounded the sensibilities 
of the majority of Italians, while even loyal Catholics 
cannot forgive the Pope the fact that in the face of 
the grave moral crisis, brought about by the outbreak 
of the war, the head of the Catholic Church, when sum- 
moned to speak, remained silent, purposely avoided 
to commit himself, and preferred the cautious, hollow 
phraseology of the diplomatist to that of a shepherd 
of the people. 

In considering the relation of the Church and State 
in Italy, it must be borne in mind that, for more than 
a thousand years the fortunes of the Catholic Church 
have been intimately bound up with those of the 
ItaUan peninsula. For the past five centuries the 
direction of the Catholic Church has been in the 
hands of Italians. Roman Catholicism, the most 
complete theocracy that man has ever created, is 
the handiwork of Italians. The presence of the Papal 
Court at Rome has, during the past forty-five years, 
been the cause of much anxiety to the Italian Govern- 
ment. However, both parties seemed to have grown 
accustomed to the anomalies of their relationship. 
The efforts of Benedict XV to revive the Roman 
Question at such a critical period in the history of the 
Kingdom would seem to indicate that under the gui- 
dance of the "political" Pontiff elected at the last 



182 GREATER ITALY 

Conclave, the Papacy in endeavouring to embarrass 
the Italian Government, by playing into the hands 
of her enemies, has sacrificed its moral and religious 
ascendency for the attainment of chimerical, temporal 
gains. For it is not alone the Italians whom the Pope 
has alienated. At a time when a religious renascence 
is unmistakably manifesting itself, there are many 
signs that would lead one to conclude that French 
and Belgian Catholics may wish to emancipate them- 
selves from the control of the Vatican. While the 
Papacy has made indirect overtures, soliciting the 
renewal of diplomatic intercourse between France and 
the Vatican, which have been coldly received, the 
French clergy, whether cardinal or village priest, 
maintaining a lofty spirit of patriotism, are letting 
France know that "God is not neutral" whatever 
may be the attitude of "glacial serenity" of the Holy 
Father, as the neutrahty of the Pope is stigmatised. 

Notwithstanding the opposition which has arisen 
against the Vatican, the Italians do not forget that 
the Catholic Church is greater than its Popes: "a 
huge, slumbering giant whose head rests in the lap 
of Italy, and whose body spreads over the world." 
This great mass, long inert, may some day awaken. 
The World War, with its far-reaching results, may be 
the cause of such a resurrection. 

The days have passed when the Quirinal trembled 
at a threat of the Vatican to reassert its temporal 
rights. As a result of a victorious war, with the econ- 
omic and pohtical strength of the Kingdom greatly 
increased, and with the stability of Italy as a World 
Power thereby assured, the temporal pretensions of 
the Papacy must inevitably vanish. Though the oft- 



THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 183 

repeated menace of the Papacy to abandon Rome may 
again be made, and all Italians recognise that such a 
step would be a severe blow to Italian prestige, it is 
well-known that the Papacy cannot leave the Eternal 
City without losing the influence and moral ascen- 
dency wliich San Pietro presso Roma alone can confer. 
The delicate problem of internationahsing the Law 
of Guarantees is of difficult solution. The great ma- 
jority of the people of Italy are actively opposed to 
any such programme, and as long as the Papacy re- 
mains at Rome Italians would consider it an infringe- 
ment of their sovereign rights for any foreign Powers 
to concern themselves with, what they hold to be, an 
internal problem. On the other hand, it is not im- 
probable that, in view of the difficulties which the 
secular sovereign rights, conferred on the Pope by the 
Law of Guarantees, have created, the Italian Govern- 
ment may impose further restrictions on Papal sover- 
eignty, and, by depriving the Papacy of all vestige 
and semblance of temporal power, settle for all time, 
by drastic measures, the vexed Roman Question. 



CHAPTER IX 

ITALY AND GERMANY 

Gekman Peaceful Peneteation. Industrial Servitude. 
The Breaking prom Bondage 

When Italy, only a decade after the achievement 
of national independence, badgered by Austria, dis- 
dained by Great Britain, and fearing an assault on 
the part of France which threatened her national 
existence, was isolated in Europe, she besought the 
friendship of Germany and sought to place herself 
under German protection. In order to secure this 
protection, Italy, at the behest of Berhn, even went 
to the length of becoming an ally of Austria, as Ital- 
ian statesmen believed that by their alliance with 
Germany they were pursuing the only course open to 
them which would guarantee the integrity of the new 
Kingdom. 

Though by courtesy admitted into the comity of 
the Great Powers, Italy was at the time in no posi- 
tion to assert her rights. In the twelve years which 
had elapsed since the House of Savoy had united the 
disjointed patchwork of ItaHan States, many of them 
the most backward and misgoverned in Europe, into 
a nation, much progress had been made in develop- 
ing the national strength of the Italian people. Yet 
Italy remained the poorest and weakest of the Powers, 
seemingly unquaHfied, either practically or potentially, 
to aspire to great expansion. 

184 



ITALY AND GERMANY 185 

With the help of France, Magenta and Solferino 
had won the first steps of Itahan unity. Sadowa 
and Sedan had been German victories, which had 
made it possible to incorporate Venice and Rome in 
the Kingdom. Thus Italy had been created with the 
aid of both France and Germany, and now had to 
make a choice between the two. Owing to the antag- 
onistic attitude of France at this time, it was not 
surprising that the Itahans chose the alliance with 
Germany. During the first years of the Triple Al- 
liance, Germany, as the result of her victorious wars, 
ruled as absolute master in Continental Europe. Italy 
had to content herself with playing a very secondary 
role. Yet these years were not without their benefit 
to her. Germany was the model and pattern. Quick 
to learn, eager to improve, the Italian people were 
laying the foundation of the future economic power 
of the State. 

When, after 1890 and the subsequent Franco- 
Russian alhance, a semblance of the balance of power 
was re-estabhshed in Europe, Italy breathed more 
freely. Her importance as an ally increased, and she 
began to play a more independent and personal part 
in European affairs. The danger of a foreign in- 
vasion had passed. Italy was now entering upon a 
period of colonial expansion. She was, however, 
still not merely poor financially and industrially, but 
ignorant of the ways and means of increasing her 
worldly wealth. She understood little of the methods 
of industrial exploitation, so astonishingly perfected 
by the Germans. Germany was rapidly rising to 
the industrial leadership of the world and had become 
the master of modern efficiency in all forms of organ- 



186 GREATER ITALY 

isation of industrial and commercial enterprise, which 
was the foundation of economic expansion. Italy- 
had allied herself with Germany for the protection of 
her national boundaries; when this protection was 
no longer needed, when no enemies threatened her, 
and the political aspects of her treaty with Germany 
assured her few advantages, Italy deliberately turned 
to Germany and prayed to be instructed in the 
methods and secrets of this modern alchemy. 

It was Crispi, in his sincere desire to foster the 
greatness and increase the wealth and power of Italy, 
who openly sought German economic aid. The op- 
portunity was propitious for the German industrial 
invasion of Italy. France, after carrying on a pro- 
longed commercial warfare against Italy, suddenly in a 
moment of childHke anger dumped all the Italian se- 
cxu-ities that she held on the market.^ Italy was help- 
less and found herself in an embarrassed position. To 
assist Italian finances there was formed in the year 
1895, by certain German financiers, chief among them 
Herr Schwabach, the head of the banking-house of 
Bleichroder of Berlin, an Italian bank, v/ith its head- 
quarters at Milan, known as the ^'Banca Conamerciale." 

Ever since the first visit of Wilham II to Italy a 
few months after his accession to the throne in 1888, 
the possibihty of the industrial exploitations of Italy 
had formed a cherished part of his programme of world 
expansion. The story of German peaceful penetra- 
tion throughout the world is one of the most amazing 
chapters in contemporary history. While the Govern- 
ments of other nations were content to permit their 
nationals to trade abroad, and open up markets for 

iSee p. 60. 



ITALY AND GERMANY 187 

their products, giving them no encouragement and 
Uttle protection, Germany, from the earUest days 
of her existence as an Empire, reahsed that financial, 
industrial, and commercial enterprise are essential, 
determining factors in world politics. While other 
Governments still clung to the antiquated notion of 
a wide gulf between economics and politics, Germany 
closely co-ordinated and allied the two branches of 
this same science. 

It was thus that Berlin became the headquarters 
of the Great General Staff of '^ Peaceful Penetration." 
Plans were here devised to achieve the economic 
servitude of the world. With methodical, plod- 
ding patience and scientific zeal, alhed with a bold- 
ness of conception and brilliancy in execution worthy 
of the greatest mihtary genius, the invaders prepared 
the outlines of the plans of their campaigns, devised 
the strategy, studied the tactics to be pursued. Just 
as at the War College across the Spree the weekly 
Kriegsspiel (war game) took place, which initiated 
the more brilHant younger officers in the plans for 
the mihtary conquest of Europe, so within the silent, 
double-doored rooms of the Deutsche Bank, of the 
Dresdener Bank, of the A. E. G., and other great Ger- 
man concerns, the programmes for the industrial 
conquest of Europe and the world were matured. 
Italy, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Chile, Brazil, France, and even Great Britain were 
the subject of careful study. 

The methods of procedure adopted to achieve the 
desired results were manifold. The Church, Parlia- 
ments, the Press were influenced, bribed, subsidised, 
and, if need be, coerced. The natural cupidity and 



188 GREATER ITALY 

the ignorance of international politics of the average 
business man were preyed upon. The almost uni- 
versal desire for material well-being, which was daily- 
becoming more wide-spread among all classes, was 
exploited. To gain secret information regarding 
markets, trade spies, both German and native, were 
widely made use of. The well-trained German chemist 
or engineer was subventioned, and thus willing to 
work abroad for a trifling stipend, until he had learned 
the secrets of competitors' processes. By German 
methods of factory efficiency, superior organisation 
and preferential transportation rates accorded by the 
home railways, the German manufacturer was soon 
able to drive the native products out of the market 
with a cheaper German substitute. German capital 
was often judiciously invested with native capital 
abroad, and later, when prosperity had crowned the 
enterprise, withdrawn. Yet the management almost 
invariably remained in German hands, as the average 
stockholder was more interested in regular dividends 
than in questions of international influence. In each 
and every case the peculiarities and particular needs 
of a given situation were maturely investigated and 
studied, and then when the field had been prepared, 
the German was ready to reap the fruits of his labour. 
For it must be recalled that every German thus en- 
gaged felt himself an essential unit of the Empire, and 
the Government saw to it that this spirit was kept 
ahve. Thus the mighty tide of German penetration 
spread irresistibly. As the years passed, on the maps 
and charts of Europe and the world, which hung in 
the halls of the great banks of Berlin, the black, white, 
and red flags of Germany, marking the deep inroads 



ITALY AND GERMANY 189 

of German trade abroad, spread their network ever 
more broadly and thickly. The grandiose plan of the 
Pan-Germans for world domination had found, in the 
material greed of the peoples of all nations, the pawns 
of their policy. The international character of world 
trade and commerce made it easy for the Germans 
to wear the cloak of a given nationality, which could 
be cast off at the opportune moment. 

German peaceful penetration, advocated and en- 
couraged by the Emperor himself, seconded by the 
united strength of the German Empire, having at 
its immediate disposal not merely the channels of 
diplomacy and the full support of the Government, 
but also the most powerful army in the world, ready 
to intimidate any presumptuous competitor, found 
opposed to it only the weak, individual initiative of 
a few groups, divided by internal dissensions. In 
many cases the Germans readily found influential 
personages abroad, who, in order to secure the co- 
operation of foreign capital, were willing to assist 
the invaders. In no country was this more true than 
in Italy. 

Bound by the ties of their alliance with Germany, 
the Italians readily welcomed the Germans. Anxious 
to learn the methods and means of acquiring an in- 
crease in their material well-being, they guilelessly 
placed their resources at the disposal of their allies 
for exploitation along German lines. The country 
was new, the people, inspired by their successful 
struggle for national unity to attempt greater things, 
were ready to follow the German lead. A certain 
affinity of spirit, and the similarity of the recent his- 
torical development of the two nations, led the more 



190 GREATER ITALY 

intellectual classes in Italy, who were coming more 
and more under Germanic influence, to look favourably 
on the increasing number of Germans, who now flocked 
to Italy to take up positions of trust, as directors, 
managers, and superintendents in the newly estab- 
lished factories which were everywhere springing up. 
The Germans brought with them to Italy a feehng 
of contempt for the Italian people, and, while exploit- 
ing the excellent and cheap labour which everywhere 
abounded, in the successful development of their 
enterprises, they remained faithful to their German 
allegiance. It cannot be gainsaid that, during the 
early years of German penetration in Italy, their 
presence was of immense material benefit to the coun- 
try. Initiated into the secrets of German methods of 
industry, trade, and commerce, the country flourished. 
It was not, however, until after the estabHshment 
of the Banca Commerciale, in 1895, that the German 
plan for the economic conquest of Italy was seriously 
undertaken. The moment was opportune. The 
bold colonial enterprise, which Italy had so enthu- 
siastically begun, had collapsed; a period of strikes 
and internal dissensions was beginning. PubHc credit 
was at a low ebb; the confidence of the people in their 
financial institutions and government was shaken; 
the antagonism of France was more virulent than it 
had been for some years past. It was at this juncture 
that the Pan-Germans turned their attention to 
Italy. They now realised that Italy, notwithstand- 
ing recent failures, had the possibility of developing 
into a great industrial State. Though still largely 
given to agriculture, Italy, with her abundant supply 
of labour, the cheapest in Western Europe, and at the 



ITALY AND GERMANY 191 

same time the most frugal, hard-working, and adapt- 
able, might, if not held in check, at no distant date 
rival Germany herself in the markets of the world. 
It thus came about that when Crispi called upon 
Germany for financial assistance, the Germans, 
officially encouraged by their Government, founded 
a bank in co-operation with Italian capital, at Milan, 
with a capital stock of only 5,000,000 hre (£200,000). 
Here, ready to hand, the Germans were soon to have 
the means of directing and dominating not merely 
the economic, but even the poHtical life of Italy, in 
the interests of Germany. Such was the Banca Com- 
mercial, which by degrees increased its capital until 
it reached the total of 150,000,000 lire (£6,000,000), 
and had an annual overturn of 800,000,000 lire (£32,- 
000,000). Throughout the years of its growth this 
banking institution was ruled over by three Ger- 
mans.^ It is furthermore astonishing to note that, 
notwithstanding the fact that this bank, which soon 
became the leading financial institution in Italy 
and was in a position to control the economic life of 
the country, though it had long since passed from 
German ownership, so that at the outbreak of the 
European War only 3,000,000 lire (£120,000) of the 
capital stock remained in German hands, its policy 
was directed from Berlin and its power made use of 
in Pan-German interests. 

It was not long after the establishment of this bank 
that it succeeded in gaining control of the chief in- 
dustrial and commercial enterprises in Italy. The 

^ C/. G. Preziosi: "La Germania alia Conquista dell' Italia," Firenze, 
1916, p. 62. This volume sheds an interesting light oa the question of 
German penetration in Italy. 



192 GREATER ITALY 

number of the joint stock companies in Italy is stated 
to be 793, with a capital of 3,898,174,049 Hre^ (£155,- 
926,961). By skilful manipulation, the Commerciale 
has been able to control this vast capital, and thus 
the economic Kfe of Italy. The favourite device to 
secure voting control was to offer a small sum for 
the privilege of representing the stock of individual 
holders in the directors' meetings. The shares were 
deposited with the bank for the time being, and the 
bank was authorised to represent its owners. By 
this simple method, year in and year out, the bank 
was able at very trifling cost, to dominate secretly 
the economic hfe of the country. The enormous 
power which was at the disposal of this bank was 
made use of to favour by all possible means the sale 
of German products, with a twofold object of keep- 
ing out of ItaUan markets products coming from 
other countries and of preventing any serious expan- 
sion of ItaHan industries. ^ It thus came about that 
great credit facihties were offered through the bank, 
both to German firms and to the ItaUan customers 
of German firms. Furthermore, when an ItaHan firm 
was in the need of new machinery or other materials, 
should it dare seek to obtain them in the open market, 
a strong "recommendation" from the bank would 
almost invariably be received, urging it to choose a 
German product, purchased from a German firm or 
one bound up with German interests, otherwise it 
would find its credit cut off, and would soon be ruined. 
By means of a slowly and carefully woven web of in- 
terests, within comparatively few years, the Commer- 
ciale gained control of the chief industries of Italy; 
1 Op. cit., p. 75. 2 Ibidem, p. 77. 



ITALY AND GERMANY 193 

steel plants, machine-shops, ship-building yards, ship- 
ping companies, power plants, armament firms, all 
passed under German control and were exploited in 
German interests. The steel plants at Terni, the 
Vickers Arms factory at Spezia, the smelters at Savona 
and at Elba, the Italian Lloyd, the General Naviga- 
tion Company, as well as many of the other more im- 
portant industries of Italy, it is alleged came under 
German domination. Slowly the grip tightened until, 
towards the end of the first decade of the present 
century, Germany had succeeded in gaining a strangle- 
hold at the throat of Italy. 

The German invasion was so insidiously carried 
on that the majority of the ItaUans did not even 
reaKse its existence. Its growth was facihtated by 
the fact that the leading men of Italy, both in poht- 
ical and commercial spheres, had been brought up to 
admire Germany and all things German. The great 
and ever-increasing prosperity of the country was 
ascribed to German co-operation, and few were in a 
position to know the full extent of German penetra- 
tion. Few knew that the greater part of the Itahan 
merchant marine was in German hands. Though the 
Italian flag flew over the ships, the poHcy of the com- 
panies was controlled by the Banca Commerciale, 
and the bank saw to it that its numberless employees 
and agents pursued a pohcy which was distinctly 
Germanophil. And so it was with the steel and iron 
industries, which the bank dominated. More dan- 
gerous to the vital strength of Italy was the German 
control exercised over the electric-power plants. Re- 
cent development of electrical energy in Italy has 
been very marked. Those controUing its supply and 



194 GREATER ITALY 

distribution have in their hands a source whence 
they can derive secret information concerning the 
most intimate particulars of any given district. The 
engineers and employees of electric light and power 
companies must, in the course of their business, be 
admitted everywhere. Arsenals and factories, private 
homes and ministries, staff colleges and fortresses, 
all are thrown open to the electrician. The ease with 
which intelHgent espionage can thus be carried out, 
unobserved, can be readily understood. Yet, not- 
withstanding the peril of intrusting the control of 
this most vital interest to foreigners, in Italy in the 
province of Venetia, bordering along the Austrian 
frontier, 99 per cent of the electrical horse-power 
was in German hands.^ 

The hold exerted by Germany over the economic 
life of Italy soon led to active interference in the polit- 
ical life of the country. In carrying on its campaign 
of penetration, the Press was from the outset the most 
essential means used to influence public opinion. 
Thus certain important Italian daily newspapers 
were subventioned to act in the interests of the Com- 
merciale and to proclaim the superiority of German 
methods and German goods. 

"The method of the Commerciale is in the main 
always the same; each one of the corporations con- 
trolled by the bank is compelled to subscribe to a 
definite share of the capital stock of a given news- 
paper or periodical. The journals, moreover, are in 
receipt of subsidies of various kinds, generally in the 

1 Op. cit., p. 118. Out of a total of 74,800,000 lire (£2,992,000) in- 
vested in electrical enterprises in Venetia, 72,000,000 lire (£2,880,000) 
was in German hands. 



ITALY AND GERMANY 195 

form of advertising contracts and advertisements of 
the industries which are estabHshed in the region 
where they are pubhshed and circulated. . . . Cer- 
tain industries have their own journals. It is beyond 
doubt that a goodly part of the daily and periodical 
Press, technical as well as political, whether of large 
or small circulation, without distinction as regards 
poUtical affiliation, obeys the mandates of the Com- 
merciale, which are those of German policy. It is 
thus that a great share of the Italian Press, by means 
of biased leaders, or news articles, by reports or ac- 
counts apparently dealing with technical matters, 
by telegrams, sensational despatches, parliamentary 
reports, and local comments, in brief by means of all 
those elements which constitute the spirit and policy 
of a newspaper, is enlisted in the service of this non- 
ItaUan Bank, to create public opinion, propagate 
its ideas, and mould the thoughts of the people." 
("La Germania alia Conquista dell'Italia," p. 130.) 
Fm-ther than this, with multifarious ramifications 
stretching in every corner of the peninsula, the in- 
fluence of the bank could make itself potently felt. 
It was no very difficult matter to materially assist 
the candidacy of a Deputy who was favoiu-able to the 
German interests of the Commerciale in Italy. 

Not content with taking an active part in internal 
pontics, the bank now interfered in Italy's foreign 
relations. It would not seem doubtful that, acting 
on instructions received from Berlin, the bank exerted 
every influence to prevent the Italo-Turkish War, 
and when this was no longer possible, pressure was 
brought to bear to bring the campaign to a speedy 
conclusion, and save Turkish susceptibilities. Unable 



196 GREATER ITALY 

to prevent the war, the German 'interests" were, 
however, able to negotiate the terms of peace. Two 
of the three delegates who negotiated the Treaty of 
Lausanne were closely identified with the bank. 

It has been suggested that the dictatorship of Gio- 
litti was alone made possible by the fact that he was 
supported by this Pan-German institution. What- 
ever the truth of the matter may be, it would seem 
that during the latter years of his administration 
Giolitti entered into close relations with the bank. 
The concession of AdaHa in Asia Minor, granted to 
Italy in 1913, was turned over to the Commerciale. 
The establishment of the Bank of Albania was, in 
so far as it concerned its Italian share, intrusted to 
this same institution. Several men, closely allied to 
the bank, were appointed Senators by Giolitti,^ and 
other proofs have been brought forward to show that 
Giolitti and the Banca Commerciale held Italy in 
subjection bordering on political and economic slavery. 
Writing of the condition of Italy as the result of the 
manoeuvres of this Pan-German institution, M. Preziosi 
declares : 

"The great calamity of Italy is that this bank not 
only controls the navigation companies, the metal- 
lurgical and manufacturing industries, but likewise 
the greater part, if not all, the industrial enterprises 
which speciahse in the manufacture of armaments. 
This explains not only the power of the bank, but also 
its poUcy. The Commerciale, controlling such an 
enormous and formidable mass of interests, exercises 
an almost overpowering influence on our political life 
and public opinion. Many of our so-called leading 
lawyers, numberless engineers, manufacturers, sena- 

1 Ov. cit., p. 145. 



ITALY AND GERMANY 197 

tors, deputies, statesmen, officers of the army and of 
the navy, members of the clergy, etc., obey its com- 
mands. The Banca Commerciale had its candidate 
for the premiership "in reserve," and there was a 
moment in which this candidacy nearly triumphed. 
The influence which the bank exercises is vast, and is 
increasing continuously. Newspapers great and small 
in the capitals and in the provinces, smaller banks, 
stock companies held in leash — these are means by 
which the Commerciale dominates and directs the 
life of Italy."! 

It is one of the most curious phenomena of Ger- 
man penetration in Italy that it rallied to its sup- 
port many sincere and ardent partisans among the 
upper and more intelhgent classes of the country, 
unsoUcited. The causes of this trend must be sought 
in the temper of our times. For the past sixty years, 
economic development has been the sole objective 
of Western civilisation. The unbridled exploitation 
wliich would turn man into an automaton, and 
make him an adjunct of a machine, has been the 
result of the frenzy for efficiency and organisation, 
inaugurated by Germany. The megalomania of 
Germany, the triumphant struggle for commercial 
and industrial expansion, for the conquest of world 
markets, the dreams of world dominion, the Pan- 
German programmes of world hegemony awakened 
in the minds of the Italians profound and unbounded 
admiration. Whether they saw mirrored in German 
aims and German ambitions their own longings is 
not easily determined; whether by an atavism which 
hearkened back through the ages to the times of 
Imperial Rome, they sought to conceive a future Im- 

1 Op. cit., p. 86. 



198 GREATER ITALY 

perial Italy, ruling again both shores of the Mediter- 
ranean, the sober fact remains that the bond which 
united Italy with Germany was the source of exulta- 
tion and pride. It was not the men who concluded 
the Triple AlHance, but their successors twenty or even 
thirty years later, the Italians of to-day, who, before 
the European War broke out, were the most enthusi- 
astic Germanophiles. During the present century Ger- 
many, in the eyes of the people of Italy, has stood forth 
as the embodiment of all the essential characteristics 
by which world power is achieved. Blinded by the 
glare of the shining armour of Germany, by the dis- 
ciphne of her regiments, the efficiency of her military 
organisation, by the amazing piles of statistical tables 
which computed by hundreds of thousands and mil- 
lions the increase in her population, the expansion of 
her commerce, the production of her industries, the 
accumulation of her wealth, Italy stood bewildered 
at the thought that she would perhaps share this 
power, enjoy this wealth and prosperity. So that 
within recent years all Italy, save a few isolated groups, 
had become frankly Germanophil. Socialists, con- 
servatives and nationalists, freethinkers and clericals, 
university professors, scientists and philosophers, art- 
ists and musicians, the nobility and the middle 
classes, all joined in a public profession of faith, in a 
hymn of praise to this new deity, '^ Germany." Hand 
in hand with this untrammelled ^'Germanism" there 
was a growing, contemptuous disregard for France, 
owing in part to the German trumpetings of French 
decadence, wjiich resounded broadcast throughout 
Italy; while the conviction that Great Britain was 
being rapidly driven out of the world's markets, and 



ITALY AND GERMANY 199 

was no longer in a position to compete with Germany, 
was daily gaining headway. 

It is interesting in looking-for the immediate pal- 
pable causes of this astonishing ^'Germanophilism" 
to note the part played by the German Emperor, 
William II. We are still in too close propinquity to 
the conditions under discussion to gain a clear-cut 
perspective of events, but it would seem beyond ques- 
tion that the influence of William II was preponderant 
in bringing about this pro-German intoxication. Not 
a year passed without repeated visits of the Hohen- 
zoUern Emperor to Italy. Now it was Venice, then 
Brindisi, now Rome or Naples, or Palermo which 
caught a gHmpse of the Imperial presence, in ghtter- 
ing state and glory. Not once or twice, but again 
and again Wilham II came on one pretext or another. 
Now, he appeared in Rome, and presented to the 
Imperial City a statue of Goethe, which was unveiled 
with much ceremony in the gardens of the Villa Bor- 
ghese. Then in the company of the King of Italy he 
visited the Abbey of Montecassino, a German monas- 
tery which was the centre of much valuable German 
propaganda; or again the Imperial yacht Hohenzollern 
cruised in SiciHan waters, or appeared suddenly amid 
the lagoons of Venice, and cast anchor close to St. 
Mark's. Whether these repeated visits to Italy were 
pure policy or predilection, is difficult to infer. In all 
probabiHty it was a combination of both. Thus during 
recent years while insidiously the chains of Itahan 
servitude were being forged, on the surface the cordial- 
ity, consideration, and friendship of the most power- 
ful monarch in the world, won for Germany many 
stanch and faithful adherents throughout Italy. It 



200 GREATER ITALY 

was not only the Emperor, but his most able and 
brilliant Chancellor, Prince Biilow, who sought to 
weave the Prussian spell over Italy. Retiring from 
the Chancellorship, he took up his residence in Rome, 
and soon succeeded in forming a pro-German coterie, 
which was made up of Italians more devoted to Ger- 
man than to ItaKan interests. And in the wake of 
the Emperor and the former Chancellor each year 
saw a more numerous tide of invasion of Germans of 
all classes. Italy has always been the land of promise 
for the peoples of the North. The Germans now came 
in droves as tourists. Many remained to take up 
their residence. They built hotels along the coast of 
Liguria; their villas dotted the hillsides of Rapallo 
and Capri, the Lido and Taormina. They opened 
small shops and large bazaars. German doctors 
established their sanatoria, and in their train came 
German patients, nurses, and chemists. In the region 
of the Lake of Garda, the Germans almost drove out 
the natives. In recent years German signs were 
everywhere to be seen along the lake side, and at the 
small stations around the lake the names of the towns 
were called out in the German language. German 
commercial travellers crossed Italy from one end of 
the country to the other, selling German wares. Ac- 
cording to statistics gathered in 1914, there were 
80,000 Germans permanently or semi-permanently 
resident in Italy, of whom 40,000 lived in Lombardy 
and Venetia. These same statistics showed only 
3,000 British and 4,000 French residents. To hasten 
the Germanisation of Italy, which was aheady making 
such rapid strides, other mediums were now openly 
made use of. The Prussian Historical Institute, which 



ITALY AND GERMANY 201 

had been founded in 1888 for the purpose of permit- 
ting German scholars to pursue their studies in the 
Vatican Archives, the German Archaeological Society 
(Jstituto Germanico in Campidoglio a Roma), where the 
study of art, science, and the humanities had hitherto 
been pursued in cloistered seclusion, now became focal 
centres, directing and propagating Pan-German doc- 
trines of Germanic world superiority and racial su- 
premacy. 

While the web of Pan-Germanism was thus being 
woven ever more intricately, and the upper classes 
in Italy had become thoroughly saturated with Ger- 
man ideas and ideals, the masses had remained rela- 
tively untouched by the alien taint. The prosperity 
which Italy was enjoying, the relatively high wages, 
and soHd benefits which the people were receiving, 
were their sole immediate interest. But when, after 
the outbreak of the European War, the Italian people 
became convinced that Germany was responsible for 
the war, when the stories of the violation of Belgium 
came to be known, the century-old hatred for the 
Germans, which had slumbered in the hearts of the 
masses since the days of the Guelphs and the Ghib- 
beUnes, burst forth. 

Italy, during the early weeks of the European War 
passed through long days of careful searching of heart, 
and awoke to the full realisation of her plight. She 
was no longer the master in her own home. The Ger- 
mans and the pro-Germans held the country bound 
and gagged. Though Germany was unable to force 
Italy into a war against her best interests — ^it has even 
been suggested that up to the last minute Berlin had 
assigned to Italy a role of most friendly and useful 



202 GREATER ITALY 

"neutrality," as best suited to Pan-German aims — 
she was able to confuse public opinion and scatter 
the seeds of distrust and perplexity throughout the 
peninsula. Among a small section of the upper classes 
the significance of the enormity of the situation dawned 
slowly. They soon became convinced that only a war 
could shake off the shackles of bondage, could arouse 
the national spirit of the people. But the masses 
were unanimously in favour of peace, and a ma- 
jority of the upper classes were still openly pro-Ger- 
man in their sympathies. Italy had been friendly 
to Germany ever since the days of the founding of 
the Kingdom; the Italians had trusted the Germans 
blindly; many still trusted, and the remainder feared 
Germany. The Italians had learned thoroughly from 
their German masters the lessons of ruthless reahsm 
in pohtics. The most enthusiastic pro-Germans in 
Italy could not consistently oppose the putting into 
practice at this opportune moment of those principles 
and methods of world pohtics which Germany had 
taught so forcefully. 

Though Italy was bound by ties of alhance with 
Austria, the alliance was regarded openly by the 
most fervid "Triplists" as merely as an opportunist 
arrangement. It had been imposed on Italy in the 
days of Italy's weakness. The European War had 
suddenly placed Italy in a position of mastery towards 
Austria. The national aspirations of the ItaHan people 
had long been held in check, and these must now be 
reahsed. Applying the German lessons of RealpoUtik 
to her own case, Italy must seize this opportunity to 
satisfy her vital interests. With the bulk of the Aus- 
trian forces engaged in a lif e-and-death struggle against 



ITALY AND GERMANY 203 

Russia, the moment had arrived for Italy to strike. 
Here was a stepping-stone to world power. And so 
the weapons which Germany had placed in Italian 
hands were to be tm'ned against her. The economic 
development of the country, which had been of Ger- 
man origin and had been carried on in German in- 
terests, had rendered the Italians strong and confident; 
now the Pan-German doctrines of ruthless aggression 
which had been so assertively reiterated, were to be 
made use of to stab Germany to the heart. Such 
was the tragedy which was to be enacted. 

But Germany still felt confident in her abihty to 
hold Italy pinioned to the ground. Italy grew more 
restive as the months passed, and the speedy con- 
clusion of a victorious war, so often proclaimed by 
Germany, was again and again postponed. The moral 
forces of the Italian people began to gather strength. 
Defections from the pro-German ranks, among the 
younger, more intelligent and aggressive Italians, grew 
daily more numerous. 

The conduct of foreign affairs had been intrusted 
to Baron Sonnino, a man imbued with German doc- 
trines and a chief protagonist of the Triple Alliance, 
who now saw clearly that the best interests of Italy 
demanded that the chains of this alliance be severed. 
WilHam II thereupon sent his most skilled emissary. 
Prince Biilow, to Rome. On his arrival he conducted 
himself in the manner of a Proconsul in conquered 
territory. He mobihsed the Pan-German organisa- 
tion, so patiently perfected in times of peace. The 
mission of Prince Biilow was to impose upon Italy a 
poUcy of continued neutrality. The Banca Com- 
merciale, the Vatican, and Giolitti became the chief 



204 GREATER ITALY 

auxiliaries of his efforts. His obstruction was for a 
time successful. Italy, bewildered by the strength 
and resource of the Germans, hesitated to pursue an 
independent policy. German gold and German threats 
for a time held the country in leash. To appease the 
more aggressive elements, the German envoy offered 
Italy territorial compensations at the expense of Aus- 
tria, and endeavoured to direct Italian attention 
towards Tunis, Corsica, and Malta. But the Italians 
were not to be deceived by these machinations. They 
had been thoroughly initiated into the secrets of 
German methods. They understood fully German 
deductive processes and the mechanism of Pan- 
Germanic procedure. They knew that the liberty 
and independence of Italy could only be regained by 
the defeat of Germany. They now understood clearly 
that it would be of no value to Italy to have her flag 
float over the Trentino and Trieste, if the German 
flag flew at Tangier, or the Austrian over Salonika. 

Nevertheless, Italy proceeded with caution. The 
bitter lessons of "isolation" had taught her to weigh 
her policy step by step. A storm of moral conversion 
was sweeping over the land. Dull rumblings, like 
those of some great volcano ready to erupt, shook 
the peninsula. The Germans redoubled their zeal. 
The pressure of Prince Billow's ''diplomacy" in- 
creased in violence and brutality. Then when he per- 
ceived that his efforts were doomed to failure, the 
Germans made frantic efTorts to retain for them- 
selves at least a portion of their former dominance. 
In this they were in part successful. The rupture of 
diplomatic relations between Italy and Germany at 
the outbreak of the Austro-Italian War was preceded 



ITALY AND GERMANY 205 

by the negotiation of a treaty which was to safeguard 
German economic interests in Italy. In return for 
certain privileges granted to Italians who had long 
been resident in Germany, more especially by an ar- 
rangement by which Germany agreed to pay the 
pensions due to Italian workmen who were Uving or 
had hved in Germany, Italy consented not to sequester 
property belonging to Germans in the peninsula. By 
this agreement Germany had protected over £150,- 
000,000 worth of property, owned by Germans in 
Italy, and in return was to continue the payments to 
Italians, amounting to about £200,000 annually. 

This arrangement was at the time interpreted in 
the nature of a "reinsurance" treaty. Whether 
Italian politicians, uncertain of the temper of the 
Italian people, wished to safeguard themselves in so 
far as possible, or whether as seems more likely, the 
Italian Ambassador at Berlin who was known to be 
distinctly pro-German, was able to influence his 
Govermnent to accede to the German proposal, the 
treaty was hailed by the Germans as a sign that their 
hold over Italy had not been broken. It would be 
useless to contend that in a few months the work of 
three decades can be wiped out. The roots of Pan- 
Germanism have struck deep in Italy. The process 
of uprooting must of necessity be slow if it is to be 
thorough. Thus Italy waged war on the ally of Ger- 
many for over a year, before the pressure of events 
from abroad forced her to declare war on Germany. 
But during that time the process of purification had 
continued. The majority of the pro-Germans have 
been weaned from their former allegiance, and the 
work of national redemption continues. 



206 GREATER ITALY 

What the relations of Italy and Germany will be 
in the future can only be surmised. The Italians, 
whether they willed it or not, have accepted many 
German poUtical precepts. The political and econ- 
omic life of Italy during the past twenty years has 
not been conducive to bringing forth the type of 
statesman or financier who could lead the country 
boldly into the safe channels of national emancipa- 
tion. Whatever the course of the relations between 
Italy and^Germany may be in the future, the legend of 
German superiority and invincibility has been shat- 
tered. If cordial intercourse with Germany is re- 
sumed by Italy more rapidly than by the other Powers, 
it will be on the terms of perfect equality, in pur- 
suance of a policy of self-interest. Italy would seem 
to have taken firmly into her own hands the conduct 
of her affairs. The German has been driven out of 
Italy; the vigilance of the Italian people can be re- 
lied upon to see to it that he will not be permitted to 
return. 



CHAPTER X 

THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 

Relations with Austria. The Need of Hegemony. 
Italians and Slavs 

Italy, on entering the Triple Alliance, had ar- 
bitrarily sacrificed her interests in the Adriatic in 
order to safeguard what she believed to be her more 
vital interests in the Mediterranean. When, by her 
increased strength and subsequent agreements with 
Great Britain, these interests were protected, the 
Itahans felt themselves at hberty to again turn their 
eyes eastward and take up the threads of their plans 
to secure the control of the Adriatic. 

Among the varied imperiahst ambitions which 
have been fanned to flame by the growth of na- 
tionahsm during recent years, the one most Ukely 
to cause unending difficulties to those upon whom it 
will be incumbent to rearrange the map of Europe, 
will be the allotment of the lands bordering the East- 
ern Adriatic. Whereas in other fields the issues are 
relatively well defined, and since the outbreak of the 
European War the struggle may be quahfied as 
German vs. French, German vs. British, German vs. 
Russian, none of the conflicts impinging but correla- 
tive; in the Adriatic a threefold struggle to the death 
is going on, which would appear likely to continue 
as a menace to the peace of Europe. Leaving out- 

207 



208 GREATER ITALY 

side of immediate consideration Germany's interest in 
the affairs of the Adriatic, which is chiefly an out- 
growth of the Pan-Germanic movement, and as such 
essentially alien to the Adriatic, the grave danger 
lies in the fact that the conflict here is one of ethnic 
imperiaHsm — Itahan and Slav. The Adriatic has 
become the scene of a struggle where these opposing 
influences, both equally strong and equally deter- 
mined to resist a outrance any intrusion of the other, 
stand face to face. The Italians are striving to re- 
gain their ancient prestige in the Adriatic, to redeem 
their irredente provinces, and once again extend the 
sway of Rome eastward. The Jugo-Slavs, after 
centuries of oppression in turn by the Turks and the 
Austrians, when finally they shall have thrown off 
the yoke of the latter, are eager to realise their na- 
tional independence. 

Looking at a map of the Adriatic, it would appear 
at first sight as though Italy and the Dual Monarchy 
held respectively an equal share of the littoral. But 
a brief study of the topographical configuration of 
these regions will at once reveal the inferiority of 
Italy's share. The Italian coast-line is, from one end 
of Italy to the other, a slow-sloping, sandy beach land, 
affording few harbours, none of which are of strategic 
value, whereas the opposite shore, held by Austria- 
Hungary, is a rocky coastland, dotted with over 600 
islands, containing some of the finest natural har- 
bours in the world, such as Cattaro and Sebenico, 
affording a preponderant strategic advantage to the 
country possessing them. With the Austrian navy- 
able to protect itself behind these natural ramparts, 
leaving the Italian coast-line exposed and vulnerable, 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 209 

it can readily be understood that Italy felt herself 
threatened as long as Austria should remain, or any 
other power succeeding to the Austrian heritage 
should be permitted to become established along the 
Adriatic. This geographical inferiority of Italy was 
further emphasised by the fact that by the Con- 
gress of Berlin in 1878, Austria was intrusted with 
the police duties of the Montenegrin waters, which 
indirectly gave her commercial fleet a great impetus, 
so that within recent years Austrian ships (17,230) 
in the Adriatic outnumbered the Italian ten to one, 
while their total tonnage (605,551) was nearly twenty 
times as great. 

However, the Italians to-day hold the Adriatic 
to be an indivisible unit, whose domination must 
eventually again rest with Italy, if Italy is to survive 
as a great Power. According to a favourite Italian 
interpretation, and it cannot be denied that it is not 
altogether unjustified, geographically speaking, the nat- 
ural boundary of Italy lies beyond the shore-line of 
the Eastern Adriatic. Since earliest historic times this 
region has, with brief interregnums, been indissolubly 
linked with the West by the ties of Rome. A study of 
the map, so they claim, will indicate that it is not the 
Adriatic but the JuHan Alps, the Velebit Mountains, 
and the Dinaric Alps, towering along the coastal fringe 
of the Northern and Eastern Adriatic, which form the 
bulwark, which, according to the Italian thesis, is the 
natural boundary of Italy. Already as early as 177 
B. C. the Romans realised the necessity of acquiring 
the control of the lands beyond the Adriatic in order 
to insure the safety of the Italian peninsula, when in 
that year they conquered the territory of the North- 



210 GREATER ITALY 

eastern Adriatic, which is present-day Istria, and 
formed the province of Illyricum. Two centuries later 
under Augustus, Dalmatia was annexed to Illyria, 
and for centuries continued a flourishing Roman do- 
minion whose former splendour is testified to by the 
Palace of Diocletian at Spalato, and ruins at Zara 
and elsewhere. The Gothic invasions followed, and 
during the era of darkness of the Middle Ages, the 
lands of the Eastern Adriatic sank to a level of quasi- 
barbarism under Slavic dominion, from the sixth to 
the eleventh century. Then once again these regions 
passed into the hands of the ItaHans under the pro- 
tection of the Venetian Republic, to continue Italian 
with varying fortunes for eight centuries. 

In the heyday of the power of Venice, the Adriatic 
was a mare clausum); both its shores from Bari to 
Venice in the west, and from Trieste to Ragusa and 
Corfu in the east, were lined with thriving, wealthy 
cities, where ItaHan culture, language, and customs 
held undisputed sway. A people of more ancient and 
unquestionably superior culture, the Itahans who 
settled in the cities along the shores of the Eastern 
Adriatic concerned themselves Httle with the rural 
inhabitants, whether Croat, Slovene, Serb, or Albanian. 
Satisfied with a thin strip of coastland, they made 
no attempt to penetrate into the interior, nor to colonise 
in any real sense of the word, content with the trade 
and commerce of the littoral and the wealth gained 
thereby. As long as no competitor appeared in the 
field, the "ItaUanism" of the Eastern Adriatic re- 
tained its hold, long after the power of Venice had 
passed away and Austria had succeeded to the Vene- 
tian domain. When, in 1866, Venice was united with 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 211 

the Kingdom of Italy, Austria still retained the an- 
cient Venetian possessions of the Eastern Adriatic. 

Then out of the East, as an indirect result of the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the ever-rising tide of 
Pan-Slavism rolled across the Balkans. The Arch- 
duke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Hapsburg 
throne, seconded by his morganatic wife, the Countess 
Chotek, herself a Slav, who was devoted to the Slav 
cause in so far as it coincided with her personal ambi- 
tions, conceived a plan of uniting all the Jugo-Slav 
elements of southeastern Europe with the Czechs and 
Poles of the north, and making the Slavs the dom- 
inant factor in the Dual Monarchy. The increased 
strength of the Slavs thus channelled would, so the 
Archduke believed, rejuvenate the senile Hapsburg 
realm. Excluded by Prussia from participation in 
the affairs of Germany in 1866, and by Italy from 
those of the Italian peninsula in the same year, Aus- 
tria turned her eyes on the Balkans and fixed upon 
Salonika as the goal of her ambitions in the south, 
while all the intervening territory of the Balkans 
to the shores of the Adriatic, acquired by "penetra- 
tion" or conquest, was to round out this new pre- 
ponderately Slav-Hapsburg Empire. This programme 
had two chief antagonists — the free Serbs and the 
Itahans. The eHmination of Serbia was required to 
reach Salonika, while that of the irredente Italians 
was necessary to secure the hegemony of the Adriatic. 
To this latter task the Austrians first turned their 
attention. By favouring the Slav elements of the 
populations of the Adriatic, by encouraging them to 
persecute the Italians of their districts, at the same 
time placing every sort of hardship and difficulty 



212 GREATER ITALY 

in the path of these Italians, by arousing in the basest 
manner the race prejudice and hatred of the Jugo- 
slavs against the Italians, the future ruler of the 
Dual Monarchy hoped to accomplish his designs. 
He was zealously assisted in the undertaking by the 
Slav clergy, which has always lent itself willingly to 
any political design of the Hapsburgs. 

Up to the opening years of the present century 
Italy was too weak to give any material support to 
her nationals abroad, and Austria, under the tutelage 
of the Heir Apparent, with unabated fury strove to 
crush and extirpate the Italian population and in- 
fluence along the Eastern Adriatic. When, by 1903, 
Italy had strengthened her position as a World Power, 
and was able to lend a hand to her compatriots across 
the Adriatic, she set to work with great skill and en- 
ergy, not only to keep aHve the Italianism of such lo- 
calities as were of Italian character, but eager to gain 
a position of preponderant influence across the water 
and forestall the aims of Hapsburg expansion, she con- 
cerned herself with the affairs of Montenegro. This 
small Slav State, the outpost of Slav independence in 
the west, was bound to Italy by family ties, as Italy's 
Queen is the daughter of King Nicholas, at that time 
the ruling prince of Montenegro. The Italians had 
little difficulty in gaining a secure economic foothold 
here. Encouraged by this success, Italian agents 
became active in Albania. This country, then a semi- 
independent Turkish province, soon became a profit- 
able field for the extension of Italian influence. As 
the Albanians lived in a state of semi-mediseval feu- 
dalism — each man an arsenal, each village a fortress, 
without any real government — it was not difficult for 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 213 

Italy to find frequent pretexts for interfering in Al- 
banian affairs. The Italians established schools, 
newspapers, banks, etc., and carried on an extensive 
propaganda. It soon became evident that Italy would 
not tolerate that any other Power should become es- 
tablished in Albania at the dissolution of the Turkish 
Empire in Europe, which could not be long delayed. 
For, aside from the fact that Albania was a region 
wliich offered promising prospects of future develop- 
ment, the port of Avlona, situated opposite Brindisi 
across the narrow straits of Otranto, would, if held 
by a foreign Power, bottle Italy up in the Adriatic. 
As it had long been foreseen that Albania might be- 
come a casus belli between Austria and Italy, as early 
as 1897 a verbal agreement had been entered into 
between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Count Goluchowski, and the King of Italy, by which 
both parties agreed to refrain from acquiring any 
portion of Albania, though both agreed to favour the 
establishment of an autonomous Albania, in case 
Turkey should disappear from the Balkans. This 
agreement was in 1899 set down in writing and sub- 
sequently reaffirmed in 1905. However, Austria did 
not remain inactive in Albanian affairs. She feignedly 
espoused the cause of Albania independence, fostered 
the expansion of the Albanian language, combated 
Italian propaganda as well as Turkish suzerainty, 
and with the help of the Vatican, as the protector of 
the 220,000 Albanian Roman Catholics, succeeded in 
gaining a dominant position in the country. 

In 1906 the Austrian Imperialists, who were in the 
confidence of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, be- 
came impatient. They were anxious to make a trial 



214 GREATER ITALY 

of the new strength of the Hapsburg realm. The 
combined Grand Manoeuvres of the Austro-Hun- 
garian army and navy were in that year held in Dal- 
matia, which was intended as a threat towards Italy. 
This was followed by the appointment of General 
Conrad von Hotzendorf to the position of Chief of the 
Austrian General Staff. The appointment could not 
fail to arouse the apprehension of Italy, as General 
Conrad was known to have gained the confidence of 
Francis Ferdinand chiefly because of his violent hatred 
of Italy, and his reiterated memorials of the necessity 
of declaring war against Italy at the first opportunity. 
He even went so far as to outline in detail the plan 
of campaign. 

In October of the same year Baron von Aehrenthal 
was appointed Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
He was known to be a man of action who would push 
forward the plans of Hapsburg aggrandisement with 
utmost vigour. The era of Austrian expansion was 
thus inaugurated. The ensuing two years were busily 
employed by the new Foreign Minister, on the one hand 
in putting to sleep Italian suspicions regarding Aus- 
trian expansion along the Adriatic, which had been 
aroused by the acts above mentioned, and at the same 
time in paving the way for the realisation of the Arch- 
duke's plans. 

In how far Austria was directly responsible for the 
''Young Turk" revolution which broke out in July, 
1908, Hes beyond the scope of this work, but it was 
the spark which Ughted the trail of powder which 
crossed the Balkans from one end to the other. Three 
months afterwards, on October 5, came Count Aehren- 
thal's grand coup; the proclamation of the definitive 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 215 

annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Dual 
Monarchy. By this bold stroke 1,800,000 Slavs 
were added to the ranks of Hapsburg subjects. For 
a moment the peace of Europe hung in the balance. 
But the promise of German support to Austria im- 
mobihsed whatever desire Russia may have had to 
protect the Jugo-Slavs. 

Italy viewed with misgivings the reviving strength 
of the Dual Monarchy, and she felt her interests in 
the Adriatic now seriously endangered. Under the 
fostering hand of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand 
the Slavs of the Adriatic had prospered. They had 
already gained an overwhelming numerical superior- 
ity along the whole eastern littoral. In Dalmatia, 
out of a population of 645,000 inhabitants in 1910, 
96 per cent were Slavs (Serbo-Croats) and only 3 per 
cent ItaUans. Along the Croatian httoral the popu- 
lation is wholly Slav, with the exception of the city 
of Fiume with a population of 49,822, of whom ap- 
proximately one-half are Italians. In Istria of 403,- 
566 inhabitants two-thirds are Slavs, the remainder 
are Italian. Trieste itself, the chief centre of the 
Italianism of the Eastern Adriatic, was slowly giving 
way under the repeated onslaughts of the Slavs, and 
though in the city itself they maintained a majority 
(118,959 ItaHans, 60,074 Slavs), yet the Slavic pop- 
ulations were daily encroaching on the surrounding 
territory so that within two miles of the city only 
Slav villages and towns are to be found. In the prov- 
ince of Gorizia the Slavs have already gained com- 
plete numerical control with 155,275 Slovenes as 
against 90,119 Itahans. 

While the Archduke was busily engaged with his 



216 GREATER ITALY 

plans of eventually bringing all the Jugo-Slavs under 
Hapsburg hegemony, forces were at work which gave 
a new trend to events in the Eastern Adriatic. This 
is the Pan-Serb movement which, with independent 
Serbia as its kernel, supported and protected by Rus- 
sia and having enlisted the open sympathy of leading 
publicists and statesmen in France and Great Britain, 
was to rally the entire Jugo-Slav world to its standard. 
By arousing the latent nationalism among the Southern 
Slavs, Serbia hoped to unite these diverse elements 
of kindred race under her national leadership, as 
Prussia and Piedmont within their respective lands 
had done a half century before. The most active 
supporters of this movement were the Slavs of the 
Adriatic, chiefly Dalmatians who had tasted the 
first-fruits of liberty under the protecting hand of 
the Austrian Heir Apparent, and now wished to turn 
to their own advantage their acquired strength; while 
Russia saw in this new State the possibility of dominat- 
ing the Balkans, and France and England a tangible 
safeguard against the Austro-German Drang nach 
Osten. 

After the Pan-Serb Congress held in 1909 at Laibach, 
the capital of Carniola, the political ambitions of the 
Jugo-Slavs became a living factor in the affairs of the 
Adriatic. The creation of a great Slav State, under 
the hegemony of Serbia, stretching from the confines 
of Bulgaria to the eastern boundary of Venetia, in- 
cluding Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slavonia, Is- 
tria, Dalmatia, and Carniola and possibly Albania, 
with a population of over 12,000,000 people, kindred 
in race, language, and tradition; this is the programme 
which the Jugo-Slavs set for themselves. Of these, 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 217 

8,100,000 were under Hapsburg rule. This new State, 
if it should become a Jait accompli, controlling, as 
planned, the great ports of Trieste, Cattaro, Avlona, 
and Salonika, was held by the Italians to be a grave 
menace to their vital interests and its establishment 
must at all cost be combated. 

Though fact and fiction regarding the aims and 
plans of the Dual Monarchy are so closely inter- 
mingled, and the events of so recent origin as to 
preclude a thorough and dispassionate examination 
of the conflicting factors, it nevertheless is evident 
that as soon as the Pan-Serb programme above men- 
tioned was clearly formulated, as soon as the Aus- 
trians realised the potential strength of this new Slav 
movement, which they believed could count almost 
unreservedly on the full support of the Russian Em- 
pire, they threw themselves into the arms of their 
German allies, and the reins of independent leader- 
ship in foreign affairs virtually passed from Vienna 
to the Berlin Government. 

The position of Italy, bound by the Triple Al- 
liance, was perplexing. Though the leading Italian 
statesmen were all loyal supporters of the Triple Al- 
liance, they began to realise that Italy would, sooner 
or later, be confronted by a coalition of Austro-Ger- 
man interests in the Adriatic, bent on destroying 
Italian prestige and influence along its eastern lit- 
toral, while on the other hand, the peril of a Slav em- 
.pire, confronting them across the narrow waters, was 
an altogether unpleasant alternative. 

Inspired by confidence in Austria's new, closely 
knit relations with Germany which materially weak- 
ened the Russian menace, the Archduke continued 



218 GREATER ITALY 

with redoubled zeal his policy of favouring the Slavs 
and persecuting the Italians. The most influential 
Viennese personages made no secret of the fact that 
they believed that in the Adriatic, Austria, as in- 
heritor of the domains of Venice, alone had the right 
to dominate this body of water, and that at the first 
favourable opportunity Austria would assert her in- 
aUenable rights. To be in a position to do so she in- 
creased the size and efficiency of her navy. Two of 
the most faithful servants of the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand were despatched to the Adriatic littoral to 
stamp out the last embers of Italian national spirit 
which still lingered there — the Prince Hohenlohe as 
Governor of Trieste and the Count Wickenburg to 
Fiume. They rivalled one another in their zeal in 
crushing the Italian elements of their respective dis- 
tricts, and made no attempt to disguise their efforts, 
while they fostered the loyalty of the Slavs for the 
Hapsburgs, which was still strong, by ever more blat- 
ant cajolery and favoritism. 

The problem of the Adriatic now entered upon a new 
phase. Under the stress of the anger aroused in Italy 
by these events, the irredentist movement there, 
which had long been dormant, or at least had taken 
on the form of a literary, rather than a political, move- 
ment, again burst forth. Early in 1909 Gabriel d'An- 
nunzio, entering for the first time the arena of national 
political discussion in which he was to play so de- 
cisive a part later on, published his poem ''La Nave," 
and referred therein to the ''most bitter waters of the 
Adriatic," hinting clearly that the time had come for 
Italy to assert herself in the Adriatic if the eastern 
shorelands were not to be irretrievably lost. Though 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 219 

in popular opinion the sufferings of the unredeemed 
Italians aroused the ire of the people of Italy, and 
revived acutely the vexed irredente question, yet 
many of the more intelligent Italians foresaw that 
the orientation of events portended a clash of forces 
in the Adriatic and the Near East, which would in- 
volve all the nations of Europe and that Italy, owing 
to her peculiar position, must be strong enough to 
defend her vital interests. 

The Slav ambitions in the Adriatic must hence- 
forth be considered independently from the Austrian, 
while the Pan-German aims now demand brief at- 
tention. 

If one should attempt to trace back to its source 
the interference of Prussia in the affairs of the Adriatic, 
no more significant document could be produced than 
the copy of a letter from the Prussian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs which Count Brassier de St. Simon, the 
Prussian Minister at Turin, left with Count Cavour 
in December, 1860. It throws an illuminating light 
on Prussian sentiment at this early date. Though 
conditions have altered materially, and Trieste is no 
longer within the boundaries of the '^ Germanic Con- 
federation," Prussian and Pan-German sentiments 
have in nowise changed. 

''To Count Brassier de Saint-Simon, Turin. 

"BerUn, 24/12, 1860. 
"My Dear Count: 

"It is only a few days since we have knowledge of 
a decree, dated November 8, and published in the 
official gazette, II Corriere delle Marche, according 
to which the Commissioner Extraordinary of H. M. 
the King of Sardinia in the Marches, M. Lorenzo 



220 GREATER ITALY 

Valerio, confirms in the name of his Sovereign all the 
privileges which the Papal Government has granted 
to the Austrian Lloyd. If we had not been unaware 
of the existence of this document up to the present 
time we would not have failed to call the attention 
of Count Cavour sooner to two passages which it 
contains, and which were for us the cause of acute 
and painful surprise. M. Lorenzo Valerio in the 
preamble of his above mentioned decree asserts among 
other things that the company known under the 
name of Austrian Lloyd, does not belong to the Power 
whose name it bears. I must confess that it has 
been impossible for me to follow the arguments on 
the strength of which M. Lorenzo Valerio arrived at 
the conclusion of his strange assertion, though I do 
not hesitate to declare that in our eyes the Austrian 
Lloyd, a company whose head offices are located in 
the German city of Trieste {la ville allemande de 
Trieste), is in truth an Austrian company. M. Valerio 
furthermore expresses the opinion that Trieste is 
not a German city, and that it is only by duress that 
the treaties have incorporated it in Germany. He 
also affirms that the city of Trieste has given unequiv- 
ocal proofs that she considers herself as belonging to 
Italy and not to Germany. I do not know on what 
facts M. Valerio rehes for accusing the city of Trieste 
of manifestations which, from our point of view, 
would have to be quahfied as treason against our 
common country. However, we must vigorously 
protest against the conclusion which M. Valerio has 
evidently drawn based on facts to which he refers 
without knowing them. Prussia has refrained from 
interfering up to the present in all the disturbances 
which have arisen in the Peninsula recently. But 
she has always reserved for herself the right to object 
in case the Italian movement developed so as to no 
longer respect the German frontiers, as delineated by 
treaties, which frontiers by virtue of these same treaties 
Prussia is obliged to defend. But it is evident that 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 221 

the decree of M. Lorenzo Valerio raises pretensions 
altogether incompatible with the rights of the Ger- 
manic Confederation. I do not doubt that Count 
Cavour disapproves wholly of the language of M. 
Valerio. But inasmuch as this official has spoken in 
the name of His Majesty King Victor Emmanuel, we 
would fail to fulfil our duty if we passed over in silence 
an incident which must necessarily worry Germany 
regarding the ultimate aim of the Italian movement. 
By order of His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent, I 
request you to ask the President of the Council: (1) 
Whether the Commissioner Extraordinary in the 
Marches really spoke in the name of his Sovereign 
as the text of the decree announces, and if he ex- 
pressed the opinion of his Government regarding the 
Austrian Lloyd and the city of Trieste. (2) Whether 
if this is not the case, M. Valerio has been admonished. 
Requesting you to advise me as soon as possible of 
the answer of Count Cavour, I authorise you to leave 
with him, if he so desires, a copy of the present 
despatch.^ 

"Kindly accept, etc., etc. 

" SCHLEINITZ." 

After the creation of the German Empire, Bismarck 
never failed to impress upon Italy that Germany 
would not tolerate that Trieste should fall into the 
hands of the Italians. Repeated efforts were made 
to encourage and increase German prestige in Trieste 
and other cities of the northern Adriatic. For two 
decades every effort was made by the German ele- 
ments of Vienna, at the instigation of the Germans 
of Germany, to establish a flourishing German colony 
in these regions. But the attempts were only par- 
tially successful. Many of the descendants of these 

^ Chiala: "Lettere edite e inedite di Camillo Cavour," Vol. TV. 



222 GREATER ITALY 

German "colonists" became assimilated with the 
Italian elements of the community, and soon joined 
the ranks of the most ardent irredentists. Those few 
who remained steadfast to their German allegiance 
formed the nucleus of a group of wealthy industrial 
and commercial firms whose affiliations with Germany 
rendered them influential, though numerically insig- 
nificant.^ 

When, early in the present century, Germany had 
created for herself a dominant position in Asia Minor, 
and, by the so-called "trust of thrones" had woven 
a web of Germanophil sovereigns over all the Balkan 
States, with the exception of Serbia, and was thus 
artfully paving the way for the realisation of Hohen- 
zollern hegemony from Berlin to Bagdad, it became 
evident that Trieste had been selected as the south- 
western outlet of the great Central European State 
which the Pan-German Imperialists had set about to 
create. The Adriatic was the shortest water route 
from the German hinterland to the Mediterranean, 
while the domination of the shores of the Eastern 
Adriatic, as well as the road to Salonika, by the docile 
Hapsburgs, seemed from the German point of view the 
best solution of the difficult problem of ruling the 
Jugo -Slavs. These plans were being matured with 
all the patience and skill with which the Germans 
enter upon any enterprise, and, with the puissant 
resources that they were able to command, would, if 
realised, not only destroy the prosperity of the in- 

^ Wickham Steed, in hia brilliant study of the "Hapsburg Monarchy" 
(p. 275), remarks that'the German, " Drang nach Triest has always been 
and remains a much more positive and practical factor of European 
politics than the Austro-Hungarian Drang nach Osten, or the dream 
of a ' March to Salonika.' " 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 223 

dustrial and economic life which the ItaHans were 
laboriously building up, as well as their markets in 
the Mediterranean, but would thwart for all time 
Italian ambitions across the Adriatic. 

In order to protect herself against this imminent 
Austro-German peril, Italy now chose to pursue a 
policy of rapprochement with Russia, and indirectly 
with the Jugo-Slavs. The visit of the Tsar to the 
King of Italy at Racconigi in October, 1909, had 
inaugurated an era of friendliness between Rome 
and Petrograd which it was easy to cultivate. Though 
this policy must be judged as purely opportunist, 
yet it served its purpose in that it acted as a timely 
warning to Austria of the possibiUty of a joint action 
on the part of the Serbs and their Russian protectors, 
together with the ItaHans. This eventuality alone, 
it is believed, prevented the Austrians from attacking 
Italy when the latter was engaged in her Tripohtan 
campaign against Turkey (1911). Though the Arch- 
duke Francis Ferdinand paraded his belhcose inten- 
tions by a showy inspection of the Austrian fortifica- 
tions in the Trentino, he became convinced that the 
setthng of accounts with Serbia was a more urgent 
problem, which must be carried through before at- 
tacking Italy. For the programme of a '^Greater 
Serbia" was now assuming in Austrian eyes alarming 
proportions. Russian interest in Balkan affairs had 
become insistently active. A recrudescence of na- 
tionaHst enthusiasm incited by Russia began to assert 
itself. The Balkan peoples, in their eagerness to oust 
the Turk from the peninsula, forgot, for the time 
being, their differences and united in a common ac- 
tion. Then came the first Balkan War in the autumn 



224 GREATER ITALY 

of 1912. Through the machinations of Vienna, the 
Serbs, who had borne the brunt of the conflict, were 
deprived of the fruits of their victorious campaign. 
Their moral prestige, however, had grown in stature, 
so as to become a real rather than a fancied menace 
to Hapsburg interests within the boundaries of the 
monarchy. The second Balkan War (1913), when 
Bulgaria fell upon her former allies, unleashed in all 
probabihty as the result of intrigues to which the en- 
tourage of the Austrian Heir Apparent was not alien, 
was to crush the growing power of the Serbs. Serbia, 
however, was again victorious, though she achieved 
no tangible benefits, and still found herself without 
an outlet to the sea. 

The repercussion of these events along the Eastern 
Adriatic was violent. The epic campaigns of the Serbs 
had fired the imagination of the Pan-Serbs, who be- 
Heved that their deliverance was at hand. Albania, 
freed from the Turkish yoke, was erected into an in- 
dependent kingdom by the London Conference in 
December, 1912. Italy sanctioned the candidature 
of Prince William of Wied as the ruler of the new king- 
dom, beheving it to be to her best interests to create 
an independent Albania, even though weakly gov- 
erned, and thus remove this vital segment of the 
Adriatic coastland from the field of expansion of either 
Hapsburg or Serb. 

Events now matured rapidly. The Jugo-Slav 
populations of the Dual Monarchy had become in- 
creasingly restive, and the Pan-Serb propaganda 
was daily gaining in strength. In order to forestall 
a Jugo-Slav revolution, which many Austrians feared 
would break out within the boundaries of the Mon- 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 225 

archy, the Vienna Government, at the instigation of 
the Archduke, determined to strike a blow at the root 
of the Serb agitation, and by subjugating Serbia put 
an end to the dreams of the Pan-Serbs. The stage- 
setting for this coup de main was similar to that in 
the episode of the annexation of Bosnia. The meeting 
of the German Emperor and the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand at Konopischt,^ in early June, 1914, seems 
to indicate that the Austrian Heir Apparent there laid 
his plans before his powerful ally. These consisted, 
after a suitable pretext had been found, of an Aus- 
trian punitive expedition against Serbia, the over- 
throw of the Karageorgevich dynasty, and the 
substitution of a servile sovereign who would work 
in the best interests of the Hapsburgs and Hohen- 
zollerns, as did the rulers of Rumania, Bulgaria, 
and Greece, at that time. The question of more 
drastic measures was left open. 

Judging from the confused state of public opinion 
and from the internal dissensions rife in France and 
Great Britain in the early summer of 1914, it seemed 
more than Hkely that this plan could be carried out 
without European interference. Though Italy, as 
an ally of Austria and Germany, had every right to 
be informed of these plans, the more so as Article 
VII of the treaty of the alliance definitely stipulated 
that "the Austro-Hungarian Government is obliged 
in exchange for the occupation of territory, even tem- 

^ Konopischt is an old chdteau which belonged to the Archduke, 
situated in central Bohemia about thirty miles south of Prague. Here 
WiUiam II, accompanied by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, arrived on 
June 11. The object of the Imperial visit was solemnly stated to be 
that "the Emperor desired to see the gardens of his friend, the Arch- 
duke, in full bloom." 



226 GREATER ITALY 

porarily, to make a preventive agreement, and offer 
compensations," Rome was kept completely in the 
dark regarding Austro-German intentions, as it was 
evident that Italy could not be made a party to a 
bargain which was to increase the power and pos- 
sibly the dominions of the Dual Monarchy without 
any regard for Italian interests in the Adriatic, where 
the Archduke was more unwilling than ever to make 
any concessions. 

Francis Ferdinand then visited Bosnia for the pur- 
pose of military inspection. The expedition against 
Serbia, if it should take place, was to be launched 
along this lateral frontier. To disarm suspicion he 
was accompanied by his wife, now raised to the rank 
of a Highness and known as the Duchess of Hohen- 
berg, who looked forward confidently to the realisa- 
tion of her long-cherished desire of placing her son 
Maximilian, who was debarred by his morganatic 
birth from occup3dng the throne of the Hapsburgs, 
on another throne. The Sarajevo tragedy followed. 
The assassination of the Archduke and the Duchess 
cannot from the most reliable evidence as yet available 
be Unked with a prearranged political plot. It seems 
not unreasonable to suppose that this deed, like so 
many of the tragedies which have dogged the steps 
of the Hapsburgs in recent years, had no immediate 
relation whatever with impending events, and as 
such was merely fortuitous. Its causes must be sought 
outside the realm of politics, in all probability in 
court intrigues and designs of personal ambition. 
The murder of the Duchess of Hohenberg would 
appear to confirm this opinion. 

The removal of the Archduke from the scene came 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 227 

too late to change the course of events. Half measures 
would no longer suffice. The survival of the Haps- 
burg Empire demanded that the Serbian undertaking 
be pushed to its logical conclusion. The ultimatum 
and declaration of war against Serbia found Russia, 
France, and Great Britain ready to act in concert 
against the Austro-German combination. Italy alone 
remained outside the conflict. No treaty obligations 
bound her to assist her allies in a war of aggres- 
sion. 

After the first days of upheaval Italy began to 
realise the inherent strength of her position as a neu- 
tral. Those in authority in Vienna were now aware 
of the mistake which the late Archduke had made in 
encouraging the Jugo-Slavs of the Adriatic to the 
detriment of the Italian populations and endeavoured 
to remedy matters by a poHcy of favoritism towards 
the Italians. The Prince Hohenlohe was removed 
from the governorship of Trieste and other concihatory 
measures were hastily introduced. But the Italians 
were in nowise deceived by these belated concessions. 
The opportunity was at last at hand for Italy to carry 
out her plans for the undisputed domination of the 
Adriatic. No longer content to lay claim only to the 
irredente coast towns, Italy foresaw the possibiHty of 
reahsing her ambition to become sole arbiter of aU 
the lands bordering the Adriatic. By November, 
1914, ItaUan pretensions as voiced in a section of the 
ItaHan Press were formulated: the whole Eastern 
Adriatic from Trieste to Avlona, with the exception 
of a small strip of territory which would give Serbia 
an outlet to the sea, must become Italian. Eager to 
be avenged for the humiliations imposed on their 



228 GREATER ITALY 

Italian brethren by Austria in recent years, and for 
the torture which Venetia and Lombardy had suf- 
fered at the hands of Austria before Itahan unity 
was achieved, it was the ambition of Italy to exclude 
Austria from any participation in the affairs of the 
Adriatic. 

Feeling secure in her armed neutrality, Italy took 
the first step to carry out her designs. On Christmas 
Day, 1914, the Italian Admiral Patris landed a body 
of marines at Avlona, where the preceding day a 
disturbance had occurred which caused the Italian 
Consul to demand protection. Avlona, it will be re- 
called, commands the entrance to the Adriatic. A 
magnificent natural harbour protected by steep cliffs, 
rising mountain high with only one narrow navigable 
channel of access, easily fortified, it could speedily 
be transformed into one of the strongest naval centres 
in the world. To place it outside the realm of Austro- 
Italian ambitions, Avlona had by the London Con- 
ference been incorporated in the Kingdom of Albania. 
Albania, owing to the weakness of its ruler, had not 
long survived its birth, and the ''King" having fled, 
the kingdom was held to be a defunct State. With 
Avlona in her possession, Italy now held securely the 
keys to the Adriatic. Even Russia, the protagonist 
of Jugo-Slav interests, appeared to approve of Italian 
occupation of Avlona. M. Sazonoff, the Russian Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, on congratulating Italy on 
her bold step, declared: 

"Albania no longer exists as an independent state; 
but Russia wishes that other peoples, the Serbs and 
Montenegrins, should be permitted to live, and their 
imprescriptible rights respected," wishing to affirm 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 229 

thereby the right of the future Serbia to the north- 
ern portion of the late Albanian State. 

Italy immediately set about to establish herself 
firmly at Avlona. She extended the limits of the 
territory acquired until the city was safe from attack 
by land and sea. In the meantime Italy, while con- 
tinuing her attitude of friendly neutrality towards 
her ally Germany, did not lend a deaf ear to the pro- 
posals of the Allies to take up arms against Austria. 
As long as the Russian armies were victorious, Italy 
found the Allies unwilling to negotiate regarding such 
concessions in the Adriatic as the Italians believed 
essential to their vital interests. On the other hand, 
Germany was eager to secure the guarantee of Italy's 
permanent neutrality and urged the ItaHan Govern- 
ment to initiate negotiations with Vienna to this end. 
After various preliminary discussions, on April 8, 1915, 
Italy formally presented her claims to Austria-Hun- 
gary regarding the territorial concessions she re- 
quired in return for continued neutrality. The clauses 
which more particularly concern the Eastern Adriatic 
littoral are: 

"I. The cession of the Trentino, according to the 
frontiers of 1911. 

"II. A rectification of Italy's eastern frontier in her 
(Italy's) favour, comprising in the ceded territory 
the cities of Gradisca and Gorizia. The fine to run 
from Trogkofel eastward to Osternig; then via Saifnitz 
between the valley of the Seisera and the Schhtza 
to the Wischberg; from here along the existing 
frontier to the Nevea Saddle, and thence to the Isonzo 
east of Plezzo; continuing along the Isonzo to Tol- 
mino, whence it runs via Chiaporano and Comen to 
the sea, which it reaches at a point east of Nabresina, 
between Monfalcone and Trieste. 



230 GREATER ITALY 

"III. The city of Trieste and its neighbourhood, 
including Nabresina up to the new Itahan frontier, 
and extending to the south to include the judicial 
districts of Capo dTstria and Pirano, to be constituted 
into an autonomous State, independent in all respects 
regarding international relations, military, legislative, 
financial and administrative affairs; Austria-Hungary 
renouncing all rights of sovereignty over the new 
State. Trieste to remain a free port. No troops, 
either Austro-Hungarian or Itahan shall be permitted 
to enter. The new State to assume its share of the 
Austrian public debt, in proportion to its population. 

"IV. Austria-Hungary shall cede to Italy the Cur- 
zolari Islands of the Dalmatian coast, including Lissa, 
Lesina, Curzola, Sagosta, etc. 

"V. Italy shall occupy immediately the ceded ter- 
ritory, and Trieste and its territory shall be imme- 
diately evacuated by Austro-Hungarian troops and 
civil authorities. 

"VI. The recognition of Italian sovereignty over 
Avlona, its bay including Sasseno, and hinterland 
necessary to their defense. 

"VII. Austria-Hungary renounces all claims to Al- 
bania."^ 

In return Italy pledged herself to remain neutral 
throughout the duration of the war and, furthermore, 
to pay an indemnification to Austria for Government 
property, debts, etc., amounting to £8,000,000. This 
programme, though moderate, nevertheless included 
the annexation of certain territory exclusively Slav. 

Towards the middle of April, 1915, or about a week 
after the above proposals were made by Italy, the 
Russian offensive had spent itself. The Germano- 
Austro-Hungarian forces were already initiating the 
movement that was to clear GaHcia and break the 

1 The "Italian Official Green Book, May, 1915," Document No. 64. 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 231 

Russian advance. The necessity of Italian inter- 
vention on the side of the AlHes became urgent. Rus- 
sia, after conceding to Italy the principle that no 
"Greater Serbia," as outlined by the Jugo-Slav pro- 
gramme, would be permitted to be created — ^but in- 
stead two Jugo-Slav States — made the following offer 
to Italy in return for her co-operation in the war on 
the side of the AlHes. In the event of the success of 
the Allied arms, which with Italian assistance seemed 
assured, Italy was to receive: 

"I. Aside from the Trentino, all of Friuli, Trieste, 
and the western shores of Istria, including Pirano, 
Capo dTstria, and the great naval base, Pola. 

*'II. The eastern shore of Istria and all territory 
as far south as the river Narenta was to belong to the 
new independent Croatian state, which was to be 
made up of Croatia, Slavonia, Carniola, and the greater 
part of Dalmatia; a State of some 4,000,000 inhab- 
itants, almost exclusively Slav, with Fiume, Zara, 
and Sebenico as its ports. 

"III. The remainder of the Dalmatian coast to 
be ceded to Serbia and Montenegro; Serbia was to 
receive also all of Bosnia and Herzegovina." 

It will be seen that this Russian proposal, while 
abandoning some of the chief Jugo-Slav preten- 
sions, ceded to Italy nearly all the territory which, 
before the war, had been claimed by ItaHan irre- 
dentists, and is far more comprehensive in scope 
than the demands made by Italy to Austria only a 
few days previous. Italy, however, rejected the 
Russian offer. The cause thereof may be sought in 
the fact that rumours had reached Rome, that in 
Russia there was a shortage of arms and mimitions, 



232 GREATER ITALY 

that the Allies were in a more difficult position than 
they had been in since the beginning of the war, and 
that Italian co-operation was more valuable than 
could be estimated in mere terms of territorial con- 
cessions. 

Italy here had the opportunity she had long been 
waiting for, to secure the acquiescence of Great Britain, 
France, and Russia to the absolute Italian domina- 
tion in the Adriatic. Austria-Hungary, feeling more 
secure as the result of the recent successes of her arms 
under German leadership, rejected the Italian pro- 
posals, and Germany was content to threaten Italy 
with the well-known German "f rightfulness," should 
she dare to take up arms against her former ally. 
Whatever Russian or other opposition there may have 
been to abandoning the pretensions of the Jugo-Slavs 
to the right of united independence, in accordance 
with the principle of nationality, were silenced by 
the military necessity of the moment and the urgent 
need of securing active Italian co-operation. Italy 
thereupon presented her counter-proposals to the Al- 
lies, which were reported to be as follows: 

"I. The Trentino up to the Brenner, to be Italian. 

"II. All of Friuli and Istria, including Gorizia and 
Gradisca and the ports of Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, 
to be ceded unconditionally to Italy. 

"III. To the new Croat state, the sea-coast begin- 
ning just east of Fiume, and extending as far south as 
the river Zermagna was to be given. However, all the 
islands commanding the coast were to be handed over 
to Italy. 

"IV. From the Zermagna River, as far south as the 
Narenta the Dalmatian coast, as well as the Dalmatian 
Islands, to be ceded to Italy. 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 233 

"V. The remaining coast land, as far as Durazzo, 
was to belong to Serbia and Montenegro, while the 
Italian possession of Avlona and surrounding terri- 
tory had already been agreed upon." 

These are, in outline, the territorial demands which 
Italy made to the Allies. The territory includes a 
population of over 1,500,000 Slavs, and gives Italy 
dominant control of the Adriatic, both strategically 
and commercially. These demands were in principle 
accepted by the Allies, ^ and definite financial assistance 
guaranteed to Italy on April 24, 1915, with a proviso 
that, within one month from date, Italy should de- 
clare war on Austria. Italy's declaration of war 
against Austria on May 24, automatically ratified 
the agreement entered into with France, Great Brit- 
ain, and Russia, guaranteeing ItaHan hegemony of 
the Adriatic. The difficult problem of the Adriatic 
is thus tending towards a solution. 

According to those in sympathy with the broader 
Jugo-Slav nationalism, Slav aspirations in the Eastern 
Adriatic have been trampled under foot. They already 
point to a Slav "irredentist" movement, directed 

^ Though the exact terms of the compact entered into have been kept 
secret, according to an authoritative statement the following outlines the 
agreement reached between Italy and the Allies regarding the distribu- 
tion of the lands of the Eastern Adriatic, and the irredente territory guar- 
anteed to Italy: 

1. The Trentino up to the Brenner to be Italian. 

2. Friuli and Istria to be handed over to Italy. The eastern bound- 
ary to run through Adelsberg to a point a little west of Fiume, 

3. Fiume and the coast, as far as the Zermagna River to be given 
to Croatia. 

4. From the Zermagna to a point three miles northwest of Spalato 
to be Italian, as well as certain of the Dalmatian Islands, including 
Lissa. 

5. Remaining coastlands as far as Durazzo (?) to be Serb. 

6. Italy to be confirmed in possession of Avlona. , , 



234 GREATER ITALY 

against Italy, if Italian pretensions as stipulated are 
realised in full, more threatening and dangerous to 
the peace of Europe in the future than any other 
factor in the international situation. A representative 
Jugo-Slav committee in London issued a manifesto 
in May, 1915, from which the following significant 
passages are quoted: 

"The Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes pray for the 
victory of the Triple Entente and confidently await 
from it the salvation of the Jugo-Slav nation. The 
conviction that the Triple Entente is fighting for the 
triumph of the principle of Nationality, inspired the 
moral energy and superhuman efforts of Serbia and 
Montenegro and prevented their kinsmen across the 
frontier from utterly losing heart. 

''For Serbia and Montenegro this war is one of self- 
defense and hberation, not of conquest; they are 
fighting to emancipate our people from a foreign yoke 
and to unite them as a single free nation. The mih- 
tary and poHtical overthrow of Austria-Hungary will 
forever put an end to that system of Divide et Impera 
by which our people has for centuries been governed. 
The Jugo-Slavs form a single nation, ahke by identity 
of language, by the unanswerable laws of geography, 
and by national consciousness. Only if united will 
they possess the resources necessary for an independent 
existence. 

"The Jugo-Slavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) in- 
habit the following countries: the Kingdoms of Serbia 
and Montenegro; the Triune Kingdom of Croatia- 
Slavonia-Dalmatia (with Fiume and district); the 
provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Carniola; con- 
siderable portions of the provinces of Istria, Trieste, 
Gorizia-Gradisca, Carinthia, and Styria; and finally 
the Jugo-Slav zone of Hungary proper. 

"To perpetuate the disunion of these territories by 
leaving so many under Austro-Hungarian rule, or to 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 235 

transfer even 'portions of them to another alien rule, 
would be a flagrant violation of our ethnographical, 
geographical, and economic unity, and to this our 
people would unquestionably oppose an energetic and 
justifiable resistance. 

'^The Southern Slav people aspires to unite its terri- 
tories in a single independent state. The internal 
arrangements of the new state will be determined by 
the nation itself, in accordance with its own wishes 
and needs." 

This proclamation, issued in the name of 12,000,000 
Jugo-Slavs, voices their determined opposition to Ital- 
ian plans of aggrandisement. 

Though a small minority of Italian Nationalists 
may wish to push to extreme limits Italian expansion 
along the Eastern Adriatic, the more reasonable and 
influential sections of public opinion in Italy are in 
favour of a more moderate programme, which will give 
the Jugo-Slavs full liberty for their economic, social, 
and national development. It is evident that Italy 
sought to secure wide territorial guarantees in the East- 
ern Adriatic in order to be able to use these as pawns 
in the general exchange of territory which will inevi- 
tably follow upon the remaking of the map of the world. 
Recent developments would tend to indicate clearly 
that Italy expects, in the event of the partition of 
Asia Minor, to receive a large share of the rich terri- 
tory in southern and western Anatolia. The vilayets 
of Smyrna and Konia have been suggested as possible 
future spheres of ItaUan development, while a vic- 
torious campaign in Europe will no doubt assure 
Italy a large share of the Ethiopian Empire of Abys- 
sinia, which now stands on the threshold of disrup- 
tion. It is not unhkely, therefore, that Italy will be 



236 GREATER ITALY 

willing to forego certain territories in the Eastern 
Adriatic guaranteed to her by France, Great Britain, 
and Russia for adequate compensation elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be contested that Italy would 
seem destined to become the chief Power in the Adri- 
atic. Through long centuries Italians have dominated 
its waters, and under their domination busy, populous 
cities sprang up, where the arts, industry, and commerce 
flourished. The memory of the glories of Venice, the 
Queen of the Adriatic, still lives in the hearts of all 
Italians. It would seem unreasonable to wish to ex- 
clude the new and greater Italy from the right of in- 
heriting this Venetian hegemony. The Adriatic through 
two thousand years of its known history has always 
after brief periods of estrangements returned under 
Italian protection. It is not to be believed that for 
many decades to come the Jugo-Slavic peoples, even 
if their territorial aspirations were realised, could 
contest Italian supremacy. Many years must elapse 
before the educational, social, and economic standard 
of the Jugo-Slavs could reach a stage of development 
to be able to cope, even feebly, with the ancient and 
vigorous Italian culture. 

As long as Italy was linked with Austria and Ger- 
many by the bonds of the Triple Alliance, France 
and Great Britain, looked askance at Italian aspira- 
tions in the Adriatic, which they believed to be a part 
of a broader Central European scheme. Italian par- 
ticipation in the European War on the side of the 
Allies conclusively proves that these fears were un- 
founded. When Napoleon, after his triumphant cam- 
paign in Italy, had wrested the lands of the Eastern 
Adriatic from Venice, the Italian envoy, Count Rocco 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 237 

Sanfermo, endeavoured to persuade the French Direc- 
tory of the advisabUity of ceding Istria and Dalmatia to 
Italy, "so that it could defend its coast and protect 
its commerce, as Italy united in a single body, governed 
according to the principles of liberty, would become 
an efficacious factor for stability and, joined with 
France, offer a strong defense against Austria." Since 
that time the history of the Italian people has been 
one long struggle to attain their confini naturali, their 
natural boundaries, to redeem the irredente provinces, 
to incorporate in one compact and great State all 
Itahans. Italy is to-day by the force of her arms as- 
serting what she believes to- be her inalienable right 
to the domination of the Adriatic. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 

The Trend of Policy. Neutbalists and Interventionists. 
The Mat Revolution 

In March, 1914, Giolitti relinquished office, and 
the Government was intrusted to M. Salandra. As 
the weeks passed the malaise of Europe became more 
pronounced. In Italy the restlessness of the people 
showed itself in mild revolutionary outbreaks in 
Romagna; though soon suppressed, they indicated a 
pervading discontent, which was current throughout 
Europe. 

On June 28, came the report of the assassination 
of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Italy received 
the news with undisguised relief. It seemed to por- 
tend an era of more amicable relations with Austria. 
These hopes were soon shattered by the announce- 
ment of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, followed 
by the declaration of war. These events came as a 
complete surprise to Italy. How carefully the plan of 
aggression against Serbia at this time had been con- 
cealed by the Berlin and Vienna Cabinets from their 
Italian ally is difficult to ascertain. Italian official 
documents proclaim that Italy was in nowise ap- 
prised of the course of action which the Vienna Govern- 
ment proposed to pursue. It would seem reasonable, 
in the hght of events, to place fullest confidence in 
this official version. 

238 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 239 

Berlin and Vienna both believed that, owing to the 
disturbed state of Italy, the depletion of her military- 
resources of which they had very definite informa- 
tion, and the financial weakness of the country result- 
ing from the vast expenditures of the Tripolitan cam- 
paign, Austria would be unmolested by Italy in her 
proposed punitive expedition against Serbia. When 
the conflict between Vienna and Belgrade, contrary 
to the expectations at least of Vienna if not of Berlin, 
no longer locahsed, became a world conjflagration which 
soon was to involve all Europe, when Russia, and 
then France, espoused the cause of Serbia, Austria 
endeavoured at the last moment to summon Italy to 
her side. The famous despatch casus fcederis was 
hurriedly sent to Rome. General Cadorna, the Chief 
of the Italian General Staff, was convoked to confer 
with General Conrad respecting the measures to be 
taken jointly to defend the Dual Monarchy against 
the threatened Russian invasion. Italy's reply was 
the prompt declaration of her neutrahty on August 3. 

This declaration must be regarded as one of the 
most important factors of the first phase of the Eu- 
ropean War. It is incontestable that Italy's straight- 
forward declaration of neutrality radically changed 
the course of world history. By merely mobihsing her 
armies along the French frontier, from the Mediter- 
ranean to the Rhone, Italy would have kept 400,000 
French troops in this area, and would thus have pre- 
vented France from throwing her whole strength into 
the balance against the German invaders from the 
north. The battle of the Marne instead of a brilhant 
French victory would, in all probabihty, have had an- 
other issuS; and the triumphant German advance would 



240 GREATER ITALY 

have swept across France instead of being stemmed 
in Picardy, Champagne, and the Argonne. Further- 
more, the mobihsation of the Italian fleet in the Med- 
iterranean could not fail to have dislocated French 
plans for the transport of troops from northern Africa, 
which rendered such great assistance from the very- 
first days of the war; while it is not generally ap- 
preciated that during those first weeks, which found 
England wholly unprepared, British lines of com- 
munication with India would have been at the mercy 
of the Italian torpedo flotilla, whose conveniently 
situated base in Eritrea along the western shores of 
the Red Sea would have made it no very difiicult task 
to cut British communications with the East, leaving 
Egypt open to invasion. 

Italy, however, spontaneously and clearly showed 
what her intentions were by withdrawing her gar- 
risons some distance from the French frontier and by 
concentrating her fleet at the entrance of the Adriatic. 

The ItaUans now began to feel the strength of their 
new position. Italy's declaration of neutrality was in 
reality to prove a declaration of independence. Dur- 
ing the half century which had elapsed since Itahan 
unity had been achieved, Italy had felt herself obliged 
by the weakness of her international position to play 
a part of minor importance in world politics, incom- 
patible with her population, resources, and national 
dignity, while the best interests of the Kingdom had 
often been sacrificed. Italy had never been free from 
foreign influences: first, that of Napoleon III and the 
French, during the formative days of the new Italy; 
later that of Bismarck and Germany. Repeatedly, 
during the long years of Italy's servitude, she had 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 241 

sacrificed her legitimate ambitions for the sake of 
national security. Now, suddenly she found herself 
the mistress of her destiny. By her declaration of 
neutrality she had cut loose from the moorings to 
which, for more than thirty years, the ship of state 
had been anchored. Italy was thus confronted by a 
new set of problems, which for the first time in her 
history she was called upon to solve for herself; she 
was now free to consult only her own interests. From 
a position of minority and dependence in world affairs, 
the Itahans had reached man's estate, and on the 
decisions which they were now called upon to make, 
the future of the country rested. 

As the only great Power in Europe which had re- 
mained outside the war, Italy became at the same 
time the object of suspicion and solicitude on the 
part of both belhgerents. On the one hand, Germany 
and the Dual Monarchy, while privately considering 
the conduct of Italy as traitorous in not coming to 
the assistance of her alhes in a war of such magnitude 
no matter what its causes might have been, were 
nevertheless eager that Italy should continue in her 
attitude of friendly neutrality, as the Itahans were 
at that time rendering great assistance by securing 
supplies from abroad. On the other hand, the Allied 
Powers though by habit of mind they classed Italy 
with their enemies, yet, eager to enlist whatever arms 
they might find in their cause, and appreciating the 
great strength Italian armies would add to their 
forces, soon began a campaign of propaganda in Italy 
to arouse the sympathy and active support of the 
Italian people. 

The Itahans themselves were divided in their con- 



242 GREATER ITALY 

victions. The Triplist tradition had for a generation 
moulded the public opinion of the country. The lead- 
ing statesmen, politicians, professors, and the more 
intelligent classes were confirmed believers in the 
advantages which Italy had derived from the Triple 
Alliance. The nation had been tutored in a faith 
in Germanic ideals of statecraft. German Realpolitik 
had in Italy many influential advocates, while the 
ascendency of Germans in the affairs of the peninsula 
has never been doubted or denied by the Italians 
themselves. 

, Italy soon found herself divided into two distinct 
camps or parties — the Neutralists and the Interven- 
tionists. The first were in favour of continuing 
the policy of neutrality and of deriving whatever 
advantages possible from this attitude, both in in- 
creased wealth and in territorial concessions; the 
second, in favour of seizing the opportunity offered 
to vindicate Italy's national aspirations by the force 
of arms. But whatever policy was to be pursued, both 
parties were agreed that it was to be a purely Italian 
policy. Though the cause of the Allies aroused re- 
sponsive sympathy throughout Italy, all Italians were 
convinced that in this crisis the best interests of Italy 
alone must be consulted. While the Neutralists 
appeared to be playing the part of defenders of the 
Central Powers, such- groups as the Nationalists, 
that is, those who had hitherto urged violently the 
need of a war against Austria, to regain the mastery 
of the Adriatic, were the first to declare: "Let us have 
no stupid Austrophobe policy." Italy, wide-awake to 
the opportunities of her position was to choose a course 
of action most suited to her national needs. 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 243 

The problem resolved itself at once into whether 
Italy should remain neutral or take up arms on the 
side of the AlHes. The few, who in the first days of 
the war may have been in favour of actively support- 
ing the Central Empires, soon became silent or joined 
the ranks of the Neutralists. Italy was now in the 
throes of a moral and political conflict, the like of 
which has never hitherto been witnessed in a great 
State. On behalf of the Neutralists Giolitti, whose 
following was wide-spread and whose voice was Hs- 
tened to with attention, sounded the key-note of their 
convictions when he exclaimed: 

"It would not seem improbable that, owing to the 
present condition of Europe, much can be obtained 
without going to war." 

The Neutralists further had enlisted the sympathy 
and support of such divergent elements as the Papacy 
and the Socialists. The Roman CathoHcs, who by 
tradition and principle were hostile to any policy 
which might increase the strength and popularity of 
the House of Savoy, opposed Italian participation in 
the war on the side of the Allies, on the grounds of 
a natural distrust of France, and jealousy and fear 
of any further expansion of Russia, the great Or- 
thodox Catholic State. Moreover, the Roman Curia 
was bound by many ties of sympathy to Austria, 
now the "eldest and most faithful daughter of the 
Church." The Papal entourage knew that in the 
event of a war with Austria, the diplomatic rela- 
tions between the Pope and the representatives of 
the Central European Sovereigns would be broken 
off, and that the Papacy would be greatly hampered 



244 GREATER ITALY 

in playing the part to which it aspired of moral arbi- 
trator and pacificator in a world where all law and order 
had been violated. The elevation of Benedict XV to 
the Papacy showed that the Catholic Church had not 
altogether abandoned its aspirations to regain its 
temporal powers. Both Berlin and Vienna let it be 
known clearly that should Italy pursue a course of 
action prejudicial to their interests, the Pope could 
expect every assistance from them towards the real- 
isation of these temporal desires; while the efforts 
of the Catholics to maintain Italian neutrality would 
not go without recompense. 

The Socialist members of the Chamber of Deputies, 
though not unanimously (several groups soon joined 
the Interventionists), basing their arguments on the 
grounds of pacifism and international brotherhood, 
maintained that it was in the best interests of Italy 
that the country should continue its policy of strict 
and stringent neutrality. 

But the most important and numerous group of 
Neutralists were not those directly affiliated with any 
political or religious party, but were what might be 
called ''debtors of Germany." As has been pointed 
out in a previous chapter, German penetration had so 
thoroughly permeated Italian industrial and economic 
life that it was difficult to find even an unimportant 
branch of industry or commerce which was not de- 
pendent in a measure on German capital and sup- 
port. The whole ItaKan economic structure had been 
built up on German foundations. To break with 
Germany meant, so they feared, the collapse and ruin 
of their hard-won prosperity. Further than this, 
during the thirty-three years of a close alliance with 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 245 

Germany, a very considerable number of Italians 
had intermarried with Germans, and were now bound 
to Germany by these tics of marriage and blood re- 
lationship, while others, trained at the German tech- 
nical schools and universities, had retained a very 
deep respect for their German masters. The great 
majority of the working and peasant classes were 
also opposed to war, cliiefly on the ground that it 
would upset their economic well-being. At the other 
end of the social scale, many members of the higher 
aristocracy, enriched bourgeoisie, and university pro- 
fessors of the older and more rigid type who had ab- 
sorbed the German point of view, rallied to the cause 
of the Neutralists. 

The opinions of the ItaKans varied widely in the 
different parts of the country. In Venetia, the prov- 
ince closest to the frontier, though the district hkely 
to suffer the most from the consequences of a war, 
the people were enthusiastically Interventionist, as 
they were also in Romagna. The Piedmontese, how- 
ever, mindful of their historical afiinity with Prussia, 
were actively opposed to the idea of a war against 
the Central Empires. In Lombardy, the industrial 
heart of Italy, opinions were divided, though the 
NeutraUsts were in a majority. In Liguria, Genoa 
was enjoying a period of unwonted prosperity on ac- 
count of her traffic of imports, ultimately destined 
for Germany, and was thus not eager for any change 
in the status quo; while Rome and Naples and the 
remainder of Italy were undecided or indifferent re- 
garding the war with Austria which the Interven- 
tionists now demanded. 

With Germany few Italians found any cause for 



246 GREATER ITALY, 

quarrel, nor were there many who wished to seek far 
afield for such a pretext. With Austria the century- 
long feud subsisted, and the violence of the hatred 
of the Itahans of Northern Italy was soon aflame. 
But Germany had espoused the cause of the Dual 
Monarchy so completely that it did not seem pos- 
sible for Italy to declare war against Austria without 
German interference, and the legend of German in- 
vincibility was deeply rooted in Italy. 

The Interventionists had a difficult task before 
them. At first composed only of an unimportant 
minority of young men, army officers, professional 
men, writers, journalists, and teachers, they beHeved 
that Italy could obtain her legitimate ends only by 
participation in the war on the side of the AlHes. But 
for years past Italians had been temperamentally 
hostile to France. They could not forget the con- 
duct of Napoleon III in regard to Nice, the Tunisian 
episode, and the many vexatious incidents which had 
clouded Franco-Italian relations within very recent 
years. Even more unpalatable to the Italians was 
the idea of fighting hand in hand with Russia, the 
protector of the Jugo-Slavs, and a possible antagonist 
in the Adriatic. 

Those in favour of intervention were materially 
assisted in their propaganda, by the campaign of 
ruthless terrorism which the Germans had pursued 
in France and Belgium. The violation of Belgian 
neutrality had a less concrete influence than the de- 
struction of the Cloth Hall at Ypres and the Cathedral 
at Rheims. The Italian people, whose aesthetic sense 
is more highly developed than that of any other modern 
European nation, could understand and gauge minutely 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 247 

the sacrilege of the German invaders against the 
monuments and rich treasure stores of the past, and 
they were aroused to anger by the vandalism which 
was vividly pictured to them by distinguished Bel- 
gians who soon flocked to Italy. 

However, the Italians were not to be persuaded by 
sentimental arguments. Though they deplored the 
loss of the historic monuments, they deemed that the 
war, if declared, must be an Italian war, definitely 
outUned as pm-suant of a definite plan of action. 

By degrees the Interventionists rallied to their 
support the leading journalists and publicists of Italy; 
in politics. Liberals, Radicals, and Conservatives 
soon ranged themselves on their side. In the uni- 
versities many of the younger professors and the 
whole student body joined the party which now 
clamoured loudly for war — ^war against Austria. 
For throughout this campaign of persuasion there 
was httle or no mention of war against Germany. 
Austria was the enemy and Austria alone was to be 
assaulted. In every city in Italy the propaganda for 
and against intervention was carried on. The man 
in the street was called upon to decide for himself in 
advance a problem which would eventually confront 
the Government. For all Italians felt that Italy could 
not long remain a neutral spectator. The future of 
the nation was at stake. Italy must sooner or later 
play an active part in the war which was to settle 
the destiny of Europe. 

While in the pubHc forum of the newspaper, street, 
and theatre the question of participation or non- 
participation in the war was being hotly debated, 
and the various opinions argued in pamphlet, leaflet, 



248 GREATER ITALY 

and viva voce, the Government found itself assailed 
by the two belligerent groups. 

On the death of the Marchese di San Guiliano, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in October, 1914, this 
office was assumed by Baron Sonnino; a clear-headed, 
silent man, who, though in the past a confirmed sup- 
porter of the Triple Alliance, was nevertheless admira- 
bly fitted by his realist training and temperament to 
guide Italy through the intricate negotiations which 
were to follow. 

Early in December, Italy took the first official 
action when Austrian forces crossed the Danube and 
began the invasion of Serbia. The Italian Govern- 
ment at once made inquiries in Vienna regarding 
Austrian plans in the Balkans, and what compensa- 
tion the Vienna Government was ready to make to 
Italy in accordance with the terms of their treaty of 
alliance, which demanded reciprocal compensation 
in the event of either party acquiring further terri- 
tory in the Balkans. At the same time Baron Sonnino 
communicated with Berlin, and added these significant 
words: "The current which manifests itself in a sec- 
tion of public opinion in favour of neutrality, does 
not mean that it abandons Italian interests in the 
Balkans and the Adriatic, nor the national aspirations, 
but rather it is persuaded of the possibility of pro- 
tecting these interests and realising these aspirations, 
at the same time remaining faithful to neutrality." ^ 

While the Vienna Government endeavoured to turn 
a deaf ear to Italian demands and let matters drift, 
Germany soon discovered that the party in Italy 

^ Despatch to Italian Ambassador at Berlin, dated December 9, 
1914. "Italian Official Green Book," Document No. 2. 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 249 

favouring Italian intervention was daily gaining 
ground. William II, who took a very personal 
interest in Italian affairs, despatched the former Im- 
perial Chancellor, Prince Biilow, to Rome as Am- 
bassador Extraordinary to open negotiations with 
the Italian Government with a view to securing 
Italy's permanent neutrality for the duration of the 
war. If any man was fitted to succeed in this difiicult 
task it was Prince Biilow. His residence at Rome, 
the Villa Malta, was still the centre of a wide and in- 
fluential circle of important personages in Italian 
public life. Confident in his ability to accomplish 
his mission, Prince Biilow arrived in Rome. On 
December 19 he was received by the Italian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. During this interview. Baron 
Sonnino frankly told Prince Biilow that, though the 
majority of the population was still willing to support 
the Government's policy of neutrality, their support 
was based on the belief that the Government would 
secure adequate compensation — ^in other words, the 
realisation of Italy's national aspirations — and that 
he felt himself quite in accord with this point of 
view. For the next three months the Italian Govern- 
ment, chiefly through the medium of the German 
Envoy, was engaged in negotiations with the Vienna 
Government, respecting the territorial concessions to 
be made to Italy in return for her continued and 
friendly neutrality. 

In the meantime the war had developed into a new 
phase. The German invasion in the West had been 
permanently checked, and the Russian armies were 
advancing victoriously through Galicia and stood 
on the heights of the Carpathians, ready to invade 



250 GREATER ITALY 

the Hungarian plain. At the same time the Serbs 
had achieved an overwhelming victory over their 
enemies, and after a brief and brilliant campaign had 
driven the Austrians completely out of Serbia and 
captured many thousand prisoners and great booty. 

The Italians looked with no little concern at this 
sudden triumph of the Slavs. They believed that 
their plans for the domination of the Adriatic were 
definitely imperilled. The news of further Russian 
successes continued to reach Rome. Negotiations 
with Vienna were dragging on slowly. The Austrians, 
after much bickering, had finally conceded the prin- 
ciple of territorial compensation. The Italian Govern- 
ment had been persuaded to forego some of its chief 
pretensions in order that a settlement might be reached. 
Italy, thereupon, on April 8, 1915, presented a definite 
proposal to Austria, regarding what she deemed the 
minimum compensations in the form of territorial 
concessions^ by Austria, in the Trentino and the Adri- 
atic; in the words of M. Sonnino, "indispensable for 
the purpose of creating between the two States a 
normal and stable status of reciprocal cordiality and 
possible co-operation in the future." 

The representatives of the Allied Powers at Rome 
were watching closely the changing attitude of the 
Italian Government. For the Allies were, notwith- 
standing the Russian victories, fully aware of their 
intrinsic military inferiority vis a vis the Central Em- 
pires. When it seemed that Italy was about to con- 
clude negotiations with Vienna, and Prince Biilow 
was already congratulating himself on the success of 
his efforts, the Allies decided to make a bold offer for 

1 C/. Chap. X, p. 229. 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 251 

Italian assistance. Though for long months the cam- 
paign of preparing Italian public opinion for armed 
intervention had been going on, the Allied Govern- 
ments had hitherto been unable to agree as to the 
terms to be offered to Italy. When it became known 
that the Russian advance had been checked, and that 
Russia had so taxed her resources as to be unable to 
cope effectively with the enemy, even on the defen- 
sive, the Allied Governments felt that the moment 
had arrived to secure Italy's active co-operation at all 
costs. 

Then followed the series of Russian reverses. The 
Austrians again victorious, through the assistance of 
their German allies, were not anxious to accept Italy's 
proposals, while the Allies, who were passing through 
the most critical phase of the war, were willing to make 
almost any concessions demanded to secure Italian 
aid. 

It is chiefly owing to the skill and tact of the French 
Ambassador at Rome, M. Barrere, that the negotia- 
tions which actually led to Italian intervention were 
brought to a successful issue in a very brief space of 
time. By April 24, 1915, the ItaUan Government 
had pledged itself under certain contingencies, and in 
return for guarantees given by the Allies,^ to declare 
war on Austria. The Government in contracting this 
engagement had kept in close touch with the will 
and temper of the Italian people. During the months 
which had elapsed since the outbreak of the European 
War, the campaign of the Interventionists in Italy 
had progressed from day to day with increasing vio- 
lence. The plight of the irredente provinces had again 

1 Cf. Chap. X, pp. 232-233. 



252 GREATER ITALY 

aroused the sympathy of all Italians. The day of their 
redemption was at hand. The opportunity must not 
be missed to complete the unification of Italy. The 
European War lost its significance and interest in 
comparison with the war which Italy was to declare 
on Austria. Italians concerned themselves little with 
the other struggle; their whole interest centred on 
Itahan affairs. It is not unnatural that observers in 
France and Great Britain should have misinterpreted 
the Italian attitude, and the numerous delays which 
arose. "Italy will fly to the rescue of the victors," 
was a hon mot which plainly voiced their impatience 
and their mistrust of Italian policy. 

But Italy had good reason for delay in declaring 
herself openly. Few foreigners could rightly ap- 
preciate how disorganised and unprepared for war 
the Italian armies were in the late summer of 1914. 
The Italian military authorities at once foresaw that 
sooner or later they would be called upon to take up 
a quarrel which was being fanned to flame by the 
national will of the Italian people. They must be 
ready to assume the responsibility when that mo- 
ment should come. Under the leadership of that 
brilliant and methodical officer, General Count Ca- 
dorna, the Italian armies were being put into shape 
to be prepared for every eventuality. The task was 
arduous. The lessons of the first months of the war 
had to be learned; the methods of the new warfare 
assimilated. Slowly the armies were making ready. 
By the end of April, 1915, it was evident that the 
great gaps in the cadres had been filled; the empty 
caissons replenished; stores and munitions accumu- 
lated. 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 253 

On May 3, Baron Sonnino transmitted to the Ital- 
ian Ambassador at Vienna instructions to denounce 
the treaty of alliance with Austria. This document, 
so lucid and concise, sets forth in a succinct manner 
the justifications of the Italian Government in tak- 
ing this step: 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs 

TO 

The Royal Ambassador at Vienna 

" (Telegram) Rome, May 3, 1915. 

" I pray your Excellency to communicate the follow- 
ing to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and leave with 
him a written copy: 

'"The alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary 
proclaimed itself since its beginning as an element 
and a guarantee of peace, and aimed first as its prin- 
cipal object at mutual defense. In the presence of 
subsequent events, and of the new situation which 
arose therefrom, the Governments of the two coun- 
tries were obliged to propose another object no less 
essential, and in the course of the successive renewals 
of the treaty, endeavoured to safeguard the continuity 
of their alliance by stipulating the principle of prelim- 
inary agreements regarding the Balkans, with a view 
to conciliating the interests and the divergent ten- 
dencies of the two Powers. 

'' ' It is plainly evident that these stipulations, loyally 
fulfilled, would have sufficed to furnish a solid basis 
for common and fruitful action. On the contrary 
Austria-Hungary during the summer of 1914, without 
making any agreement with Italy, without even giv- 
ing her the least notice, and paying no attention to 
the counsels of moderation which were addressed to 
her (Austria-Hungary) by the Royal Government, 
handed to Serbia the ultimatum of July 23, which 
was the cause and the beginning of the present Euro- 
pean conflagration. 



254 GREATER ITALY 

"'Austria-Hungary in neglecting the obligations of 
the treaty, disturbed profoundly the status quo in 
the Balkans, and brought about a situation by which 
she alone would be called upon to profit to the great 
detriment of the interests of greatest importance, which 
her ally had so often aflirmed and proclaimed. 

"'A violation so flagrant of the letter as well as the 
spirit of the treaty, not only justified the refusal of 
Italy to range herself on the side of her allies in a war 
brought about without her advice, but at the same time 
it took away from the alliance its essential factors as 
well as its raison d'etre. 

"/Even the clause concerning benevolent neutrality 
provided for by the treaty, was compromised by this 
violation. Reason as well as opinion agree in pre- 
cluding that benevolent neutrality can be maintained 
when one of the allies takes up arms to realise a pro- 
gramme diametrically opposed to the vital interests 
of the other ally, interests the safeguarding of which 
constituted the principal reason for the alliance it- 
self. 

" ' Notwithstanding this, Italy during several months, 
endeavoured to create a favourable situation for the 
re-establishment between the two States of those 
friendly relations which constitute the essential foun- 
dation of all co-operation in the realm of general 
politics. 

"'With this object in view, and with this hope, the 
Royal Government declared itself disposed to lend it- 
self to an arrangement having for its object the satis- 
faction, in an equitable manner of the legitimate 
national aspirations of Italy, and which at the same 
time would have served to reduce the existing dis- 
parity between the two States in the Adriatic. 

"'These negotiations, however, arrived at no ap- 
parent result. 

" ' All the efforts of the Royal Government met with 
resistance on the part of the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment, which after several months has only made 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 255 

up its mind to admit the claim of the special interests 
of Italy at Avlona, and to promise an insufficient 
concession of territory in the Trentino; a concession 
which provides in no way for a normal adjustment 
of the situation, either from an ethnic, political, or 
military point of view. 

'"This concession furthermore was not to be car- 
ried out until some undetermined date; that is to say 
only at the end of the war. 

'''In this state of affairs, the Italian Goverrmient 
must renounce all hope of arriving at an arrangement, 
and sees itself obhged to withdraw all its proposals 
of agreement. 

'"It is likewise useless to give to the alliance an 
outward form, which would only be destined to dis- 
simulate the reality of continual suspicion and daily 
differences. 

"'Therefore, Italy confident in her good right, af- 
firms and proclaims that she resumes henceforth her 
full liberty of action and declares her treaty of al- 
liance with Austria-Hungary annulled and without 
effect.'i 

"SONNINO." 

Thus the Government had executed the mandate 
which it believed intrusted to it by the people of Italy. 
For in this Italian war it was the voice of the people 
that dominated. Italy alone of all the belligerent 
Powers was to enter into the conflict with her eyes wide 
open. The first decisive step had been taken. The 
treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary had been de- 
clared null and void, yet the Neutralists did not give up 
hope that war might be averted. They had worked 
with great skill and much tenacity to spread abroad 
their views. They had proclaimed their admiration 

1" Italian Official Green Book," Document No. 76. 



256 GREATER ITALY 

for the genius of the German people, its strength and 
virility. The historical associations and similarity of 
the rise to nationhood of Italy and Germany had 
been evoked. The necessity of Italy's remaining 
faithful to her treaty obligations was emphasised; 
the threat of a Slav peril in the Adriatic was reiterated. 
But the most trenchant argument of the Neutralists 
was that of the added burden in the form of increased 
taxation and disturbed industrial conditions which 
would be brought upon Italy in the event of war, 
to say nothing of the thousands of useful lives that 
would be sacrificed on the field of battle; while by 
negotiations much might be obtained without going 
to war. 

To these arguments the Interventionists had op- 
posed others equally strong. First and foremost was 
the problem of the irredente provinces, which they 
were now prepared to solve. As a result of unforeseen 
circumstances, Austria found herself embarrassed and 
in a difficult position. Italy must not refrain from 
seizing this opportunity of rescuing the unredeemed 
Italians, whose survival under the pressure of the 
Germans of Tyrol and the Slavs of the Adriatic was 
daily more threatened. Secondly, military considera- 
tions demanded that Italy's northern frontier should 
be rearranged so as to secure Venetia from invasion, 
which, under existing conditions, could be launched 
without difiiculty, and with every chance of success 
by the Austrians. The gates of Italy were in the 
hands of a potential enemy. The time had come for 
Italy to act as her own gatekeeper. A third, more 
cogent argument was that .Italy could not afford to 
remain outside the conflict. Isolated in the midst of 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 257 

the combatants, no matter which group of belligerents 
won, Italy would find herself unable to vindicate her 
position as a World Power, and would inevitably sink 
to the position of a State of the second rank. Italian 
aspirations in the Adriatic would be definitively 
thwarted. Should the Austro-German Powers be 
victorious, Italy would be forced to accept a sub- 
servient part in their scheme of a great Central Eu- 
ropean Empire, and would become another Bavaria. 
Should the Allies win without Italian co-operation, 
they would have no time nor desire to consider Ital- 
ian needs or ambitions. 

Notwithstanding the apparent gains of the Inter- 
ventionist cause, the Neutralists were still confident 
in their strength. The ferment of the ItaHans had 
already reached such a height that any shght inci- 
dent might at the last moment determine the course 
of action which the nation was to pursue. 

On the very day. May 4, that the Italian Ambas- 
sador at Vienna dehvered the Note denouncing the 
Austro-Itahan alliance, there arrived in Italy, coming 
from France, a man whose voice was to carry the day; 
a man who seemed by temper and character, as well 
as by his past record, wholly unsuited for the part 
that was to be allotted to him in the great Italian 
drama. It was Gabriel d'Annunzio. Known abroad 
chiefly through his novels, wherein the vision of the 
poet is often obscured by a sordid, egotistical mate- 
riaHsm, d'Annunzio in his own country was hailed as 
a poet whose knowledge and flexible use of the Italian 
language, as well as his unerring poetical instinct, 
rank him with the greatest in the Italian tongue. 
Many of his later poems breathe a lofty spirit of pa- 



258 GREATER ITALY 

triotism and devotion to the cause of a Greater Italy. 
Of aesthetic temperament, he had hitherto kept him- 
self aloof from crowds, and seemed wholly unfit to 
become the leader of the people and to force a Par- 
liament and a Government to obey his mandate. It 
is more than probable that d'Annunzio had only a 
very vague notion of the part that he was to be called 
upon to play. His chief object in coming to Italy, 
after an absence of nearly five years, was to deliver an 
address at the unveiling of a monument at Quarto, 
near Genoa, where, on May 5, fifty-five years before, 
*Hhe Thousand" under Garibaldi had set sail, to 
undertake the first step to bring about the unifica- 
tion of Southern Italy. Though d'Annunzio had never 
before played an important political role, he never- 
theless appreciated the psychological possibilities of 
his position and the influence he could exert on his 
fellow countrymen in this crisis. From time to time 
during the past months, he had, since the war began, 
by his articles in the Press set forth his convictions as 
to the necessity of Italian intervention. 

On his arrival at Bardonnechia, the fiist small 
station on Italian soil, d'Annunzio was greeted with 
enthusiasm by a group of officers and soldiers who 
had assembled on the railway quay. At every station 
where the train stopped he was the object of a bois- 
terous ovation. At Turin, the chief centre of the 
NeutraHsts, a great crowd of students gathered to 
welcome the return to Italy of the poet. By the time 
he had reached Genoa all- Italy was aflame with the 
news. The poet had become the vates, the seer of 
the new Italy. The Italians were ready to be led, 
eager to find a hero. D'Annunzio, by his stirring ad- 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 259 

dresses to the people, by the appeal that he made to 
the grandeur and splendour of the past glory of Italy, 
aroused his Hsteners to an enthusiasm which bor- 
dered on frenzy. 

At the fetes at Quarto d'Annunzio was to be the 
principal speaker. The ICing of Italy had signified his 
intention of being present. At the last moment, 
however, the King, not wishing to show his sympathies 
for one party or the other, before the people had 
through the Government proclaimed their will, cancelled 
the engagement. D'Annunzio thus became the chief 
figure of the celebration. His oration, couched in 
high-flowing, allegorical language, did not arouse more 
acclaim than his mere presence. He became the ob- 
ject of an ovation the like of which has rarely been 
given to any civilian. His carriage was surrounded 
by excited admirers; he was showered with flowers, 
and with difficulty escaped from the hands of his 
well-wishers. Everywhere he was called upon again 
and again to harangue the assembled crowds. His 
words, inspired by an intense sincerity, carried with 
them a conviction and authority which increased 
hourly. D'Annunzio's reception at Genoa and Quarto 
was merely a precursor of other and greater triumphs. 
He became the embodiment of the idea which he 
preached. To an audience of university students 
who had presented him with a gold medalhon of 
homage, d'Annunzio exclaimed: 

"If it is true, as I swear it is, that the Italians have 
lighted again the flame on the altar of Italy, take 
torches lighted in its fires in your hands, and fan them 
to flame ! Hold them in your clenched fists, brandish 
them aloft wherever you may go! Sow the warlike 



260 GREATER ITALY 

fire, my young companions ! Be ye the intrepid in- 
cendiaries of your great country. 'Begone! Obey! 
said the priest of Mars to the consecrated youth.' 
You are the seeds of a new world. Begone! Make 
ready! Obey! I can command you to do this be- 
cause you have made me worthy to consecrate you 
since you are the sparks of the divine fire. Sow broad- 
cast this fire ! to-morrow let the souls of all be aflame ! 
Let the voice of all arise in one single flaming clamour, 
'Italy! Italy!'" 

Thus d'Annunzio exhorted others to carry on the 
task which he had assumed for himself. His mission 
was to inflame the hearts of all Italians for war. 

After a triumphant progress through various Italian 
cities, on the evening of May 12 d'Annunzio was to ar- 
rive at Rome. The city was in a turmoil. Giolitti, at 
the head of a group of influential Neutralists, who were 
apparently working in close co-operation with Prince 
Billow, had arrived in Rome on May 9. Though no 
longer in office, Giolitti was omnipotent in Italian 
political circles. He still controlled a majority in the 
Chamber. It was said that he had come to the capital 
for the purpose of overthrowing the Government, and 
of forming a new Cabinet under his own leadership; 
he would then repudiate the Sonnino-Salandra agree- 
ment of April 24 with the Allies, reopen negotiations 
with Austria, and secure in return for Italy's neu- 
trality wider and more extensive concessions from the 
Dual Monarchy, which the latter at this eleventh 
hour would be compelled to grant. The fact that 
Giolitti on his arrival had been received by the King 
as well as by M. Salandra, seemed to confirm these 
rumours, notwithstanding the fact that Giolitti em- 
phatically denied the allegations, and stated that he 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 261 

had come to Rome at the invitation of the King to 
confer on the situation in general. For a moment it 
seemed as though the GioUttian plot was about to suc- 
ceed, and that Parliament, in face of a strong though 
disjointed and incoherent public opinion, would readily 
veto the arrangement entered into by the Salandra 
Cabinet in favour of intervention. It is at this junc- 
ture that d'Annunzio arrived at Rome. 

In the square in front of the railway-station in the 
vast Piazza delle Terme, with the imposing back- 
ground of the massive brick arches of the Baths of 
Diocletian rising against the deep blue of the evening 
sky, 150,000 Romans had assembled to welcome the 
arrival of the modern Tribune, for such d'Annunzio 
had now become in the eyes of the Italians. To the 
people of Rome d'Annunzio came in the guise of a 
dehverer. By some strange whim of fate, d'Annunzio 
the poet, the artist, the maker of elegant verses, had 
been clad by popular fancy with the virtues of a hero 
of ancient Rome. The Romans, ever ready to ap- 
plaud, to be led, willing to be admonished, exhorted, 
inflamed to action, greeted their new idol with scenes 
of wild and exultant tumult. D'Annunzio was borne 
aloft on the shoulders of the people. Finally he was 
able to reach his automobile; the car was compelled 
to proceed at a snail's pace, halting at almost every 
yard, cutting as it advanced a lane through the dense 
throng which lined the streets from side to side. Es- 
corted by torch-bearers, the car made a slow progress 
through the city. The multitudes formed in procession 
in the rear, and with banners and flags unfurled, 
among which those of Trent and Trieste were con- 
spicuous, bearing thousands of torches and vari- 



262 GREATER ITALY 

coloured lanterns, the procession wound its way- 
through the streets of the capital, up the Pincian 
hill to the Hotel Regina, opposite the palace of the 
Queen-Mother. Queen Margherita, surrounded by her 
ladies-in-waiting, stood at the window of the palace, 
and added her applause to that of the multitude. 

The next day Rome awoke to learn important 
tidings. The Salandra Cabinet, not feeling itself 
strong enough to confront Parliament at its opening 
on May 20, intended, so it was reported, in view of 
the uncompromising attitude assumed by the Neu- 
tralists, who controlled a majority in the Chamber, 
to tender its resignation to the King. The situation 
was critical. The honour of Italy was at stake. The 
Salandra Government had pledged itself to foreign 
Powers on behalf of intervention; the accession of 
Giolitti to office would mean that the Italian Govern- 
ment would repudiate these pledges. It appeared as 
though Giolitti and the Neutralists, working in con- 
cert with Prince Biilow, were about to frustrate the 
aims and manifest will of the Italian people. 

It was then that d'Annunzio, in an improvised 
speech during a performance at the Costanzi Theatre, 
voiced a direct accusation against the ^Hraitors," 
and bade the Romans fight against this enemy with- 
in their gates : 

"Giolitti knew the terms of our treaty with Aus- 
tria and Germany; knew that on May 4, we had 
denounced it — at least so far as Austria is concerned. 
He also knew the terms of our recent agreement with 
the Triple Entente, and the engagements entered into 
by us with France, England, and Russia. Never- 
theless, he is making every effort to compel us to break 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 263 

our given word. ... He is betraying the King and 
the country. ... He is guilty of treason. This is 
not merely a manner of speaking, a simple phrase. 
Giolitti is a traitor according to the usual interpre- 
tation of the word. ... If the Italian Parliament re- 
opens on May 20, we must by every manner and means 
forbid the entrance of the lackeys of the Villa Malta 
and send them back one by one to their master. . . . 
At the Italian Parliament on May 20, the sacred Gari- 
baldian anniversary, the liberation of the country and 
the realisation of its ambitions must alone be pro- 
claimed." '• 

Rome, on learning the confirmation of the news 
of the resignation of the Salandra Government, was 
in an uproar. "War or revolution," was the ugly 
cry that now spread through the remotest corners of 
the Eternal City. Insurrection committees were 
formed, and a barricade was even erected in one of 
the streets. The outburst was not directed against 
the King, but against Giolitti and the Neutralists, 
against the "lackeys of the Villa Malta," as d'An- 
nunzio had branded the pro-Germans. The violence 
of the mob grew. In the streets well-known Neutralists, 
who dared to venture abroad, were openly maltreated. 
The police authorities were forced in the interests of 
pubhc safety to advise Giolitti to leave Rome. 

In the meantime the King was called upon to find 
a solution of the crisis. Victor Emmanuel III, though 
a constitutional monarch in the most exact mean- 
ing of the word, could not fail to take into account 
the will of the majority of his people. One after an- 
other, the most important officials were called in con- 
sultation by the King. This constitutional formality 

1 Corriere delta Sera, May 15, 19 15. 



264 GREATER ITALY 

having been gone through with, the King requested 
M. Salandra to reassume office as Premier and recon- 
stitute his Ministry. Thus assured of the support of 
his sovereign, as well as of that of the people, Salandra 
on May 16 accepted the mandate of the King, and 
was ready to lay before Parliament at its opening 
the project of Italian intervention on the side of the 
Allies. King Victor Emmanuel had by his firm con- 
duct in this crisis averted an armed outbreak which 
might have menaced the existence of the dynasty. 
Had the King chosen to dissolve Parliament, or taken 
any other course than the one followed, grave dis- 
orders would have undoubtedly arisen. The more 
active elements of the population had been aroused 
and incited to action by the impassioned speeches of 
d'Annunzio, and had been led to expect an affirmative 
outcome, a declaration of war. 

On May 20, Parfiament reassembled. The historic 
session opened. D'Annunzio's commands had been 
obeyed. Giolitti, fearing for his fife, had fled to Pied- 
mont. The Neutrahst Deputies, hooted and threatened 
by the crowd, had been compelled to take refuge in 
a hotel adjoining the Chamber the day before the 
session. Here, protected by a strong guard, they 
remained in order to be able to attend the meetings 
unmolested. 

The newly constituted Ministry under M. Salandra, 
having received a vote of confidence, was granted 
full powers. Even the Neutralists, cowed into sub- 
mission, voted for war. D'Annunzio thereupon ar- 
rived at the Chamber. The Deputies rose to their 
feet, and with prolonged cheers acclaimed the poet: 
"Long live d'Annunzio! Long live Italy!" Three 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 265 

days later Italy declared war against Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

Wliat course Italy would have followed had d'An- 
nunzio not appeared on the scene is difficult to deter- 
mine. Before his arrival the work of preparing public 
opinion had been zealously carried on by the Inter- 
ventionists. D'Annunzio did not create the current 
of opinion which brought Italy into the war. He 
merely aroused popular imagination, and by the 
vivid imagery of his speeches, by the searching 
sincerity of his words, made the people visuaUse the 
passions, hopes, and desires which slumbered in their 
hearts. But it cannot be gainsaid that had not some 
such a dynamic force awakened the patriotism of the 
more alert elements of the population, the Giolittian 
Neutrahsts, who controlled a majority of the Chamber, 
would have been able to force the country to accept 
the role of neutrahty and would have prevented 
ItaUan intervention. To d'Annunzio must be al- 
lotted a great share of the responsibiHty for Italy's 
declaration of war. 

Thus the days of neutrahty had come to an end. 
Italy during the ten months which had elapsed since 
the outbreak of the European War had undergone 
a radical national metamorphosis. She had abandoned 
her poUcy of alliance with the Central Empires; had 
emancipated herself from foreign control. She had 
weighed carefully the advantages and disadvantages 
which she might expect to reap from her continued 
neutrahty, and then calmly faced the alternative of 
war. At the outbreak of the European War, the 
great majority of Italians had been strongly in favour 
of neutrality. Even after the campaign of the Inter- 



266 GREATER ITALY 

ventionists had been carried on for many months, 
the great mass of the people still favom-ed non-inter- 
vention. The Neutralist arguments were subtle and 
feasible. The "much can be obtained without war," 
enunciated by Giolitti, and summed up by him in 
the Piedmontese term of parecchio, which was inter- 
preted to mean "a good deal" when referring to 
territorial compensations offered by Austria in return 
for Italy's continued neutrality, had captivated the 
steadier elements of the population. It was then 
that the Salandra Government, making itself the in- 
terpreter of the more virile elements of the country, 
showed signs that it deemed war with the Dual Mon- 
archy inevitable, if Italy were to realise her greater 
territorial ambitions, i maggiori destini d' Italia. 

The nation was quick to respond to the cue given 
it. But there arose the figure of GioHtti, who for 
twelve years had cast his shadow over the pubHc 
life of Italy. He held the reins of power firmly in his 
hands. He had behind him a docile parliamentary 
majority. The Salandra Government knew itself to 
be helpless. 

Who bade d'Annunzio to return to Italy? Who 
intrusted him with the task he so successfully carried 
out ? Was it the Nationalists, or a Francophil coterie 
at Rome? Or was it the private invitation of the 
Salandra Government? Future historians will tell 
us. An account of the struggle of those two mid-May 
weeks has been briefly related. It is the story of a 
nation coming into its own heritage, and forms one 
of the most brilliant pages in the history of the Ital- 
ian people. 

When the effervescent enthusiasm had died down, 



THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 267 

and the Italians took up the business of waging war 
in earnest, M. Salandra, rising to address the vast 
crowds who had assembled on the Capitohne Hill 
(June 3, 1915), eloquently interpreted the feelings of 
the Italian people when he exclaimed: 

''As destiny has allotted to our generation the 
terrible though sublime task of realising the ideal 
of a Greater Italy, which our heroes of the Risor- 
gimento did not live to see, let us undertake this task 
with an invincible courage, ready to give ourselves 
wholly to our country, to give what we are and what 
we have." 



CHAPTER XII 

ITALY AT WAR 

Pebiod of Aloofness. Military and Political Crises. 
Unity 

Italy had entered into the war with her eyes wide 
open, in pursuance of a carefully matured programme 
of poHcy. She had ranged herself on the side of the 
Allies not only to safeguard her vital interests, but 
with the clear intention of increasing not merely her 
prestige and power, but her territory. The scenes of 
enthusiasm for the war against Austria, witnessed in 
Rome, Milan, and elsewhere, were effervescent out- 
bursts of long pent-up feeUngs; they soon died down, 
and the people of Italy prepared themselves calmly 
to face the trials and hardships of war. 

Italy had chosen her own time to open hostilities. 
Though the actual declaration of war was postponed 
for some days, owing to the Giolittian cowp d'etat, 
which gave the Austrians more time to bring up rein- 
forcements and fortify their positions, yet they were 
unable to carry out their long and carefully prepared 
plan, drawn up personally by the Austrian Chief of 
the General Staff, General Conrad von Hotzendorf, 
of a smashing offensive into the Italian plain. Never- 
theless, Austria's strategic superiority was not with- 
out its dangers to the Italians. Italy had to close 
securely her Trentino gates, and see to it that they 
remained tightly shut, for only then would she have 

268 



ITALY AT WAR 269 

a free hand to conduct an offensive in the east. Both 
plans required superhuman efforts on the part of the 
Itahan troops, owing to the geographical configura- 
tion of the boundary-line. In the north the high 
Alpine passes, leading straight down into the Italian 
plain, were in the hands of the Austrians. In the .east 
the Isonzo River and the rock-ribbed Carso plateau pre- 
sented formidable barriers to any advancing armies. 

The Italian General Staff realised fully the dif- 
ficulties of the task which was to be intrusted to 
them. The war which had been raging for nine months 
throughout Europe had taught them many valuable 
lessons. They had learned the advantages to be de- 
rived from a body-blow delivered at the very outset 
of the campaign. If this was an advantage in other 
zones of operations, it was an absolute necessity along 
the Italian battle-line, otherwise Italy would find 
herself in a difficult position; therefore, she prepared 
to wage an offensive campaign. 

Throughout the winter and spring the Italian 
armies had been moulded into shape; the cadres 
brought up to full strength; the transport perfected; 
munition and supply depots arranged for. By the 
end of April everything was in readiness; the ''armed 
neutrahty" declared by Salandra, which the Vienna 
Government had long believed to be a ''bluff," was 
to prove itself an important factor in the early days 
of the war. For when the declaration of war came, 
there was no stoppage of the ordinary life of the coun- 
try; there was none of the chaos and confusion such 
as was witnessed in France when mobilisation was 
ordered there. In Italy on May 22 the general mobil- 
isation orders were issued. Except for the delimita- 



270 GREATER ITALY 

tion of the Zona di Guerra (war zone) — ^which included 
virtually only Venetia and a very small sector of 
Lombardy — a slight delay of some trains, and the 
movement of troop trains, there was little to indicate 
that Italy had entered into the conflict. On May 
25, the King left Rome for General Headquarters, 
where he personally assumed the duties of Commander- 
in-Chief of all the Italian armies, after appointing his 
uncle, the Duke of Genoa, "Lieutenant-General" of 
the Kingdom during his absence. 

The actual control of the conduct of the war was 
intrusted to General Count Luigi Cadorna, the son 
of the General Cadorna who had played such an im- 
portant part in the wars of liberation and had directed 
the operation which resulted in the taking of Rome. 
To the father had been intrusted the task of setting 
the seal of consummation on the plan of Italian unity; 
to the son was to be intrusted the task of bringing 
about the redemption of the Italians who Kved be- 
yond the boundaries and the creation of Greater Italy. 
No man knew better than General Cadorna the dif- 
ficulties which would confront his troops. No man 
knew better than he did the regions of the Trentino 
and Trieste. Though he had never commanded an 
army in the field, his skill as a commander had been 
brilliantly displayed during several Grand Manoeu- 
vres. Furthermore, by his writings on military sub- 
jects he had won for himself a high reputation. His 
"Frontal Attack," first published in 1898, set forth 
lucidly the advantages to be gained by a well-executed 
offensive. The temper of the man is well given in 
his own words, when in the preface of his book he 
remarks: "It is impossible to achieve success in war, 



ITALY AT WAR 271 

if the stanch disciphne of the men is not joined to a 
stern disciphne of the leaders. The first makes the 
body of troops docile in the hands of their chiefs, the 
second makes these capable of guiding the operations 
with that unity of opinion and conception which is 
indispensable to victory." He himself superintended, 
even down to the most minute details, the reorganisa- 
tion of the Itahan armies during the days of neutrality. 
Though hampered by the lack of funds, he was able 
to bring his armies up to a high standard of efl&ciency. 
His organising faculties are remarkable, so that it 
became a byword throughout Italy, soon after the 
outbreak of the war, that "General Cadorna has 
organised his armies too well not to be able to organ- 
ise victory." Possessing in a superior degree calm- 
ness in the face of danger, yet deprecating individual 
bravery as detrimental to the smooth working of the 
mihtary machine; brilHant in his method, though 
consistently, almost ploddingly methodical, he was 
to lead Italy into war as coolly and calmly as though 
it were merely the usual Grand Manoeuvres. The 
sobriety of his communiques won the confidence not 
merely of his troops, but of the civiHan population. 
Trusted implicitly by all Italy, from the King down 
to the humblest peasant, he was to be able to carry 
out his plans of campaign, even at the most crucial 
moments, undisturbed. 

It is beUeved that General Cadorna had planned 
to begin his campaign on May 15, and, thus taking 
the enemy by surprise, to carry the warfare by swift, 
bold strokes deep into the enemy country. The 
machinations of Prince Biilow and Giolitti prevented 
this plan from being realised, and the enemy had ten 



272 GREATER ITALY 

days at his disposal to reinforce his positions as soon 
as he saw that war was inevitable. Yet General 
Cadorna kept to the main outline of his plan. In one 
mighty bound, along Italy's four-hundred-mile Aus- 
trian frontier, from the Stelvio at nine thousand feet 
above sea-level, to the shores of the Adriatic, the 
Italian troops sprang forward. During the first days 
of the campaign the Italians secured the keys to the 
passes leading into Italy, while the Austrians retired 
all along the line to well-fortified positions. The war 
had been everywhere carried into enemy territory. 
The Austrians offered little resistance. It was obvious 
that General Cadorna planned to carry on his offen- 
sive in the east, at the same time exerting an ever- 
increasing pressure in the north. 

The operations along the Isonzo were, however, 
hampered. Mistakes and delays occurred during those 
first days which, though perhaps inevitable, cost the 
Italian armies many valuable lives. The crossing of 
the Isonzo, which it was hoped to carry out in a few 
days, was delayed three weeks, and it was not until 
June 18, that a general forward movement was made. 
But the Austrian guns, posted on the Carso heights, 
still dominated the river, which is here nearly a mile 
wide. The Italians worked with dauntless courage 
to repair the broken bridges, to build new ones, to 
get across the river by boats. It was at Sagrado that 
the most determined attacks were made. By dint 
of persistent efforts and dogged courage, the ItaHans 
crossed the river, established themselves firmly at 
Sagrado, and pushed up the flank of the Carso to 
Castello Nuovo. By June 27, the Italians held the 
bridge-head, which now made it possible to carry on 



ITALY AT WAR 273 

a general attack on the Carso. Soon a general ad- 
vance began, so that early in July the Italians had 
everywhere crossed the lower Isonzo and securely 
held its left bank. Only in one sector the two almost 
impregnable positions of the Monte Sabotino and the 
Podgora, defending the town of Gorizia, the former 
rising two thousand feet and the latter eight hundred 
above the plain and fortified with great skill by the 
Austrians, remained in Austrian hands on the right 
bank. Though the ItaHans made repeated assaults, 
one of which at least almost succeeded, the fire of the 
enemy batteries, posted on even higher peaks beyond 
the river, drove off the assailants, and the fighting 
soon settled down to trench-warfare. In the region 
of the upper Isonzo minor successes were gained by 
the Itahans. 

In the Alpine regions the Alpini battalions, the most 
daring mountain troops in the world, had achieved 
astonishing successes. They climbed over seemingly 
impassable rock ledges; they clambered up perpen- 
dicular cliffs and drove out the Austrians. As they 
advanced the resistance of the enemy stiffened. By 
the end of June the impetuous onslaught of the Ital- 
ian mountain regiments had slackened. The Alpini 
dug themselves in, and here as elsewhere trench fight- 
ing began. 

It was soon found that the enemy had been able 
to spare more troops from his Galician front than had 
been expected, and that he was equipped with a more 
numerous artillery than the Italians. Above all, his 
skilful and flexible use of his heavy guns had rendered 
the task of assault difficult. Though the Italians 
had settled down to trench-warfare, this did not mean 



274 GREATER ITALY 

that they had abandoned their offensive tactics. 
Along the Isonzo they pushed their trenches forward 
and kept the enemy constantly engaged. Steadily 
the pressure along the whole Carso line continued. 
The Italians took many prisoners, and were daily 
consohdating their positions more strongly. Suddenly, 
during the last week in July, the Austrians began a 
furious offensive. The attack was well conducted, but 
the Italians by bringing up reserves soon counter- 
attacked with increased vigour. For nearly a fortnight 
the battle raged violently with varying fortunes. The 
crest of the Carso was won and again lost by the 
Italians, and when the fighting ceased at the beginning 
of the second week in August the Italians found them- 
selves established in strong positions close to the top 
of the plateau. 

Throughout the summer the fighting in the high 
Alps continued. It was more in the nature of skir- 
mishes and brushes with the enemy, than well-defined 
warfare. The Austrians frequently held niches above 
ravines commanding an important fine of communi- 
cations, where a corporal's squad with a machine-gun 
or two and plenty of ammunition could do an im- 
mense amount of damage to transport columns and 
passing troops, until destroyed by a bold assault on 
the part of a few intrepid volunteers. The Itahans 
were slowly gaining the summits. The fighting was 
now carried on from at seven to nine thousand feet 
above sea-level. The Austrians under the protection of 
their heavy-cahbre guns, which jutted out from thick 
armoured, revolving turrets on the mountain tops, 
were able to maintain themselves in relative security. 
The task of destroying these gun emplacements was 



ITALY AT WAR 275 

stupendous. The Italian forces had to bring up their 
big guns. There were no roads. Roads were built. 
Then by hand, by harnessing a company, even a 
battalion to one gun, the guns were hauled slowly 
and laboriously to the mountain tops. Artillery 
duels followed, while the infantry remained inactive 
until the enemy guns were silenced and the infantry 
could then move forward. 

Winter set in early, but the Alpini did not abandon 
their positions. By the end of September deep snow 
had made the high Alps almost impenetrable. Yet 
these mountain troops stuck to their posts. The 
silence of the Alpine valleys was suddenly and unex- 
pectedly disturbed by the crash of exploding shells 
or a dull hiss as the hot metal buried itself deep in 
the new-banked snow. Thus the heights above the 
valley of Cortina d'Ampezzo were mastered. The 
Monte Baldo, and the mountains dominating the Val 
Sugana and the Val Lagarina and all the other valleys 
which converge on Trent, one by one fell into Italian 
hands. But the work was slow, and throughout the 
winter and early spring the positions maintained were 
relatively unchanged. 

On the Isonzo the campaign was active, even if 
no great progress was recorded. During October 
and November the fighting continued. The Italians 
attacked furiously, hoping to gain the Monte Sabo- 
tino. They advanced their trench Hues, and once, 
early in November, actually held the heights, but 
were obHged to evacuate the position. Nor was the 
enemy inactive. He fought doggedly and never gave 
ground until it had been dearly paid for. The morale 
of the Itahan troops was excellent. Though their 



276 GREATER ITALY 

offensive had not progressed as rapidly as they had 
desired, they were everywhere fighting on enemy 
territory. Two thousand square miles of the cherished 
Italia irredente had been redeemed, including 125 
villages and townships, with a normal population 
of nearly 100,000 inhabitants. 

While General Cadorna was vigorously prosecut- 
ing his campaign, the attitude of Italy at large re- 
mained perplexing. The country had entered into 
the war in the face of a Parliament whose majority 
was distinctly Neutralist. After the ''week of Pas- 
sion," as d'Annunzio so strikingly characterised those 
eventful May days, which culminated in the historic 
session of May 20 and the declaration of war, the 
country regained its normal aspect with astonishing 
rapidity. Not two weeks elapsed before the Germans 
(for though Rome had broken off diplomatic rela- 
tions with Berlin, numerous partisans remained to 
take up their cause) were again at work. Italy had 
declared war against Austria. There were few who 
were in favour of declaring war on Germany. The 
most active Interventionists had hoped that the 
declaration of war would come from Berlin. But 
when the weeks passed, and Germany maintained 
an attitude of stolid silence, it became evident that 
the Germans had other plans. 

The position of M. Salandra was one beset with 
difficulties. He had skilfully guided Italy into the 
war, and was a sincere Interventionist, yet he reaHsed 
that the Chamber was still controlled by Giolitti; 
that the majority was still secretly Neutralist while he 
himself commanded only a small following. Further- 



ITALY AT WAR 277 

more M. Salandra's part in Italian public affairs had 
been local in character. ''A modest burgher of Apulia," 
as he was wont to characterise himself, he was not in 
the habit of thinking nationally; he displayed few of 
those qualities of statesmanship, the breadth of view 
or the bold initiative needed in such a crisis. He had 
led the country into war, and having thereby won the 
high esteem of the majority of the Italian people, it 
seemed as though he felt that his task had been ac- 
complished. A warm friend and admirer of Baron 
Sonnino, whose faithful lieutenant he had been until 
he had rallied to the Giolittian majority in 1913, Sa- 
landra had called Baron Sonnino to the Foreign Office, 
and together they had laboured in the cause of war. 
However, neither possessed the gift of magnetic leader- 
ship necessary to inspire the country with buoyant 
confidence. As was to be expected, it was soon evi- 
dent that the Government had lost touch with Par- 
liament and the people. 

Though Italy had entered the war on the side of 
the Alhes, during the first months she seemed to wish 
to let it be known that she was fighting her own war 
independently; that Italy's war against Austria was 
only indirectly connected with the war being waged 
along the other fronts. Italy maintained an attitude 
of aloofness towards the Alhed Powers. They, in turn, 
regarded Italy with some misgivings. The fact that 
Italy had not altogether broken off indirect commer- 
cial intercourse with Germany, and that goods from 
Italy were still reaching Germany, rankled in their 
minds. The belief that some secret arrangement be- 
tween Rome and Berlin existed, readily gained wide 
credence in both France and England. Though there 



278 GREATER ITALY 

was no truth in these rumours as circulated, the com- 
mercial agreement/ entered into by Italy before the 
rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany, was dis- 
torted to fit the circumstances. The Salandra Govern- 
ment did not exert itself to dispel the false impression 
which had gained currency, so that it was not sur- 
prising that Italy was regarded with increasing sus- 
picion abroad. 

In Italy itself there was a party with German 
affiliations, who soon after the declaration of war 
began a campaign in favour of what came to be known 
as la piccola guerra or ''small war," which meant 
that Italy should only put forth a half-hearted effort, 
instead of energetically prosecuting the war. It can- 
not be denied that during the early months many 
obstacles were placed in the way of mobilising Italian 
resources to the fullest for war purposes. The peculiar 
timidity of Governments, which manifested itself in 
all the Allied States, in London as well as in Paris and 
Petrograd, where the several Cabinets, fearing pop- 
ular discontent, were afraid to ask their countries to 
bear burdens which were subsequently looked upon 
as trifling, was a contributing factor in preventing the 
Salandra Ministry from pursuing a vigorous policy, 
though the nation at large was ready and eager to 
bear manfully its share. 

On August 21, Italy declared war on Turkey. This 
action was taken in view of Italy's increasing interests 
in ^gean affairs, more particularly in Asia Minor, 
rather than from any probabihty of direct conflict, 
though the Turks had stirred up some trouble in 
Libya. The declaration of war against Germany was, 
1 See page 205. 



ITALY AT WAR 279 

however, still deferred. The active Interventionists 
became restive. Parliament was not to reopen be- 
fore December 1. It soon became known that the 
Itahan forces in the field did not possess the neces- 
sary munitions to carry on an aggressive campaign, 
and that this was the main cause of the slow prog- 
ress on the Isonzo. Machine-guns and heavy-cahbre 
artillery were also lacking. To this was added the 
report of a shortage of coal, due to insufficient trans- 
portation facilities. Other disquieting rumours soon 
gathered strength, yet the Government vouchsafed 
no explanations, and the country was left in the darJc 
as to the true circumstances. 

It is doubtless true that the discontent rife in Italy 
was increased by the fact that the war was going 
against the Allies. In October Italy declared war on 
Bulgaria, and still the long-expected declaration of 
war against Germany was once again postponed.. 
The position of Italy had grown increasingly dif- 
ficult. In France and Great Britain it was not easily 
forgotten that for thirty-three years Italy had been 
alHed to the Central Empires, and that the treaty 
of alliance with Germany had not been denounced. 
In Paris and London it could not be understood 
why Italy had not declared war on Germany. No 
temporising excuses were accepted. At home there 
was an increasing number of Italians who were strongly 
dissatisfied with Italy's ambiguous position. At this 
time the cry arose for greater solidarity among the 
Allies. Italy must co-operate more closely with the 
Allies, both militarily and politically. 

On December 1, the day of the opening of the 
Chamber, Baron Sonnino, in the course of a speech 



280 GREATER ITALY 

on Italy's foreign relations, announced that Italy 
had formally adhered to the Pact of London, pledging 
herself not to sign a separate peace. This was a first 
step in the right direction. About this time Italy 
arranged to make use of the German ships interned 
in Italian ports, 'Ho be paid for after the war," in 
order to relieve the shortage of tonnage which was 
daily growing more acute. 

The year 1915 closed with the country in a state of 
restless uneasiness. The Government had failed to 
come forward with a clear-cut statement of the situ- 
ation. Though the integrity of Sonnino and Salan- 
dra was above reproach, their methods had done 
much to leave doubts in men's minds as to Italy's 
aims and intentions. 

The military situation in the Near East was caus- 
ing serious concern to the Allies. The Austro-German 
armies under von Mackensen had swept across the 
Balkans; Serbia had been crushed and the Austrian 
forces were now directing their energies to the con- 
quering of Montenegro and Albania. Their advance 
was -not long delayed. On January 12 (1916) the 
news reached Rome that Cettinje had fallen in the 
hands of the Austrians, and that the Montenegrins 
were retreating towards the Albanian coast. On 
January 28, the Italian forces occupied Durazzo. It 
was now decided to rescue the Serbian army, which 
had retreated through Albania to the coast, as well 
as the scattered forces of the Montenegrins, together 
with the civilian population which had fled before 
the invaders. This task was intrusted to the Itahan 
navy. The work was beset with great peril. Enemy 
submarines infested the Adriatic, yet the undertaking 



ITALY AT WAR 281 

was successfully carried out. The Serbian armies, 
estimated at over 50,000 men, were transported to 
Corfu. The sick and wounded, as well as the civilian 
population, were taken to Italy; stores and supplies 
were taken over to Albania; Italian troops were 
transported; in all 250,000 men and 10,000 horses, 
with supplies, etc., were safely carried. Italy had 
fulfilled the task intrusted to her with remarkable 
ability. Her forces held on at Durazzo until the 
town was completely evacuated, and then only retired 
on Avlona, which they continued to hold. Notwith- 
standing Italy's admirable work of rescue in Albania, 
the rumour soon spread that Italy was in part to 
blame for the defeats of the Allies in the Balkans, as 
she had refused to send a force to Salonika to co- 
operate with the French and British. No consider- 
ation was taken of the fact that Italy had first to 
protect her own battle-line, and that she could spare 
no men or guns for a far-distant expedition. 

But the effort to secure close co-operation among 
the Allies was now being systematically carried out. 
In February M. Briand, the French Premier, came 
to Rome to pave the way for the politico-military 
conference of the Allies which was to take place the 
following month in Paris. Here, on March 27, M. 
Salandra, Baron Sonnino, and General Cadorna for 
the first time came in personal, official contact with 
the representatives of the Allied Governments. Hence- 
forth Italy was to act in close co-operation with her 
AlHes in all matters, whether diplomatic, military, or 
economic. The effect of this conference was of great 
value in co-ordinating closely the joint efforts of the 
AlHes. Exchanges of official visits also took place be- 



282 GREATER ITALY 

tween Great Britain and Italy. General Cadorna 
visited London; Mr. Asquith came to Rome and paid 
his respects to King Victor Emmanuel at the Italian 
front. The relations between Italy and her AlHes 
now entered upon a new phase of friendliness and 
mutual confidence. Italy no longer was isolated in 
the war, fighting her own battles unaided; she had 
finked her fortunes with those of the AUies, yet re- 
tained her liberty of action. In the words of Baron 
Sonnino, who, speaking in the Chamber on April 16, 
declared : 

"Our aim is simple: to fight with all our strength 
in the common cause, at the same time protecting the 
supreme, vital interests of the nation." 

The steps towards a closer co-operation with the 
Allies had greatly strengthened the Government, 
but the question of declaring war against Germany 
still hung like a dark cloud over the horizon. It has 
often been suggested that Italian statesmen are fond 
of dalljdng with equivocal situations, and that in 
their desire to appear crafty, their diplomacy often 
becomes entangled in the woof of their own weaving. 
It is impossible as yet to determine whether the Sa- 
landra Government aimed purposely to continue its 
semi-friendly relations with Germany or whether it 
was afraid to break off entirely with Germany, in 
view of the strong pro-German sentiments which 
still existed in Italy. The disasters which had be- 
faUen Allied arms in the eastern theatre of war — ^the 
conquest of Poland and much Russian territory, of 
Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania — the Titan blows 
which the German armies were striking at Verdun 



ITALY AT WAR 283 

made it appear desirable to many Italians not to pro- 
voke a war with Germany, who still loomed all-power- 
ful. The Government at all events continued its 
course unchanged. The Interventionist members of 
the Chamber were now consolidated into a hloc of 
140 members under the leadership of M. Bissolati, 
the brilliant Socialist Deputy who at the outbreak of 
the war had volunteered for active services, and was a 
sergeant in an Alpini battaUon. They had hoped for 
a reconstruction of the Cabinet which would lead to 
a more vigorous prosecution of the war. But M. 
Bissolati was unwilhng to precipitate a crisis. He 
counselled patience and prudence, and urged his 
followers not to upset the Government, even though 
he himself would have been the first to welcome the 
declaration of an energetic policy in the prosecution 
of the war. On the other hand, the Official Socialists, 
who numbered 36 members of the Chamber, were still 
solidly opposed to the war, and daily voiced embit- 
tered criticisms of the Government for having dragged 
Italy into the conflict. At the same time the impor- 
tant group of Germanophiles, who had numerous sup- 
porters throughout Italy, frankly stated that though 
Italy's declaration of war against Austria was justi- 
fied and justifiable, to declare war on Germany would 
be an act of wholly unwarranted aggression. 

On the battle-fields of the Isonzo, with the return 
of spring, activity was being renewed. The German 
onslaught at Verdun, which the French were heroically 
withstanding, had brought to the fore more insistently 
than ever the cry for unity of action on all the fronts. 
Some even went so far as to suggest that Italy should 



284 GREATER ITALY 

send an expeditionary force to France. But the Ital- 
ian Higher Command knew that in the near future it 
would need all its available strength. However, a 
heavy bombardment was opened along the Isonzo, 
and though no general assault took place, this diver- 
sion had a salutary effect, and stopped the Austrians 
from transporting artillery to France. 

The reason why the Italians were unable to assist the 
French at this time soon was made known. Dur- 
ing the winter months the Austrians had been slowly 
concentrating a considerable force in the Trentino. 
Spurred on by Austria's recent successes in the Bal- 
kans, General Conrad could not resist the temptation 
of putting into execution his long-matured plan for 
the invasion of Italy. There can be no doubt that it 
seemed certain that with due caution, adequate prepara- 
tion, and sufficient effectives both in men and guns, 
the project would succeed. The prospect was allur- 
ing. Russia was, at this time, so it was believed 
within the Central Empires, wholly hors de combat, 
and before she could take the field again it was pro- 
posed to break through the Italian defenses in the 
Trentino, pour into the Italian plain, and thus getting 
in behind General Cadorna's main forces operating 
on the Isonzo, crush the armies of Italy by one swift 
stroke. Once the Austrians were in the Venetian 
plain, they were confident that Italy would be ready 
to sue for peace. 

A glance at the map will readily show that this 
"Napoleonic" plan of campaign offered many chances 
of success. The Italian forces had pushed northward, 
up through the chaotic valley systems which converge 
on Trent, without much regard for the defensive 



ITALY AT WAR 285 

strength of their positions. They held a Hne, in the 
sector which was to be the scene of the great battle, 
running roughly from a point a little south of Rovereto, 
north of the Col Santo, supported by the Pasubio, 
which has an altitude of 7,353 feet, then following 
the old Italian frontier Hne across the Valle Maggie 
and the Val Sugana to the Monte Collo, northwest 
of Borgo. For nearly a year the Italians had been 
carrying on an offensive campaign, and as the enemy 
had never counter-attacked in force, the result was 
that in certain sectors the Italians had neglected to 
strengthen their positions as adequately as would have 
been desirable. The rumours of an impending Aus- 
trian offensive were current as early as March, but as 
time wore on and the enemy made no move, whatever 
apprehensions there may have been were quieted, 
more particularly so as the Italian General Staff had 
learned of the great offensive preparations of the 
Russians, in their southern sector, and they could 
not believe that Austria would dare to weaken her 
Eastern front. 

The young Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, the 
Heir Apparent of the Hapsburg throne,^ arrived in 
Trent to take command in person of the invading 
forces; while General Conrad hovered in the back- 
ground, retouching his strategy and amending his tac- 
tics. Fifteen divisions, totalling 350,000 men, the 
picked troops of the Dual Monarchy, were gathered 
here for this great undertaking. The most powerful 
big guns which Austria possessed had been brought 
from remote confines of the Empire and beyond, and 
were now concentrated along the short sector of the 
1 The present Emperor Charles I. 



286 GREATER ITALY 

battle-line, stretching from the Val Sugana to the Val 
Lagarina. Here forty-five great 12-inch howitzers from 
the Skodawerke, which had reduced Li^ge, Antwerp, 
and Laon in the West, Novo Georgievsk, Ivangorod, 
and Brest Litovsk in the East, the most powerful, 
easily handled heavy-calibre guns that have been 
used in this war, were disposed along the Alpine pla- 
teaux, ready to move forward and batter down all 
resistance. There were, furthermore, at least six of 
the monster German 420-mm. guns, and as many more 
long-range 15-inch naval guns, to say nothing of the 
smaller calibres. It is estimated that over 2,000 pieces 
of artillery were massed along a short front, extending 
not much over 22 miles — that is to say nearly 100 
guns to the mile, or one gun every 20 yards. Great 
reserves of munitions were piled up, and it was soon 
evident that the Strafexpedition or ^'punitive ex- 
pedition," as the Austrians termed their proposed 
offensive, was to be carried out on a formidable scale. 
Everything was done to arouse the enthusiasm of 
the polyglot divisions of the Hapsburg realm. The 
beauties of the rich Venetian plain were extolled, 
and it was noisily proclaimed that this was to be the 
final offensive, and that the crushing of the Italians 
would bring about the end of the war. 

During the last week in April, General Cadorna, 
after making a tour of inspection of the Trentino 
defenses, took up his headquarters with the First 
Army, commanded by General Brusati,^ which held 
what was to be the centre of the battle-Hne; as it was 

1 General Brusati was removed from his command of the First Army 
at the opening of the Austrian offensive and was retired from the army a 
few weeks later. 



ITALY AT WAR 287 

evident that the General commanding here had made 
insufficient provision in the event of a strong attack, 
the Commander-in-Chief set about to remedy the 
defective defenses. The ItaHan Hues in the Trentino 
were at best ill-suited to hold up an assault pushed 
home with the vigour which modern artillery has 
made possible. The valleys leading into the Italian 
plain radiate, fan-like, from Trent as a centre. The 
Austrians could choose any of these six valleys as a 
channel to pour into the plain. The Italian lines of 
defense were isolated and only poorly provided with 
lateral communications. General Cadorna expected 
a violent attack, but had not counted on the tremen- 
dous battering ram of shells which crumpled the Ital- 
ian advance positions when the bombardment opened 
on May 14. The attack began with a general bom- 
bardment along the whole front from the Val Guidi- 
caria to the Adriatic, and was of peculiar violence at 
Monfalcone. But it was soon evident that the Aus- 
trian Command was well informed as to the weakest 
link in the Italian trench line, and concentrated its 
greatest efforts there. It was along the sector between 
the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana that the main 
attack developed. Prolonged bombardments of un- 
precedented violence were followed up by massed in- 
fantry attacks, driven home with great skill. The 
co-ordination of the Austrian artillery fire was ad- 
mirable, and in no battle of the European War had 
artillery been used more efficaciously, and at the 
same time more flexibly in delivering its full force 
where most effective. 

The Austrian blow was well aimed, and it would 
be useless to deny that Italy reeled under the on- 



288 GREATER ITALY 

slaught. The Italian troops were forced slowly but 
continuously backward. Step by step the Austrian 
armies advanced under the cover of their big guns, 
which were moved forward with unusual celerity. 
The Italians were compelled to evacuate their advance 
positions. Their lines of communication were seriously 
disturbed by the Austrian long-distance fire. Aus- 
trian shells were now dropping ten miles behind the 
ItaKan first-line trenches. Italian towns and villages, 
which had hitherto been immune from the destruction 
of war, were razed to the ground by the great Austrian 
shells which fell thickly on the Asiago and Asiero 
plateaux. A great stream of refugees, with their goods 
and chattels and flocks of goats and cattle, hurried 
to safety in the plain, as the highlands of the fertile 
Sette Communi now came within the range of battle. 
The Itahans fought everywhere with unusual courage 
and determination, but it was impossible to withstand 
the deadly enemy shell fire. Along this sector there 
were few bomb-proof dugouts, few shelters, and to 
hold out beyond a certain limit meant an unnecessary 
and needless sacrifice of life. The task of checking 
the advance was further hampered by the lack of an 
adequate number of guns. The Austrians continued 
to advance. Thereupon General Cadorna decided 
to withdraw his centre, to the south of the Posina 
torrent, in order to consolidate his position. This 
manoeuvre meant the abandonment of much valuable 
territory, but there was no alternative, as the Italians 
were still outnumbered four to one both in men and 
guns. The Austrians were now pouring down from the 
heights, and the Italians had no time to dig them- 
selves in. Trench-warfare was abandoned. Great 



ITALY AT WAR 289 

masses of troops were manoeuvring in the open. The 
battle raged on the mountain tops and in the valleys. 
On the heights the contending armies were fighting 
in the snow; in the valleys the heat and dust of the 
Italian mid-May days was suffocating. 

The operations of withdrawal, which now brought 
the battle-line several miles beyond the old ItaUan 
boundary into Italy, were successfully carried out by 
May 22. The Austrian attack had now slackened, but 
it was only a temporary lull in the battle, which was 
to be resumed with renewed fury within a very few 
days. In fact by the 24th, the Austrians' onslaught on 
the left centre was renewed with increasing violence. 
There seemed to be no shortage in the Austrian supply 
of shells, of which the expenditure had been prodigious. 
The Italian resistance was now beginning to stiffen, 
yet the situation was still precarious. On the right 
centre the enemy was pressing steadily onward; he had 
crossed the Posina and was pushing southward. To 
the east in the Altipiano dei Sette Communi, the 
Itahans were compelled to evacuate its chief centre, 
Asiago. The fighting continued desperately. Only 
three miles of highland country lay between the Aus- 
trians and the ItaUan plain. Already General Cadorna 
had made provision for the constitution of a new army 
for the defense of Venetia. The organising capacity 
of the Italian General Staff was here put to a supreme 
test. Notwithstanding the great battle that was 
being fought in the highlands, in less than ten days, 
centring around Vicenza, a complete army of 500,000 
men with mule and motor transport columns, field 
kitchens, sanitary corps, as well as its full comple- 
ment both of men and guns was assembled ready for 



290 GREATER ITALY 

action, and during all this time a steady stream of 
reinforcements, munitions, and supplies was being 
despatched to the troops in action. 

On the evening of June 1, it seemed as though the 
Austrian invasion of Italy had succeeded. Only two 
short miles lay between the Austrians and the plain. 
In massed formation the enemy came on resolutely, 
to break down the last remaining barrier. Blow upon 
blow, well aimed and carried out with astonishing 
valour and great courage, was directed at these last 
Italian defenses, but General Cadorna's men had 
been ordered to die in their positions, rather than give 
ground. The hom* had struck for Italy to show her 
mettle, and it found the Italians ready. The at- 
tacks of the Austrians had not slackened; they had 
the advantage of terrain as well as a superiority in 
artillery, yet the Itahans held on. It would be im- 
possible to recount even fragmentarily the heroic 
fighting of those early June days. It was not one 
battle but a hundred battles fused into one terrible 
struggle. The Austrians stood on the heights looking 
down into the Italian plain. Before them lay the rich 
cities of Venetia: Vicenza, Bassano, Padua; even 
Venice and the Adriatic could be faintly discerned 
through the haze. Sixty-six invasions have been 
launched into Italy since the days of Rome, and of 
these only nine had failed. Would this invasion, 
the most carefully planned and executed, as well as 
the greatest of them all, succeed? For a week the 
decision hung in the balance. Again and again, with 
sledge-hammer blows, the massed columns of the Aus- 
trian infantry advanced to the attack and broke 
against the Italian lines. The Italians were still com- 



ITALY AT WAR 291 

pelled to give ground, but at no point were they 
obliged to surrender an important position. 

By June 3 General Cadorna, who throughout the 
fortnight of fighting had not sought to deceive the 
country as to the gravity of the situation, was able 
to announce that the imminent danger of invasion 
had passed. The fighting still continued with un- 
abated fury. The Austrians renewed their onslaught, 
and the Italians now fought with increased stubborn- 
ness. The great army which had been mobilised for 
the defense of the plain was now sent forward to 
take part in the battle in the highlands. The Aus- 
trians, seeing their prize eluding them, fought with 
desperation. The Italians throughout the second and 
third weeks in June had to meet repeated assaults, 
executed with great gallantry and skill. But the 
tide had begun to turn. The mastery of battle now 
lay with the ItaHans, but the Austrians would not 
concede defeat. They poured an unending stream of 
shells on the Italian lines; their attacks were still 
pushed home with vigour. The Itahans suffered ter- 
rible losses. In some brigades as high as 60 per cent 
of the cadres, including officers, were wiped out. 

The Italians from all over the peninsula had vied 
with each other in indomitable courage to turn the 
tide of invasion. The early onslaughts were stayed 
by the Sicilians; the Ligurians, the Calabrians, the 
Sardinian troops, all had a part in the fierce fighting. 
But the greatest share of the terrific struggle fell to 
the Alpini battalions. They won immortal glory in 
the defense of the last fines of trenches against which 
the invading armies stormed in vain, and when the 
current of battle turned and the Italians, on June 25, 



292 GREATER ITALY 

began to drive the Austrians before them the Alpini 
were in the vanguard of every assault and blasted 
open the road which made possible the advance of 
General Cadorna's main forces. 

During the last week in June the Austrians began to 
retire. The Italians were now in a position to move 
forward. The fighting was difficult. The Austrians 
withdrew slowly, destroying the towns and villages 
in their path, but they held on stubbornly to the 
heights, and were only driven out after hot fighting. 
The Italians were now taking numbers of prisoners, 
and gathering in many guns, stores, and other booty 
abandoned by the enemy. 

By the first week in July the great battle of the 
Trentino had come to an end. The Austrians still 
held a line, roughly from about three to seven miles 
in advance of their former positions before the be- 
ginning of the offensive, and they dug themselves in 
firmly in their new positions, but the great objective 
of the offensive had failed miserably. Italy was saved 
from invasion, but, more than this, the great battle 
had given the Italian troops a renewed and greater 
confidence in themselves, and the world at large who 
were informed of the prowess of the Italians could 
not fail to be impressed by the greatness of this achieve- 
ment. No other battle of the European War, with 
the possible exception of the assault on the fortress 
of Verdun, brought forth a more potently concentrated 
mass of artillery on so short a frontal sector. Even 
the defense of Verdun presented no such difficult 
problem as that which faced the defending armies in 
the Trentino when the Austrian attack was once 
launched. 



ITALY AT WAR 293 

It has been suggested that had not General Bru- 
silof early in June initiated his great drive in the East, 
which was to sweep the Russians rapidly through the 
Bukowina, and thus prevented new forces from being 
despatched to the Trentino, the Austrian attack here 
would have succeeded. It cannot be denied that the 
Russian thrust in the East was of timely assistance, 
but this can in no way detract from the greatness of 
the Italian exploit. General Cadorna had won a great 
victory, the significance of which is not even to-day 
fully appreciated. He did more than merely to stem 
an invasion; he proclaimed Italian unity on the battle- 
field. Here for the first time in the history of the 
ItaHan people, Italians from all parts of the peninsula, 
from the North, the South, the mountains, and the 
plain, had a share in the fighting, and acquitted 
themselves in a manner worthy of the highest admi- 
ration. 

While Italy was in the throes of the greatest battle 
of her war, with the Austrians pushing onward, another 
crisis arose within her boundaries which was precip- 
itated by this event. The discontent with the Salan- 
dra Government had steadily grown during the spring 
months, though it was kept in check by a desire not to 
appear disunited in face of the enemy. When the 
Chamber reopened on June 6, it was evident that 
unless M. Salandra departed radically from his atti- 
tude of aloofness he would soon be in open conflict 
with the Chamber, which would lead to his down- 
fall. The Chamber was in a restless frame of mind. 
The Government had maintained absolute silence re- 
garding the military situation in the Trentino, and 
insisted on pursuing routine business. The Chamber 



294 GREATER ITALY 

bowed to the demand and passed financial bills in 
rapid succession without discussion. Thereupon M. 
Salandra, in demanding a vote of confidence on June 
10, made a reference to the war which may have been 
the truth, but which, under the circumstances, was 
decidedly tactless. In speaking of the defensive posi- 
tions of the Trentino and the Austrian oJEfensive, he 
remarked : 

"We must manfully recognise that had the posi- 
tions been better prepared and better defended, these 
positions would have at least held out longer." 

Here was an open criticism of the Italian Higher 
Command which, though it was not directed against 
General Cadorna personally, but rather against Gen- 
eral Brusati, spoken by the head of the Government 
in so grave a moment, could only be interpreted as 
an accusation. It was evident that M. Salandra was 
sincere when he spoke, and that he did not wish to 
give the country mere sentimental bombast, but it 
was also patent that he was tired of the struggle with 
a recalcitrant Parliament, and that if he had to fall 
it would be by his own hand rather than by that of 
another. As was inevitable, the Government motion 
for a vote of confidence was defeated; two days later 
M. Salandra announced his resignation. The men 
who had compassed his overthrow did so actuated by 
the most diverse motives; the Official Socialists and 
Giohttians because he had led the country into war; 
the Interventionists because he had not prosecuted the 
war with sufficient vigour. 

The King, who for a year had been living unin- 
terruptedly at the front and had personally visited 



ITALY AT WAR 295 

all the zones and sectors of his long and varied battle- 
line, was obUged to return to select a new Premier. 
Though M. Salandra had by his lack of souplesse 
ahenated the sympathy of many, he, nevertheless, 
was still strong in the country, and the King was 
unwilHng that he should not remain at his post at the 
head of a larger, more representative Ministry. But 
apparently M. Salandra wished to retire. The In- 
terventionists loudly clamoured for a National Min- 
istry which would take firm hold of the business of 
waging war with greater zeal and energy. After due 
consultations M. Boselh, the dean of Itahan Deputies, 
was intrusted with the formation of a ''National 
Cabinet." It was a difficult task. It was held desir- 
able to have Baron Sonnino remain at the Foreign 
Office, but he was unwilhng to do so unless M. Sa- 
landra also remained in the Cabinet. Baron Sonnino's 
objections were finally overcome, and after some de- 
lays, on June 18, the composition of the National 
Ministry was announced. 

The new Ministry had been increased in size from 
13 to 19 members, in order to include in so far as pos- 
sible the representatives of all ParHamentary 'groups. 
Here for the first time we find a Catholic and a Re- 
pubHcan with a portfolio in the same Cabinet, which 
also included a Sociahst, M. Bissolati, the leader of 
the Interventionists. The Salandra Ministry thus 
came to an end, and the new National Ministry took 
up the reins of power. M. Salandra's name, however, 
stands in high honour in his country; he played a 
leading part in the work of constructing the new 
Cabinet. For the first time in many years the name 
of Giolitti was not openly mentioned, though he re- 



296 GREATER ITALY 

turned to Rome from his home in Piedmont about 
this time, for the first time in nearly a year. 

M. BoselH, though seventy-eight years of age, 
with an unquenchable optimism assumed the respon- 
sibilities of government, and was soon to give proof 
that the National Ministry was to keep its pledge to 
prosecute the war with full energy. 

While the ministerial crisis may be regarded as an 
affair of internal politics, the attention of the world 
was soon to be centred on Italy's battle-line. General 
Cadorna, though busy parrying the Austrian blow in 
the Trentino with his left hand, when the danger of 
invasion had passed set to work immediately to pre- 
pare for his own advance in the East. With the guns 
still thundering in the Trentino, and with the ItaHans 
still keeping the enemy busily engaged there, the 
great final assault against the Podgora and the Monte 
Sabotino was launched. The onslaught was irresis- 
tible. The Italians drove the enemy before them, 
cleared the heights which dominated Gorizia, crossed 
the Isonzo, captured the city, and by August 14, ten 
days after this great offensive thrust had begun, they 
had pushed their fine forward along the Carso and 
firmly held Gorizia. These operations netted the 
ItaHans not only a great gain of territory, including 
the city of Gorizia, which next to Trieste is the largest 
city of Italia irredenta, but 18,758 Austrian prisoners, 
including 393 officers, and 32 large-calibre guns, be- 
sides great quantities of munitions, machine-guns, 
rifles, etc. 

This was but the first of a series of vigorous offen- 
sives which General Cadorna was to carry out on the 
Carso front, extending from Gorizia southward. To- 
wards the middle of September another movement was 



ITALY AT WAR 297 

initiated here, which gained for the ItaHans several 
important positions, including San Grado and some 
4,000 prisoners. This was quickly followed by a third 
and even more powerful blow, which straightened 
out the Italian lines which had by this time eaten deep 
into the Carso plateau. In a furious surprise attack, 
developed October 10, the Italians were able to take 
nearly 8,000 prisoners. But General Cadorna would 
give the enemy no respite, and three weeks later, dur- 
ing the first days of November, he launched another 
assault along this same front, which, though tena- 
ciously opposed, left 8,982 prisoners in his hands, be- 
sides guns and war materiel of all sorts, making in all 
over 40,000 Austrian prisoners, including 1,008 officers 
taken by the Itahans during three months' fighting on 
the Carso front. 

Everywhere along the whole Italian front the enemy 
is on the defensive. Though the Austrians still hold 
a small segment of Italian territory along the Tren- 
tino front, and make occasional offensive sallies, they 
are being each day more closely invested, and with 
the return of spring may be expected to be driven 
out. But the eyes of all Italy are turned towards 
the Carso front. Here by a series of hard, well-directed 
blows, the Italians have forged ahead and will con- 
tinue to do so. Trieste at the present writing Kes not 
much more than twelve miles beyond the ItaUan ad- 
vance positions. The enveloping movement which 
General Cadorna is executing it is hoped will spare 
Trieste from destruction, at the same time placing 
it safely within Italian hands, as the troops push ahead 
towards Istria to complete the task of ''redemption" 
of the northeastern Adriatic. 

In the Balkan war zone Italy is pursuing consis- 



298 GREATER ITALY 

tently her new plan of an energetic prosecution of the 
war, not merely by sending a strong force to co-operate 
with the Allied armies assembled at Salonika, but 
has undertaken the task of opening a road across 
Epirus to form a junction with the AlUed armies, 
pushing northward into Serbia. During the first week 
in October (1916), it was announced that a consider- 
able ItaHan force had landed at Santi Quaranta, 
north of the island of Corfu, and was proceeding 
rapidly northward towards the lake of Prespa across 
the Albanian frontier where it had come in contact 
with the Alhed forces. 

The unity of front is now becoming a reality. Italy 
is closely co-operating with the Allies in the conduct 
of the campaign, and though great obstacles still 
remain to be surmounted, the Italian people look 
forward with full confidence in their armies to attain 
the principal object of their participation in the war; 
the redemption of the Trentino and the Italian lands 
of the Eastern Adriatic. 

It would be too dogmatic an explanation of the 
decisive step the new National Ministry was to take 
in regard to its relations with Germany to state that 
it spontaneously declared war on Germany. The 
preparation for this event had been slowly and cov- 
ertly proceeding under the Salandra Government. 
One by one the bonds which bound Italy to Germany 
had been severed. The process was perhaps over- 
cautious, and during many months kept Italy in a 
false position. It must, however, be recalled that it 
was a current behef among many Italians, during the 
greater part of the first year of their war, that inasmuch 
as the entire ItaUan economic structure rested on Ger- 



ITALY AT WAR 299 

man foundations, a drastic severing of all connection 
with Germany would inevitably lead to a catastrophe. 
But when the ItaUans realised that they could carry 
on their industrial and commercial life as well, if not 
better, alone than under German tutelage, they pro- 
ceeded patiently and thoroughly to eliminate German 
influence and control. 

Italy throughout her conduct of foreign affairs 
since August, 1914, had shown a marked capacity for 
safeguarding her paramount interests and for visual- 
ising clearly her national needs. Her policy has been 
strikingly free from rash and immature decisions. 
When Italy was ready, and not before, she followed 
to its logical end the other great object for her entry 
into the war — the emancipation of Italy from Ger- 
man control. 

Therefore the declaration of war against Germany 
on August 28, 1916, came as no great surprise in Italy. 
The justifications for the step were not lacking. Ger- 
many had from the outset of hostilities furnished 
great assistance to her Austrian ally in the campaign 
against Italy. During the recent offensive in the 
Trentino German guns and German shells contributed 
largely to the success which the Austrians were able 
to obtain. But further than this, Germany had broken 
her agreement entered into with Italy in May, 1915, 
and had stopped the payment of pensions due to 
Italian workmen. But these excuses were a mere 
formahty embodied in the official declaration of war. 
The real cause lay deeper. Italy had thrown in her 
lot with the nations who were opposing the spread of 
Pan-Germanism. Italy had for twenty years lived 
under its influence, and knows more thoroughly than 



300 GREATER ITALY 

any of the other belligerents the dangers to national 
independence to which this vassalage may lead. To 
emancipate herself from German influence, to become 
a free and powerful agent in the affairs of the world, 
is one of the chief underlying causes for the Itahan 
declaration of war on. Germany. 

Whatever may have been the motives of the Gov- 
ernment in openly breaking off all connections with 
Germany, the declaration of war was to prove an 
important step towards the increase of Italian prestige 
and independence. Italy was now to be received on 
terms of intimacy, confidence, and equality by the 
Allied Powers. The Quadruple Alliance was a fait 
accompli. The last ties which bound Italy formally 
to Germany were severed. Henceforth no loyal ItaUan 
could maintain friendly relations with Germany with- 
out being a traitor to his country. 

For the people of Italy the future has much in store. 
The pathway to a Greater Italy lies open. By pur- 
suing the cautious, clear-sighted, constructive policy 
which Baron Sonnino has so consistently followed 
it would appear probable that the '^ greater destinies" 
of Italy are on the eve of fulfilment. The apparent 
ehmination of Greece from- the participation in the 
affairs of the ^gean and the Adriatic has greatly 
simpUfied a problem the solution of which would 
have caused much vexation. Italy may now assert 
openly, without undue clandestine bickering, her 
claims to a share of dominance in the eastern ^gean. 
Serbia, for the time being, no longer exists as an in- 
dependent State. It would be premature to predict 
an immediate and vigorous revival of Pan-Serb as- 



ITALY AT WAR 301 

pirations. The drain of the present struggle will have 
been too great for the Serbs to reassert any unreason- 
able claims to national expansion, in the immediate 
future. Italy at all events can afford to be magnan- 
imous towards her stricken neighbour in the Eastern 
Adriatic. 

Is it too soon to speak of victory? 

Whatever may be the decision arrived at on the 
field of battle, whatever may be the fate that befalls 
Italian arms, Italy has already won a great victory. 
For she is fighting not solely for the aggrandisement 
of her territory nor the increase of her wealth: she 
is fighting for the greatness of her national soul; not 
exalted by any chimerical idealism, not in pursuit 
of some high-sounding phrasemaker's catchword such 
as ''humanity" or ''civilisation," but as an upholder 
of the right of nationhood she is helping to bring once 
again peace, security, and liberty to Europe. 



INDEX 



Abruzzl. Duke of tbe, Italian Ad- 
miral, 125. 

Abyssinia, 40, 235 ; "Green Book " on 
War with, 72 ; Military strength of, 
64: War with. 63-66, 70. 

Adalla Railway, Concession of, 137, 
196, 235. 

Adis Ababa, Treaty of, 70-71. 

Adriatic, Geographical survey of, 
208-209; Italianism of, 210; The 
Slavs of, 27, 211, 215; Italian policy 
of expansion in, 227, 231, 233; Rus- 
sian proposal of territorial distri- 
bution in Eastern, 231; Gabriel 
d'Annunzio, regarding, 218; see also 
under Francis Ferdinand and Irre- 
dentism. 

Aehrenthal, Baron von Oater Count), 
Austro-Hungarian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by, 214-215; 
Railway concession through Saniak 
of Novi Bazar, 102; Meeting of, 
with di San Guliano, 109; Attitude 
of, during Italo-Tvu-kish War, 125- 
126. 

Mge&n Islands, see Rhodes. 

Agadlr (1911), 110, 117. 

Agriculture, 145. 

Albania, Inviolability of, 136; Es- 
tablishment of Kingdom of, 157; 
Bank of, 196; Defimct state, 228. 

Alexandra, Queen of England, 106. 

Algeciras Conference (1906), 100-101, 
110, 117. 

Allegemeiner Deutscher Schulverein, 
28. 

Alpini. 154. 273, 275. 

Amadeus VIII, Duke of Savoy, 
elected Pope (1439), 87. 



AndrSasy, Coimt, 11. 

Annuario Statistico Italiano, quoted, 
144. 

Annimzlo. Gabriel d", 218; Character 
of, 257-258; Italian intervention in 
European War championed by, 
258; Speech of, at Quarto. 268; Re- 
ception of, at Rome. 261; Accuses 
Giolitti and Pro-Germans. 362-363; 
Triumph of. 264-266, 276. 

Argentine Republic, ItaUan emigra- 
tion to, 144. 

Army, Constitution of, 154; Credits 
for, 50; Increase of, 39; Service in, 
155; Condition of, at outbreak of 
European War, 250, 269; Shortage 
of supplies and munitions of. 279. 

Asinari di Bemezzo, Italian General, 
107. 

AsQuith, Mr., British Prime Minister; 
282. 

Augustus Caesar. 210. 

Austria. Attitude of, towards Pied- 
mont (1859), 2; Belations with, 
15. 

Austria-Hungary, Army manoeuvres 
of, 101,214; Attitude of at Algeciras. 
100-101; Unfriendly attitude of, 
101-103, 107; Annexation of Bosnia 
by, compensations therefor to Italy. 
105 ; Amelioration of relations with. 
109. 136; PoUcy of, during Italo- 
Turkish War, 125-126; Policy of, 
re Albania, 135-136. 213; In Adri- 
atic, see under Francis Ferdinand; 
German ascendency in, 217, 260; 
War declared by Italy against, 265 ; 
see also under European War, Cen- 
tral Powers, 

Avlona, 213, 228, 229, 230. 



303 



304 



INDEX 



Bagdad Railway, 137. 

Baldissera, General, 65, 68-70. 

Balkans, Violation of status quo in, by 
Austria, 102-103; Austro-Italian 
agreement regarding, 109, 125-126 
and note, 253 ; War in, 130-132, 138, 
224; Austrian plans in, 211-212; see 
under Eiiropean "War, Balkans. 

Banca Commerciale, Establishment of, 
186; German control of, 190; Con- 
trol over Italian joint stock com- 
panies gained by, 192; Favours 
German firms and products, 192; 
Increase in affairs of, 191; Influ- 
ence of, over press, 194; Interfer- 
ence of, in home and foreign poli- 
tics, 195-196, 203. 

Baratieri, General, 62-65. 

Barrfire, French Ambassador, 251. 

Bava-Beccaris, General, 80. 

Belgium, Relations of, with Papacy, 
163, 177; Influence of, on Italian 
public opinion in 1915, 246. 

Benedict XV, 'Pope, Election of, 171- 
173; Biography and qualifications 
of, 173-175; First encycUcal of, 176; 
Policy of, during European War, 
176-179; Conflict of, with Quir- 
inal, 179-183. 

Benghazi, Battle for, 121. 

Berchtold, Count, Austrian Foreign 
Minister, 138. 

Berlin, Congress of, 11, 25, 130; 
Right conferred on Austria to 
police Montenegrin waters, by, 
rescinded, 209. 

Berlin, Treaty of, 105. 

Bersaglieri, see under Army. 

Bertolini, M., Italian delegate. Treaty 
of Lausanne, 131. 

Beyrout, Bombardment of, 129. 

Bismarck, Count Herbert, 49. 

Bismarck, Prince, 6; Crispi's first 
visit to (1877), 10; Attitude of, to- 
wards Italy in Triple Alliance, 15, 
41, 42, 44; Crispi's second visit to 
(1887), 46-48; Relations of, with 



Leo XIII, 165-166; Concerning 

Mediterranean policy of Italy, 114; 

Policy of, re Trieste, 221, 222 note. 

240. 
Bissolati, M., Socialist Deputy, 283; 

Cabinet Minister, 295. 
Borgia, Lucrezia, 33. 
BoseUi, M., Italiaii Premier (1916), 

forms National Ministry, 295, 296; 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11, 25. 

Annexation of, by Austria (1908), 

103, 105, 216. 
Boxer Uprising, 82. 
Brassier, de St. Simon, Prussian 

Minister, 219. 
Briand, M., French Premier, visits 

Rome, 281. 
Brusati, General, 286 and note, 294. 
Brusilof, Russian General, 293. 
BtUow, Prince von, German Imperial 

Chancellor, Mission of, to Rome, 

249-250; Residence of, at Rome, 

200, 203; Pressure exerted in Italy 

by, 204, 260. 262, 271. 



Cadoma, Count Lulgi, Chief of the 
Italian General Staff, 239, 252; 
Personality and work of, 270-271 ; 
Plan of campaign of, 272, 276; In 
Paris and London, 281-282, 284; 
Takes personal command in Tren- 
tino, 286, 287-292; Constitutes new 
army, 287; Defeat of Austrians by, 
292, 293; Criticism of, 294; Pre- 
pares Carso offensive, 296; Cap- 
tures Gorizia, 296-297. 

Cadoma, Raffaele, General, Captures 
Rome, 159, 270. 

Caesar, 33. 

CsetanI di Sermoneta, Duke, Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 73, 75. 

Canada, Italian emigration to, 144. 

Caneva, General, 132, 138. 

Canevaro, Count, Admiral and Ital- 
ian Foreign Minister, 71, 82. 



INDEX 



305 



Caprivi, Count, German Imperial 
Chancellor (1890), 52. 

Carnot, M., President of French" Re- 
public, Assassination of, 61. 

Carthage, S.S. Incident, 127-128 and 
note, 135. 

Caux, Peace negotiations at, 132. 

Cavallotti, M., Italian Radical lead- 
er, 77. 

Cavour, Count, Meeting of, with 
Napoleon III, 1; Plans for Italian 
unity of, 2, 87; Character of, 45; 
PoUcy, re Papacy, 163-164; Letter 
to, 219. 

Cellini, Benvenuto, 33. 

Central Powers, see under Austria- 
Hxmgary, Germany, and European 
War. 

Charles Albert, King of Piedmont, 
85, 88. 

Charles, Francis Joseph, Archdiike, 
285. 

Chemical industries, 147. 

Chlala, quoted, 73, 221. 

Chiesa, Cardinal della, see Benedict 
XV. 

Chotek, Countess, see Duchess of 
Hohenberg. 

Cicero, 33. 

Coatit, 62. 

Colombia, Italy secures redress from, 
82. 

Conrad von Hotzendorf, Baron, 
Chief of the Austrian General 
Staff, 126, 138, 214, 239, 268; Plan 
of invading Italy of, 284-285. 

Co-operative societies, 145. 

Corradini, E., quoted. 111. 

Corti, Count, 11. 

Crete, ItaUan participation in affairs 
of, 71, 76. 

Crime, decrease of, 152. 

Crispi, Francesco, Tour of Eiu-ope of 
(1877), 10, 191; First Ministry of 
(1887), 44; Character of, 45^6; 
Visit of, to Bismarck (1887), 46-47; 
At Berlin, 51 ; And Triple Alliance, 



46-47, 52, 56-57; Colonial policy 
of, 53-55, 62, 66-67, 70-71; Re 
armaments, 50; Relations of with 
France, 10, 50, 51 ; Re Tripoli, 55, 
115, 121; Retires from office, 56; 
Second Ministry of, (1893), 61; 
Suppression of irredentist propa- 
ganda by, 62; Re Abyssinia, 54, 62- 
65; Overthrow of , 66-67, 134; Per- 
secution of, ,72, 77, Economic pol- 
icy of, 186. 



Dante, 33. 

Dante Aligheri Society, Objects of, 
31. 

Dardanelles, Closing of, 129-130, 132. 

Delcasse, M., French Foreign Min- 
ister, quoted, 116. 

Depretis, M., Italian Premier, 9, 23, 
59. 

Diocletian, 210, 261. 

Dodecanese, see under Rhodes. 

Dogali, Defeat at (1887), 40; Influ- 
ence of, on Triple Alliance, 43. 

Dual Monarchy, see under Austria- 
Hungary. 



Education,' 153. 

Edward VII, King of England, 106. 

Electrical Power, Development of, 
146, 194 and note. 

Emigration, Cause of, 143; Distribu- 
tion of, 144. 

Emilia, United to Italy, 5. 

England, Attitude of, towards Italy, 
3, 8, 10, 11, 14, 163; Re Egypt, 17 
18; Understanding with, re Medi- 
terranean, 44, 74; Tension between 
Italy and, 72; Co-operation in 
Greece with, 76; Policy of, re 
Morocco, 100, 110; Attitude of, 
during Bosnian crisis, 103; Friendly 
relations with, 106; Attitude of, re 
Tripoli, 111, 115, 116, 120; Atti- 



306 



INDEX 



tude of, towards Italy, re Libyan 
War, 120, 129, 135; Re occupation 
of Rhodes, 137; Diplomatic mis- 
sion of, to the Vatican, 178; see also 
under European War, The Allies. 
Enver Bey, 124. 

Eritrea, Expedition to, 39-40; Bound- 
ary of, 71; Population of, 156; 
Trade and commerce of, 156; 
Railways of, 157, see under Abys- 
sinia.? 
European War — 

Balkans: Occupation of Avlona by 
Italians, 228; Territorial de- 
mands of Italians in, 229-233; 
Protests of Jugo-Slavs, 234-235; 
Austrian invasion of Serbia 
(1915), 248; Austrians driven 
from, 250; Austro-German in- 
vasion of (1916), 280; Fall of 
Cettinje, 280; Serbs rescued by 
Italians, 280-281 ; allied expedi- 
tion to Salonika, 281; Disasters 
to Allied arms in, and effect in 
Italy. 282-283; Italy declares war 
on Bulgaria, 279 ; ItaUan Partic- 
ipation in Campaign, 298. 
Central Powers: Failure of, to no- 
tify Italy of proposed attack on 
Serbia, 238; Summon Italy to 
give aid, 239; Italy declares neu- 
trality, 239; Desire of, to secure 
permanent Italian neutrality, 
241; Vienna and Rome take up 
negotiations, re compensations, 
229, 248; Rupture of Austro- 
Italian alliance, 253; War de- 
clared by Italy against Austria, 
265 ; Rupture of diplomatic rela- 
tions by Italy with Germany and 
consequences to, 276-277, 279, 
280; Opposition to Italian decla- 
ration of war against Germany, 
282-283; German Attack on Ver- 
dim, 283; Success in Balkans of, 
284; Austrian preparations for 
invasion of Italy (1916), 282- 



286; Battle of the Trentino, 287- 
292; ItaUan declaration of war 
against Germany (August 28, 
1916), 299-300. 

The Allies {France, Great Britain, 
and Russia) : Assistance of Italian 
neutrality to, 239-240; Russian 
victories and reverses, 250-251; 
Terms proposed by, to Italy, 
231-233; Secvu-e participation of 
Italy |in war, ?251 ; Distrust of 
Italian policy, 252, 277, 279; 
France repiilses assault at Ver- 
dxm, 283; Russia, 284, 293; Close 
co-operation of Italy with, 298- 
300. 

Italy : Not notified of plans of her 
Allies, 238; Declares neutrality, 
239; Negotiations of, with Aus- 
tria, 229, 248; Occupation of 
Avlona by, 228; Rupture of Alli- 
ance with Austria by, 253; De- 
clares war on Austria (May 24, 
1915), 265; Plan of campaign, 
271, first phases, 272, trench-war- 
fare, 273, Alpine warfare of, 273, 
275, Morale of annies of, 275 ; Ter- 
ritorial conquests of, dvutog first 
six months, 276 ; Declares war on 
Turkey (August 21, 1915), 278; 
Shortage of munitions in, 279; 
Declares war on Bulgaria (Octo- 
ber, 1915), 279; Seizure of Ger- 
man ships by, 280; Adheres to 
Pact of London, 280; Occupation 
of Durazzo by, 280; Rescue of 
Serbs by, 280-281 ; Delegates of, 
attend Paris Conference (1916), 
281; Attitude of Official Social- 
ists in, 283 ; Threatened invasion 
of, 285; Enemy preparations 
against, 286; Battle of the Tren- 
tino, 287-292; National Ministry 
in, 290-291 ; Campaign of, on the 
Isonzo, 283-296, Gorizia cap- 
tured by, 296-298; Declares war 
on Germany (Augiist 28, 1916) 



INDEX 



307 



299 ; Participation of, in Balkan 
campaign (October, 1916), 298. 
Papacy: Policy of, towards bellig- 
erents, 175-176; Favours Cen- 
tral Powers, 177, 243; England 
and, 178; Re Italy, 179-180; 
France and, 182."' 
Ex-diplomat, quoted, 43 and not«. 



Vlllafranca, 4; Visit of, to Trieste 
(1882), 18; At Venice, 23; In Ty- 
rol, 101; Receives Italian Foreign 
Minister, 109. 

Franco-Prussian War (1870), 6, 162. 

Frederick, German Emperor, Death 
of, 47. 

Fuslnato, M., Italian Delegate, 131. 

Futurism, 32 «t seq. 



Fahreddln Bey, Tiu-kish Delegate, 
132. 

Felix V, Pope, see under Amadeus 
VIII. 

Ferrero, G., Italian Historian, quoted, 
96 note. 

Fortis, M., Italian Premier, 97. 

France, Relations of, with Piedmont, 
2-4; African policy of, 12; Acquisi- 
tion of Timls by, 12-14, 75; Italian 
difficulties with, 44, 50-51, 59, 61; 
Russian relations with, 58; Liqui- 
dates Italian securities, 60; Co- 
operates with Italy, re Crete, 71; 
Friendly relations with, 72, 74-75, 
99; Be Morocco, 100-101, 110-111. 
117; Be TripoU and Libyan War, 
111-114, 116-117, 120; attitude of, 
re S.S. Carthage and Manouba inci- 
dent, 127-128 and note; Recogni- 
tion of ItaUan sovereignty over 
Libya by, 133. Relations of, with 
Vatican, 160, 161-162; Severs dip- 
lomatic relations with Vatican, 170; 
Benedict XV and, 176-177, 182, 
see also under Em-opean War, The 
Allies. 

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, Re 
temporal power of Papacy, 101- 
102; Slav policy of, 211, 215, 218; 
Anti-Italian policy of, 102, 212, 
214, 218, 223; Meeting of, with Ger- 
man Emperor at Konopischt, 225 
and note; Visit to Bosnia of, 226; 
Assassination of, 226, 228. 

Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria. 
Meeting of, with Napoleon III at 



Galileo, 33. 

Garibaldi, Sails from Quarto, 5. 258; 
In the Trentino, 23, quoted, 25, 88; 
Attempts to captiu-e Rome. 160- 
162. 

Genoa, Duke of, 84. 

Genoa, Port of, 194; British Squadron 
at. 106. 

George, Prince, of Greece, 72. 

Germans of Tyrol, 28. 

Germany, 60; Relations with, 73-75 • 
At Algeciras Conference, 100-101, 
117; Be Tripoli, 117-118; Attitude 
of, during Libyan War, 126, 135; 
Commercial relations with, 148; 
And the Vatican, 177, 179; Peace- 
ful penetration by, 185, 187-189; 
And Banca Commerciale, 190-196; 
Ascendency of, in Italy, 197; At- 
tempts to dominate Italian aflfairs, 
203 ; Future relations with, 206, see 
also under Eiiropean War. Central 
Powers. 

Giolittl, Giovanni, Italian Premier, 
Birth and early years of, 92-93; 
Fh-st Ministry of (1892), 58; Policy 
of, 51-61; Second Ministry of, 94; 
Control over Chamber by, 95-96; 
Retires from office (1905), 97-98; 
Third Ministry of, 99, 102, 106; 
Again retires (1909), 108; Fovu-th 
Ministry of, 109; Growing opposi- 
tion to, 110; Be Tripoli, 112-113; 
Quoted, 134; Resigns (1914), 139, 
238; Survey of dictatorship of, 138- 
139; Relations of with Banca Com- 



308 



INDEX 



merciale, 196, 203; Neutrality ad- 
vocated by, 243; Opposes Italian 
participation in war, 260; Resigna- 
tion of Government forced by, 
262; Accused of being a traitor, 
263; Is compelled to leave Rome, 
263-264; The parecchio of, 266, 
268; Present position of, 295. 

Giotto, 33. 

Goethe, 199. 

Goltz, von der, Pasha, 124. 

GoluchowsM, Count, Austro-Hun- 
garian Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, 74, 213. 

Gorizia, Conquest of (1916), 296. 

Great Britain, see under England. 

Greece, Cretan difaciolties of, 132, 
137; Elimination of, 300. 

Grey, Sir Edward, British Foreign 
Secretary, 137. 



Hamburger Nachrichten, quoted, 41 
note. 

Helena, Princess of Montenegro, 
Marriage of, to Victor Emmanuel, 
later Kmg of Italy (1896), 75, 212. 

Henry, Prince, of Prussia, 49. 

Hohenberg, Duchess of, 211; death 
of, 226. 

Hohenlohe, Prince, Governor of 
Trieste, 218, 227. 

Humbert, The Whitehanded, Pound- 
er of the House of Savoy, 86. 

Humbert I, King of Italy, 51, 59, 67, 
74; Priendsliip of, for Germany, 
76;'Death of (1900), 83; Reign of, 
83-85, 90. 



Irish Revolution (1916), 178. 

Iron and Steel, 147. 

Irredentism, Growth of, 24; Active 
agitation of, 25-26; Change in 
objective of, 31-32; Suppression of, 
52; Revival of, 219, 256. 

Ischia, Earthquake at, 83. 



Isvolsky, M., Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, 102 ; Quoted, 228. 

Italia irredenta, definition of, 21-24; 
Redemption of, 279, 296. 

Italy, Area, population, vital statis- 
tics of, 141-143. 



Jagow, von, German Ambassador, 106. 
Jugo-Slavs, see under Pan-Serbs. 



Karageorgevich, Ruling dynasty of 
Serbia, Contemplated overthrow 
of, 225. 

Karamanli, Hassuna Pasha, Tripoli- 
tan Sheik, 55, 115, 121. 

Kassala, 62, 70-71. 

King, Bolton, Italy To-day, quoted, 
80 and note. 

Kulturkampf, 165. 

Kxmflda, Naval engagement at, 129. 



Launay di, M., Italian Ambassador, 
42. 

Lausanne, Treaty of (1912), 131-133, 
196. 

Law of Guarantees, ' provisions of, 
162-163; proposal to international- 
ise, 167-168; Papacy and, 169, 
171; Present status of, 180, 183. 

Lega Nazionale, 31. 

Leo XIII, Pope, Election of, 164; At- 
titude towards Italy, ^,164, 166; 
Death of (1903), 168. 

Libya, Annexation of, 124; Area, etc., 
of, 156, see also under Tripoli. 

Lombardy, Liberation of, 3. 

Loubet, President of French Re- 
public, Visit to Rome of, 99, 170. 

Luzzatti, Italian Premier, 108-109. 



MachiaveUi, 33; Quoted, 19. 
Mackensen, von, German Field-Mar- 
shal, 280. 



INDEX 



309 



Magenta, Battle of (1859); 3, 106, 
185. 

Makallg, Siege of, 63. 

Malaria, Prevalence of, 143. 

Mangasha, Ras, 62, 70. 

Manin, at Venice, 85. 

Manouba, S.S., see Carthage'. 

Marches, The, United to Italy, 5. 

Margherita, Queen of Italy, Marriage 
of, to King Humbert, 84; Quoted, 
84; Personality of, 84. 262. 

Marinetti, M., 36. 

Maximilian, Son of the Duchess of 
Hohenberg, 226. 

MazzLni, 45, 84, 145; Struggles of, 
at Rome, 160. 

McClure, W. K., Italy in North Af- 
rica, quoted, 67, 120. 

Menelek, Ascends Abyssinian throne, 
54; Treaty of UcciaUl denounced by, 
62; Attacks Italian forces, 63; De- 
feats Italians at Adua, 65-66; 
Peace negotiations of, with Italy, 
69-71. 

Mentana, Battle of (1867), 161. 

Merchant Marine, 148. 

Mercier, Cardinal, Primate of Bel- 
gium, 177. 

Merry del Val, Cardinal, Papal Sec- 
retary of State, 174. 

Messina, Earthquake at, 104. 

Milan, Disturbances at, 78-81. 

Mines and Minerals, 146. 

Modane, Race riots at, 51. 

Modernism, Suppression of, 169, 176. 

Monte Rotondo, Battle of (1867), 
161. 

Montenegro, 132, 136, 137. 

Morocco, see under France. 

Mulla, Diamilla, 114- note. 



Naby Bey, Turkish delegate, 132. 
Naples, 49; United to Italy, 5; flrst 

port of Italy, 148. 
Napoleon, 236. 
Napoleon III, at Plombieres, 1; In- 



terest of, in Italian unity, 2; Cam- 
paign of, in co-operation with 
Piedmont against Austria, 3-4, 88; 
Meeting of, with Francis Joseph at 
Villafranca, 4; Defeats Italian at- 
tempts to take Rome, 161-162; In- 
fluence of, in Italy, 240, 246. 

National Debt, 151; Conversion of, 
152. 

NationaUsm, 20-21, 111-113. 

Navy, 155. 

Near Eastern Question, see Balkans. 

Nerazzini, Doctor, ItaUan Envoy to 
Abyssinia, 70. 

Nice, ceded to France, 4. 

Nicholas, King of Montenegro, 212. 

Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, Visit of, 
to Italy, 106-107, 223. 

Nigra, Count, Italian Ambassador, 
quoted, 26. 

Nuova Antologia, quoted, 43 note. 



Oberdank, W., 18. 

Oddone, Count of Savoy, 86. 

Otranto, Channel of, Italian policy, 

re, 137. 
Ottoman Empire, see Turkey. 
Oudinot, General, 160. 



Pan-Germanic movement, 28, 99; Be 
Adriatic, 208, 219-221 ; Methods of, 
186-189; Italy and, 190-205. 

Pan-Serbs, Programme of, 216-217; 
Disavowed by Russia, 231; Proc- 
lamation of, 234. 

Panther, at Agadir, 110. 

Papacy, Bismarck and, 15; Loss of 
temporal powers of, 159-162; 
Struggle of, to regain temporal 
rights, 102, 166, 176; PoUcy of, re 
Italy, 163, 165-167, 169, 176; Pro- 
posal of, to remove abroad, 165, 
179, 183; Proposal to internation- 
alise jxirisdiction over, 167, 171; 
Suspends non expedit, 97, 169; Be 



310 



INDEX 



Albania, 213, see also under Euro- 
pean War. 

Patris, Italian Admiral, takes pos- 
session of Avlona on behalf of 
Italy (1914). 228. 

Pecci, Cardinal, see Leo XIII. 

Pellagra, Prevalence of, 143. 

Pelloux, General, Italian Premier, 
80-82. 

Petrarch, 33. 

Piedmont, Relations of, with France, 
2-4, 88; With Prussia, 5-7; Kernel 
of Italian imity, 5 ; Under House of 
Savoy, 87; Loss of ascendency of, 
9, 89; Attitude of, re Italian inter- 
vention in European War, 245. 

Pius IX, Pope, First driven from 
Home, 160; Refuses to renounce 
temporal power, 159; Loss of sov- 
ereignty by, 162; Prisoner in the 
Vatican (1870), 160; Ignores Law 
of Guarantees, 163; Death of, 164. 

Pius X, Pope, Policy of, 168-171. 

Poincarg, M., French Premier, 99. 

Pope, see Pius IX, Pius X, Leo XIII, 
Benedict XV. 

Postal Service, 149. 

Preziosi, G., La Germania alia Con- 
quista deU'Italia, 191 note; Quoted, 
196, et seq, 

Prinetti, M., Italian Foreign Min- 
ister, quoted, 117. 

Prinzivalll, L'ltalia nella sua Vita 
Economica, quoted, 150 note. 

Prussia, Relations with Piedmont of, 
5-7, 99, 245; Re Papacy, 163; Be 
city of Trieste, 220-221. 



Quarto, 5, 258. 

Quirinal, King of Italy first takes up 
residence at, 162. 



Railways, Mileage of, 149. 
Rampolla, Cardinal, Papal Secre- 



tary of State, 168, 173-174; Friend 
of France, 176. 

Re-Insurance Treaty (1884), 41 and 
note, 68. 

Reshid Pasha, signs Treaty of Lau- 
sanne, 132. 

Rhodes, Italian occupation of, 130, 
137; Development of, by Italy, 157. 

Ricci, Borea, Italian Admiral, 121. 

Roberts, Field Marshal Lord, quoted, 
122. 

Robilant, Coimt di, Italian Foreign 
Minister, Policy of, re Triple Al- 
liance, 42. 

Rocco di Sanfermo, Count, 237. 

Roman Question, 163, 167, 169, 177, 
180, 183; See Papacy. 

Rudini, Marchese di, Italian Premier. 
57-58; Second Ministry of, 67; 
Policy of, re Abyssinia, 68-71; 
Persecution of Crispi by, 72, 77; 
Foreign policy of, 72-74, 76; Weak- 
ness of, in home affairs, 76-77; 
And Milan disturbances, 78-79 ; Re- 
tirement of, 80. 

Rural Credit Banks, 145. 

Russia, Rapprochement of, with 
France, 68 ; Relations with, 72, 74- 
75, 102, 133, 216, 223; And Vati- 
can, 177; Terms offered by, to se- 
cure Italian intervention, 231; 
■See also under European War. The 
Allies, 



Sadowa, Battle of (1866), 6, 185. 

Said HaUm, Prince, 131. 

St. Francis of Assisi, 33. 

Salandra, Italian Premier, 238; Resig- 
nation of, 260; Forms new Min- 
istry, 264; Speech of, on the 
Capitoline, quoted, 267; Armed 
neutrality of, 269; Difficulties of, 
with Chamber, 276; Character of, 
277-278; Attends Paris Conference, 
281; Relations of, with Germany, 



INDEX 



311 



282, 293; Speech of, In Chamber, 
294; Second resignation of, 299. 
Sallsbiu-y, Lord, 76; Re Tripoli, 

quoted, 115, 118. 
Salonika, 43, 102-103, 126; Italy 
sends force to, 298. 

Salsa, Major, 69. 

Salvemini, Professor, 43 note. 

San Gmliano, Marchese dl, Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 109; 
Death of, 248. 

Sanjalc of Novi Bazar, 102-103. 

San Mim Bay, 82. 

Saracco, M., Ministry of, 83. 

Sarto, Cardinal, see Piiis X. 

Savings-Banks, 150. 

Savoy, House of, 60; Leaders of 
Italian unity, 5, 89, 184; Histor- 
ical survey of, 84-91. 

Sazonofl, M., Russian Foreign Min- 
ister, quoted, 228. 

Schleinltz, Prussian Foreign Minister, 
letter of, concerning Trieste, 219- 
221. 

Schwabach, Herr von, German finan- 
cier, 186. 

Scutari, 136. 

Sedan, Battle of (1870), 185. 

Serbia, 102, 103, 132, 137-138; R&- 
latlons of, with Austria, 2-3, 211; 
See also under Pan-Serbs and Euro- 
pean "War, Balkans. 

Sicily, Disturbances in, 61; Sul- 
phur mines in, 146. 

Solferlno, Battle of (1859), 3, 106, 185. 

Somaliland, Occupation of, 53; Eco- 
nomic status of, 157. 

Sonnino, Baron Sidney, Character of, 
98 and note, 203, 248; Premier, 98, 
108; And Triple AUiance. 203, 248; 
Sets forth Italian position, re neu- 
trality, 248; Receives Prince Biilow, 
249 ; Presents terms to Vienna, 250. 
Despatches note annulling Treaty 
of AlUance with Austria, 253-255; 
Relations of, with Salandra, 260, 
277. 295; Attends Paris Confer- 



ence (1916), 281; Policy of, 300; 

Quoted, 105, 248, 282. 
South of Italy, Economic conditions 

of, 145. 
Steed, Wickham, Hapsburg Monarchy, 

quoted, 222 note. 
Sildmark, 28. 



Taxation, 152. 

Telephones, telegraph, and wireless. 
Development of, 149-150. 

Ticino, Swiss Canton, 21. 

Tientsin, ItaUan concession at, 82. 

Tlrpitz, Grand Admiral von, 225 note. 

Titian, 33. 

TIttonI, Italian Foreign Minister, 94* 
97; Quoted, 103. 

Trenttao, Description of, 22, 24; 
Austrian persecution of Italians in, 
27; Battle of, see under European 
War. 

Trieste, 22, 138; Historical reference 
to, 22 note; Encroachments of 
Slavs in, 29-30; Population of, 215; 
Ville allemande, 219-221 ; Efforts to 
Germanise, 221-222. 

Triple Alliance, First negotiations of, 
14; Italy's share in, 14-15, 18; 
Date of signature of, 15; Terms of, 
16 and note; Renewal of (1887), 44, 
(1891), 57; Crispi and, 46-47, 52, 
56-57; Prolongation of (1896), 74- 
75 ; King Humbert, supporter of, 83 ; 
Giolitti and, 99, 138; Prolongation 
of, 101; Difficulties of, 102-103; 
Italy and, 105, 106, 185, 198; Be 
Balkans, 109, 125 note ; And Italian 
interests in the Mediterranean, 117; 
Loosening of bonds of, by Italy, 
135; Renewal of, eighteen months 
before expiration (1912), 136; And 
Triple Entente, re Mg.e&a. Islands, 
137; Baron Sonnino and, 203; De- 
noimced by Italy, to Austria, 252. 

Tripoli, Crispi's Interest in, 55, 115; 
Italian plans concerning, 100, 112, 



312 



INDEX 



114; Attitude of France re, 116, 
127, 135; German interest in af- 
fairs of, 113, 121, 124, 126; Nego- 
tiations •with England, re, 115, 117; 
Italian grievances in regard to, 118; 
Ultimatum to Turkey, re, 119; 
Opening of hostilities in, 120; 
Campaign in, 121; Annexation of, 
to Italy, 124; Treaty of Lausanne, 
re, 133. 

Tunis, Italian interest in, 12-14; 
Franco-ItaUan competition in, 12; 
Acquisition of, by France, 13, 116; 
Treaty, re, 75; And Tripoli, 116. 

Tiirin, International exhibition at, 
141. 

Turkey, War of, with Greece (1897), 
76; Relations of, with Italy, see 
under Tripoli and European War. 

Tuscany, United to Italy, 5. 



Uccialli, Treaty'of (1889), 54-55; De- 
nounced by Menelek, 62; Annul- 
ment of, 71. 

Umbria, United to Italy, 5. 

United States, Italian emigration to; 
144. 



Valerio, Lorenzo, 220. 

Vatican, see Papacy. 

Venetia, Annexation of, to Italy, 6; 

Attitude of, re war with Austria, 

245. 
Verdun, Battle of (1916), 292. 
Victor Emmanuel II, King of United 

Italy, 2, 6, 86-88; At Vienna, 23; 

.Government removed to Rome by, 

162; Death of, 25, 89; Monimaent 

to, 141. 
Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, 



Marriage of, 75; Early life and 
training of, 84-85; Liberal policy 
of, 90; Receives Tsar, 106; Atti- 
tude of, during crisis, re Eviropean 
War, 263-264; With his armies, 
270, 295. 

Villafranca, Armistice of, 4. 

Virgil, 33. 

Visconti Venosta, Marchess, Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 73, 76, 
82; Negotiations of, with Prance, 
re Timis, 115-116. 

Volpi, M., 131. 



Wickenberg, Count, 218. 

Wied, Prince William of. King of 
Albania, 224, 228. 

WUham I, German Emperor, Death 
of, 1888, 47. 

WUliam II, German Emperor, First 
visit of, to Italy (1888), 47-49; 
Receives King Humbert, at Ber- 
lin, 51; In Italy, 62, 73; At Tangier 
and consequences of visit of, 99- 
100; Personal propaganda of, in 
Italy, 199, 203; Encoiu-agement of 
German peaceful penetration by, 
189; Entertains Italian sovereigns 
at Kiel (1913), 136; Interview of, 
with Archduke Francis Ferdinand 
at Konopischt (1914), 225 and note ; 
Personal interest of, in Italian af- 
fairs (1914), 249. 



Young Turks, 118, 214. 



Zanardelli, M., Italian Premier, 94. 
Zanzur, Battle of (1912), 131. 
Ziirich, Treaty of, 4. 



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